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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses and critically evaluates an aspect of Karl Barth’s thought, the 
understanding of which is important to a broader understanding of Barth, his 
relationship to other (especially iconoclastic) thinkers, and his relevance for 
contemporary theology: his understanding and critique of idolatry and the idol. Chapter 
2 argues that it was revelation which both drove Barth’s idolatry-critique and 
determined his concepts of idolatry and the idol. It analyses Bath’s idolatry-critique as it 
was levelled against natural theology, and offers an evaluation of the picture of Barth’s 
thought which emerges. Chapter 3 analyses Barth’s idolatry-critique in relation to the 
doctrine of God. Directives which, for Barth, had to be adhered to within the 
development of the doctrine of God for the avoidance of idolatry, are discussed. Finally, 
an evaluation and critique of Barth’s critique of idolatry within the doctrine of God, and 
of his own adherence to these directives, is offered. Chapter 4 analyses the relationship 
of Barth’s idolatry-critique to his discussion of religion. It is shown that Barth, in his 
mature thought, criticised both the essence of religion and certain theological uses of the 
concept of religion as idolatry. Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry is itself subjected 
to critique, and the question of what bearing his critique of religion as idolatry ought to 
have for Christian, theological engagement with adherents of other world religions is 
taken up. Chapter 5 summarises and discusses further some of the findings and 
implications of this study. It is suggested that Barth’s thoroughly christological critique 
of idolatry (which is not without its own problems), in that it stands in contrast to the 
less particularistic forms of idolatry-critique set forth by several other modern scholars, 
raises the question of whether an idolatry-critique like his own might be called for 
within contemporary theology.  
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Chapter 1: Idolatry in the Theology of Karl Barth 
 
The critique of idolatry and of idols formed a significant part of the negative aspect of 
Karl Barth’s theology, from the time during which he was a liberal student of Herrmann 
until the end of his career. Indeed, everything which Barth would call sin in practical 
living, and which he sought to avoid in theology, he could also describe and critique as 
idolatry. Of course, this negative aspect of his thought, as with all negative aspects of it, 
was, and must be understood as, derivative of, and subservient to, his positive concerns: 
primarily, his commitment to rendering faithful testimony to the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ.  
 
1.1 The Value of Considering ‘Idolatry in the Theology of Karl Barth’ 
Nevertheless, the negative, iconoclastic aspects of Barth’s thought, and especially his 
critique of idolatry and the idol, merit detailed analysis for a number of reasons. In the 
first place, their consideration simply helps to understand Barth, who by all measures 
was one of the most important theologians of the 20th century, more fully. Derivative 
though they were, they were both integral to the structure of his thought (because of the 
very fact that they were for him necessary implications of the attempt to testify to 
revelation) and of great prominence in his (both intra- and extra-theological) polemical 
strategy.1 Any account of Barth’s overall project is simply incomplete without a careful 
analysis of the logic and function of the negative, iconoclastic aspects of his thought and 
rhetoric, among which the critique of idolatry played a dominating role.  
                                                          
1 Within theology, one may point to the way in which the critique of idolatry was utilised by 
Barth within the doctrine of God as a form of self-differentiation from and criticism of the doctrines of 
God of Protestant liberalism (see chapter 3). As an example of the way in which the critique of idolatry 
and the idol played an important role in Barth’s extra-theological polemical strategy, it is natural to think 
of Barth’s criticism of National Socialism (see chapter 2). 
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Secondly, Barth’s idolatry-critique must be understood in order that its cautions 
and admonitions to contemporary, constructive theology might be brought into view. If 
Barth by his idolatry-critique both explicitly and implicitly closed off certain paths, and 
pointed the way down other ones, for constructive theology (and he did), then the latter 
would do well to understand how and why he sought to do so, and to think carefully 
about whether and how these cautions and admonitions ought to be heeded. The present 
work will bring into view the explicit and the implicit warnings and admonitions of 
Barth’s critique of idolatry, identify their internal logic, and offer an evaluation of them, 
with a view toward understanding what their implications are and should be for 
contemporary theology. 
Thirdly, a consideration of Barth’s idolatry-critique provides direction for 
theology in its attempt to understand the nature of the critical, prophetic role that it must 
play, in relation to itself, in relation to the Church and her worship, and in relation to the 
world at large. If theology must, at least at times, still say ‘no,’ to itself, to the world, to 
the church, and to the individual (and indeed it must) then it must think carefully about 
why it must do this, when it must do it, and to what end. And if the critique of idolatry 
must play a part in theology’s exercise of this role (and obedience to Scripture demands 
this), then theology must seek to answer the questions of the nature of idolatry and the 
idol. Barth’s theology, particularly in its critique of idolatry, is exemplary in its 
fulfilment of this critical, prophetic role,2 and so a consideration of the negative aspects 
                                                          
2 Though this will be discussed further below, Barth’s prophetic stances vis-à-vis both the events 
surrounding WWI, and National Socialism and WWII, often expressed in the form of an idolatry-critique, 
are widely (and properly) extolled, and he is often recognised as having taken such stands even when 
many of his theological contemporaries did not. See, e.g., Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Remembering as a Moral 
Task: The Challenge of the Holocaust,’ in The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael 
Cartwright (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 331; Alister McGrath, ‘Reclaiming our Roots 
and Vision: Scripture and the Stability of the Christian Church,’ in Reclaiming the Bible for the Church, 
ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 77-78; Angela Dienhart 
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of Barth’s thought, and of his idolatry-critique in particular, must surely form an 
important part of contemporary theology’s attempt to think through these questions. 
Fourthly, an analysis of Barth’s idolatry-critique helps to situate Barth’s thought 
in relation to a number of other important negative and iconoclastic thinkers who loom 
large in contemporary thought, both in philosophy and theology. In mind here are 
figures like Nietzsche, Derrida, Levinas, Marion and other broadly ‘postmodern’ and 
anti-metaphysical thinkers. Previous works have sought to describe Barth’s relationship 
to these figures and others like them.3 They have, however, (as Ward notes4) often 
focussed almost exclusively upon Barth’s thinking as represented by Romans II. Often, 
they have not emerged out of a sustained analysis of Barth at all – his overall 
theological programme and his indebtedness to modern theology. Wood is right, in 
other words, to suspect that ‘in much talk of the ‘postmodern Barth’ the adjective is of 
far more interest than the noun.’5 Thus, the similarities which have been identified 
between Barth and these other thinkers seem (and perhaps are) rather forced, superficial 
and ultimately even trivial.6 What is needed if one is to understand Barth’s relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hancock, Karl Barth’s Emergency Homiletic, 1932-1933: A Summons to Prophetic Witness at the Dawn 
of the Third Reich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013). 
 
3 The major contributors to this effort include Richard H. Roberts (A Theology on its Way? 
Essays on Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991)), Hans Küng (‘Karl Barth and the Postmodern 
Paradigm,’ The Princeton Seminary Bulletin 9, 1 (1988): 8-31), David E. Klemm (‘Towards a Rhetoric of 
Postmodern Theology: Through Barth and Heidegger,’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, 
3 (1987): 443-469), Walter Lowe (Theology and Difference: The Wound of Reason (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1993)), Isolde Andrews (Deconstructing Barth: A Study of the Complementary 
Methods in Karl Barth and Jacques Derrida (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1996)), William Stacy Johnson (The 
Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1997)), and Graham Ward (Barth, Derrida, and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995)); ‘Barth, Modernity and Postmodernity,’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 274-295). 
 
4 Ward, ‘Barth, Modernity and Postmodernity,’ 279-280. Ward specifically mentions the work of 
Roberts, Klemm, Lowe and Webb (Refiguring Theology: The Rhetoric of Karl Barth (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991)). 
 
5 Donald Wood, Barth’s Theology of Interpretation (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 2. 
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to these figures and the tradition(s) to which they belong is, rather, a careful analysis of 
the negative aspects, and particularly the iconoclastic aspect, of Barth’s thinking, 
undertaken with careful attention to its place in Barth’s larger theological programme 
and to Barth’s indebtedness to quintessentially modern theologians like Albrecht Ritschl 
(1822-1889) and Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922). The present work seeks, in part, to 
contribute to such an analysis. 
 
1.2 The Aim and Plan of the Present Work 
In particular, it seeks to provide a comprehensive conceptual analysis of idolatry-
critique, idolatry, and the idol in Barth’s thinking across his career, and, at the 
appropriate points, an evaluation of the same. It emerges from a careful study of these 
concepts in Barth’s works from the time of his very early, pre-Marburg days, all the 
way until the end of his life, including, as will be seen, texts which rarely receive 
attention, particularly within English-language Barth studies. 
The present work will unfold across five chapters. This present introductory 
chapter will below analyse the most relevant secondary literature, and enumerate 
specifically some of the questions which this work seeks to answer which have, to this 
point, not been answered (or which have not been answered satisfactorily).  
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 analyse Barth’s understanding and critique of idolatry and 
the idol via analyses of the way in which Barth’s idolatry-critique was related to, and 
deployed within, his treatments of the doctrine of the knowledge of God (chapter 2), of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
6 It is, for example, a mischaracterisation of Barth’s discussion of the theological use of concepts 
to describe God in the CD II/1 to describe it, as does Ward (‘Barth, Modernity and Postmodernity,’ 285-
287, 289), as a proto-postmodern critique of the correspondence view of language and affirmation of non-
realism. Barth’s discussion, as will be seen, is an explicitly theological attempt (with reformation roots, 
even if his position is a radicalisation of the reformation position) to testify to the fact that, according to 
revelation, the noetic effects of human sin mean that the human being cannot think concepts such that 
they apply to God. Apparent overlap between this position and a general critique of the correspondence 
theory of language is superficial, at best.  
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the doctrine of God (chapter 3), and of religion and the religions (chapter 4). These 
chapters also help to uncover and evaluate the cautions and directives for contemporary 
theological engagement with these topics which are either explicit or implicit within 
Barth’s idolatry critique. 
Chapter 2 will analyse the relationship of idolatry-critique (and Barth’s thought 
on the nature of the idol and idolatry) to Barth’s doctrine of the knowledge of God 
across his career. It will there be argued that Barth’s idolatry-critique emerged, first and 
foremost, from his consideration of the question of the source of the knowledge of God 
– broadly understood. In particular, it will be argued that it was Barth’s positive 
conviction that the knowledge of God comes solely by the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ that drove his idolatry-critique, and that the fact that his idolatry-critique was so 
driven determined his understanding of the nature of idolatry and the idol. Because this 
is the case, in this chapter more than others, and especially in its discussion of the 
relationship between revelation and idolatry, a great deal will be said concerning the 
contours of Barth’s concepts of idolatry and the idol. Furthermore, it will be shown that 
the formal relationship between revelation and idolatry was such that material changes 
to Barth’s doctrine of revelation necessarily meant changes in the scope of his critique 
of idolatry. The chapter will also analyse Barth’s idolatry-critique as it was levelled 
against natural theology. Finally, it will offer a criticism of Barth’s idolatry-critique on 
the grounds that the understanding of revelation which drove it, and caused it to be 
levelled against all natural theology without distinction, cannot be fully accepted. 
Chapter 3 will analyse the relationship of Barth’s idolatry-critique (and his 
thought on the nature of the idol and idolatry) to the doctrine of God. It will be argued 
there that, for Barth, idolatry always contained both subjective and objective moments, 
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and that, within the doctrine of God, the subjective moment of idolatry (the utilisation 
of the wrong source for the knowledge and description of God) was called ‘speculation,’ 
and the inevitably resulting objective moment of idolatry (the possession of a doctrine 
of God of which God was not the object) was typically understood in terms of 
Feuerbach’s projection thesis. It will be argued that Barth held that all doctrines of God 
were, in the strict sense, idolatrous, but also that some – the ones which corresponded to 
revelation in the way proper to and possible for the created intellect – could avoid being 
only idolatrous. Several directives which Barth followed himself, which he implicitly or 
explicitly enjoined upon others, and which, according to him, had to be followed within 
the development of the doctrine of God for the avoidance of idolatry, will be discussed. 
Finally, an evaluation and critique of Barth’s critique of idolatry within the doctrine of 
God, and of his own adherence to these directives, will be offered. 
Chapter 4 will analyse the relationship of Barth’s idolatry-critique to his 
discussion of religion, focusing upon the seventh chapter of Barth’s Romans II and 
especially §17 of the CD I/2. The understanding of ‘religion’ of liberal Protestantism, 
from whence Barth’s own definition of religion was drawn, along with the liberal 
Protestant theological use of the concept of religion, which provided the main impetus 
for Barth’s own theological engagement with it, will be described. It will be shown that, 
in Romans II, Barth considered religion to have the potential to reveal idolatry, while in 
the CD I/2 religion simply was idolatry with no capacity to reveal itself, or anything 
else, as such. Thus, while in Romans II, Barth sought to criticise the idolisation of 
religion by liberal Protestant theology, in the CD I/2 he sought to criticise not only that, 
but also religion itself as being a form of idolatry.  Thus it will be argued that, contrary 
to much of the secondary literature, Barth’s evaluation of religion was much more 
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positive in Romans II than it was in the CD I/2. Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry 
will itself be subjected to critique. Finally, the question of what bearing his critique of 
religion as idolatry ought to have for Christian, theological engagement with adherents 
of other world religions will be taken up. 
Chapter 5 will discuss further some of the findings of this study. It will be 
suggested, further, that Barth’s thoroughly theological, christological, critique of 
idolatry, which stands in contrast to the less particularistic forms of idolatry-critique set 
forth by several other modern scholars, raises the question of whether an idolatry-
critique like his own might be called for within contemporary theology. 
 
1.3 The State of the Question 
Idolatry-critique and the concepts of idolatry and the idol in Barth have never before 
been subjected to a full-scale conceptual analysis, whether in English- or in German-
language scholarship.7 Treatments of these themes, in whatever format, have always 
been very limited in scope materially and (with one significant exception8) 
chronologically (whether limited to the consideration of one or two of Barth’s works, or 
to the consideration of Barth’s works within a narrow window of time). 
In English-language theology these themes have been taken up only rarely, and, 
for the most part, superficially. While there are numerous places in which English-
language commentators have noted the importance of one or more of these themes in 
                                                          
7 Perhaps the closest thing to a full-length engagement with these themes is Sabine Plonz’s, Die 
herrenlosen Gewalten: Ein Relektüre Karl Barths in befreiungstheologische Perspektive (Mainz: 
Matthias-Grünewald, 1995). Plonz’s main goal is, however, to understand Barth’s relationship to 
liberation theology, and not to provide a comprehensive systematic and conceptual analysis of the themes 
in question. 
 
8 The exception, it will be seen below, is van Wyk’s article, but his ability to consider his theme 
across Barth’s career came at the price of substantive engagement with Barth’s texts. As will be seen, his 
was a highly descriptive, survey approach. 
 
8 
 
 
 
Barth in passing, sustained engagement with them of any kind may be found in only 
two works: David Clough’s 2007 chapter ‘Karl Barth on Religious and Irreligious 
Idolatry,’9 and I.W.C. van Wyk’s 2007 article ‘‘God and the gods’: Faith and Human-
Made Idols in the Theology of Karl Barth.’10 
 Both of these works, but especially that of van Wyk, are quite descriptive in 
character. The overarching aim of Clough’s chapter seems to be to show that, ‘Barth’s 
account of idolatry is significant in identifying three unlikely and unsuspecting groups 
of idolaters.’11 Van Wyk’s article is a survey of the occasions upon which Barth took up 
the theme of ‘God and the gods,’ which aims to demonstrate that obedience to the first 
commandment was of importance to him throughout his career. Both van Wyk and 
Clough were undoubtedly successful in their aims: they have established both that the 
critique of idolatry was of great importance to him throughout his career, and that he 
directed it against unlikely groups. Their work needs to be supplemented, however, by a 
more complete conceptual analysis of idolatry-critique in Barth, and by further attention 
to the questions of the nature of the human act of idolatry and of the idol in his thinking. 
The present work seeks, as far as possible within the constraints with which it must 
operate, to provide a comprehensive conceptual account of idolatry-critique (and its 
function), idolatry and the idol in Barth.12  
                                                          
9 David Clough, ‘Karl Barth on Religious and Irreligious Idolatry,’ in Idolatry: False Worship in 
the Bible, Early Judaism, and Christianity, ed. Stephen Barton, (New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 213-227. 
 
10 I.W.C. van Wyk, ‘‘God and the gods’: Faith and Human-Made Idols in the Theology of Karl 
Barth,’ HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 63, 4 (2007): 1587-1612. 
 
11 Clough, ‘Karl Barth on Idolatry,’ 226. 
 
12 Of course, it will not be possible for the present work to be comprehensive in the sense of 
offering a direct analysis of all the specific ways in which the critique of idolatry functioned in Barth. It 
will, rather, analyse Barth’s understanding and critique of idolatry and the idol conceptually via analysis 
of Barth’s idolatry-critique as levelled at three important and broad theological topoi, taking the 
judgments derived from these latter analyses to be representative and descriptive of main features of the 
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   Furthermore, these two works do not engage substantively with many works of 
Barth’s which are of importance to a consideration of the themes here under discussion. 
While Clough engages with Barth’s writings substantively in a way in which van Wyk 
(whose survey approach prohibits such engagement) does not, the former limits that 
engagement mainly to Barth’s CD I/2 and II/1 (especially §17), while at times also 
referring to Romans II. Clough was unable to engage, for example, with the important 
unpublished §42.1 of the CD, which is entitled ‘Gott und die Götter,’13 and which only 
appeared in print after his chapter was published. Van Wyk’s article does speak briefly 
of the unpublished §42 but, once more, his survey approach does not allow for much 
substantive engagement with it. The little that he does say about it includes a crucial 
misunderstanding of its place in Barth’s thought on idolatry and the idol which wrongly 
minimises its importance; he suggests, for example, that the reason Barth’s unpublished 
§42 was not included in the Church Dogmatics was that he later realised (as evidenced 
by the doctrine of das Nichtige in §50) that gods and idols were ‘‘nothing’ really, and 
without the capacity to survive.’14  The present work emerges from a comprehensive, 
sustained analysis of Barth’s works, including the unpublished §42, and corrects this 
misunderstanding. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
way in which Barth’s idolatry-critique functioned, and idolatry and the idol were defined in his thinking, 
more broadly. 
 
13 It was not until 2014 that §42 was published, under the title, ‘Der Schöpfer und seine 
Offenbarung,’ as a part of the following volume: Karl Barth, Unveröffentlichte Texte zur kirchlichen 
Dogmatik (GA II.50), ed. Hinrich Stoevesandt and Michael Trowitzsch (Zurich: TVZ, 2014). It may be 
found on pages 5-304 of that volume. Through the present work this paragraph will continue to be 
referred to as the ‘unpublished §42,’ in reference to the fact that Barth himself chose not to publish it, and 
in order to distinguish it from the §42 which is found in the Church Dogmatics. ‘Gott und die Götter’ (9-
113) and ‘Der Glaube und die Weltanschauungen’ (113-304) are the titles of the two sub-sections which 
comprise the paragraph. The former will be focussed upon in the present work, and will be cited as ‘Gott 
und die Götter.’ 
 
14 Van Wyk, ‘Gatg,’ 1595. 
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 In spite of the differences between the present work and that of Clough and van 
Wyk, there are some basic material insights relevant to the former which emerge in the 
latter. These will be noted below. 
 The situation is slightly different within German-language scholarship, for there 
exists within it a slightly larger body of literature which treats of the relevant themes in 
Barth, some works within which contain more conceptual analysis than any works in 
English. Still, there exists no comprehensive, conceptual account of these themes within 
Barth. Of the relevant German literature – Fischer’s article ‘Götze des Bürgertums oder 
Herr der Welt? Die Theologische Revolution Karl Barths’ (1966),15 Stoevesandt’s 
article ‘Gott und die Götter’16 (1986), Plasger’s chapter ‘Das Bild und die Bilder: Im 
Gespräch mit Karl Barth zum Bilderverbot’ (2002),17 and several works (or parts of 
them) by Hailer (2003, 2006, 2013)18 – nearly all have a far narrower chronological 
scope, and a narrower or merely different focus materially, than the present work. The 
result is that a number of the questions that the present work will answer have not been 
answered previously, or have only been answered unsatisfactorily. 
 Fischer’s 1966 article, for example, was devoted to the description of a 
particular form of Barth’s idolatry-critique, namely his criticism of the idolatry of the 
bourgeoisie ‘Bindestriche-Christentum’ regnant between the two world wars. His 
                                                          
15 Joachim Fischer, ‘Götze des Bürgertums oder Herr der Welt? Die Theologische Revolution 
Karl Barths,’ Estudos Teológicos 6 (1966): 1-21. 
 
16 Hinrich Stoevesandt, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ Evangelische Theologie 46 (1986): 457-476. 
 
17 Georg Plasger, ‘Das Bild und die Bilder: Im Gespräch mit Karl Barth zum Bilderverbot,’ in 
Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen: Von der Weisheit des Bilderverbotes, ed. Jörg Schmidt (Wuppertal: 
Foedus-Verlag, 2002), 49-73. 
 
18 These years are meant to denote the following works by Martin Hailer, respectively: ‘Gott und 
die Götter: zum nachgelassenen §42 KD,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 19, 1 (2003): 60-79; Gott 
und die Götzen: Über Gottes Macht angesichts der lebensbestimmende Mächte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Rupert, 2006); ‘Gott und die Götter: Auseinandersetzung mit einem heiklen Thema, beraten von Karl 
Barth,’ in Gott - Götter - Götzen: XIV. Europäischer Kongress für Theologie (11.-15. September 2011 in 
Zürich), ed. Christoph Schwobel (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2013), 636-656. 
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consideration of Barth’s works was largely limited to six, each composed between the 
years 1919 and 1922: Romans I (1919), ‘Der Christ in der Gesellschaft’19 (1919), 
‘Biblische Fragen, Einsichten und Ausblicke’20 (1920), Romans II (1922), ‘Grundfragen 
der christliche Sozialethik’21 (1922), and ‘Das Wort Gottes als Aufgabe der 
Theologie’22 (1922). His account of matters, accurate as far its description went, but 
narrowly focussed as it was, did not attend sustainedly to the question of the nature of 
the idol or idolatry in Barth’s thinking, nor was his consideration of Barth’s idolatry-
critique comprehensive, either chronologically or materially. This meant, further, that he 
did not engage seriously with the question of development in Barth’s thinking on these 
matters across his career,23 and that he did not discuss the way in which idolatry-critique 
functioned at a number of important theological loci. 
 The 2002 chapter of Plasger is similar in that it focusses upon a certain form of 
Barth’s idolatry-critique, namely his discussion of the biblical prohibition of images, 
and that he does this through consideration of a small number of Barth’s works during a 
                                                          
19 Karl Barth, ‘Der Christ in der Gesellschaft,’ in Das Wort Gottes und die Theologie (Munich: 
Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1924), 33-69. English translation: ‘The Christian in Society,’ in The Word of 
God and Theology, trans. Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 31-70. 
 
20 Karl Barth, ‘Biblische Fragen, Einsichten und Ausblicke,’ in Das Wort Gottes und die 
Theologie (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1924), 70-98. English translation: ‘Biblical Questions, 
Insights and Vistas,’ in The Word of God and Theology, translated by Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 
2011), 71-100. 
 
21 Karl Barth, ‘Grundfragen der christliche Sozialethik: Auseinandersetzung mit Paul Althaus, 
1922,’ in Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922-1925 (GA III.19), ed. Holger Finze (Zurich: TVZ, 1990), 
39-57. English translation: ‘Basic Problems of Christian Social Ethics: Discussion with Paul Althaus,’ in 
The Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, vol. 1, trans. Keith Crim, ed. James Robinson (Richmond, VA: 
John Knox Press, 1968), 46-57. 
 
22 Karl Barth, ‘Das Wort Gottes als Aufgabe der Theologie,’ in Das Wort Gottes und die 
Theologie (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1924), 156-178. English translation: ‘The Word of God as 
the Task of Theology,’ in The Word of God and Theology, trans. Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 
2011), 171-198. 
 
23 He seemed to think that Barth’s views were unchanged during and after this time period. 
Fischer, ‘GdB,’ 19-20. 
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narrow window of time: namely his 1935 sermon on Exodus 20.4-6, §17 of the CD 1/2 
(1938), and, to a lesser degree, his CD 1/1 (1932). And while there is little in Plasger’s 
presentation to contest, the limitations of his chapter do not allow for a conceptually or 
chronologically comprehensive account of idolatry-critique in Barth. It also does not 
treat sustainedly of questions relating to the nature of the human act of idolatry and the 
idol, nor does it give an account of Barth’s development on the issues in question 
throughout his career. 
 Other works – namely, Stoevesandt’s 1986 article and Hailer’s 2003 article – are 
interpretations and evaluations of the unpublished §42.24 While they are important for 
the present work, since the unpublished §42 is itself important, their limitations of scope 
mean that they only partially help to answer the questions that this work seeks to 
answer. Unlike Fischer and Plasger, Stoevesandt and Hailer in this article do treat 
sustainedly of the nature of the idol in Barth, though their chronological focus is again 
limited, and though they give very scant attention to the question of the nature of the act 
of idolatry, and the various ways in which idolatry-critique functioned within Barth’s 
theology. Even beyond this, their treatments of the nature of the idol in the unpublished 
§42, and their accounts (or lack thereof) of the way in which Barth’s understanding of 
the idol there relates to the ways in which he understood the idol at other points during 
his career, are problematic. The present work will provide a very different interpretation 
of what the unpublished §42 has to say about idols, and its relation to Barth’s 
discussions of the idol (and, relatedly, of nothingness and the demons) elsewhere, than 
does either Stoevesandt or Hailer, and will thereby do greater justice to the details of 
Barth’s writings and allow Barth’s thought on idolatry and the nature of the idol to be 
                                                          
24 This is not, of course, meant to suggest that other works of Barth’s are not also referenced 
(they are), but only that the interpretation and evaluation of this one work is the chief goal in both of these 
articles. 
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viewed as more stable throughout the Church Dogmatics period. In short, the work of 
Hailer and Stoevesandt differs from the present work not only in that it is narrower in 
scope (focussing upon the nature of the idol at a specific time in Barth’s career), but 
also in that, where its concerns overlap with that of the present work, the latter will 
interpret Barth and his development very differently. Though the relevant sections of 
Hailer’s 2006 book and his 2013 paper differ in some ways from his 2003 article (e.g., 
they consider slightly more of Barth’s works than does the 2003 article) the present 
work differs from them in broadly the same way in which it differs from it. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the relevant secondary literature differs in 
approach and (both chronological and material) scope from the present work, from the 
former a number of facts concerning idolatry-critique, idolatry and the idol in Barth 
relevant to the latter have emerged. First, as mentioned in the discussion of the work of 
Clough and van Wyk above, it has been demonstrated that idolatry was a matter of 
ongoing concern to Barth, and that he found and critiqued idolatry in a number of 
unexpected places.25 Second, it has been generally seen, that in some sense idolatry-
critique was for Barth the negative side of a more fundamental, positive concern, viz., 
the concern to faithfully testify to revelation.26 Third, it has been firmly established that, 
at least in the unpublished §42, Barth considered the idol or false god to be both Nichts 
(Hailer (2003)) and Geschöpfe (Stoevesandt (1986)). Fourth, it has been fairly well 
established that idolatry was in some sense a universal human reality for Barth.27 
                                                          
25 See also Hailer, ‘Götter,’ 643-645.  
 
26 Fischer, ‘GdB,’ 9-10; Plasger, ‘DBB,’ 67; Van Wyk, ‘Gatg,’ 1588; Clough, ‘Karl Barth on 
Idolatry,’ 213. 
 
27 Hailer, Götzen, 279-280; Clough, ‘Karl Barth on Idolatry,’ 214. 
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 It has not, however, been satisfactorily explained how it is that Barth could call 
idols both Nichts and Geschöpfe in the unpublished §42.  Relatedly, the place of the 
unpublished §42 in Barth’s thinking on the nature of the idol has not yet been 
determined. These questions are of great importance to any attempt to understand 
Barth’s concept of the idol in general. Once again relatedly, the question of 
development in Barth’s thinking on the nature of the idol during his CD period 
(especially across the unpublished §42, the CD §§50-51, and §78.2) has not yet been 
satisfactorily answered. More broadly, no satisfactory account of development in 
Barth’s idolatry-critique, and the underlying reasons for it has been attempted. 
Numerous questions relating to the human act of idolatry: its relationship to sin in 
general, its relationship to das Nichtige, etc., have not been satisfactorily answered. The 
logic of Barth’s deployment of his idolatry-critique within the realm of dogmatics (e.g., 
within the realms of the questions of the knowledge of God, the doctrine of God, and 
the theological evaluation of religion) has not yet been laid bare, nor has it (or the 
positive dogmatic decisions he made with the implicit or explicit argument that the 
alternative would be idolatry) been critically evaluated. What serious reckoning with 
Barth’s idolatry-critique means (or should mean) for the development of theology (here, 
the doctrine of the knowledge of God, the doctrine of God, and the theology of religion) 
and for the life of the Christian, has not yet been satisfactorily settled. All of these 
unsettled or hitherto unaddressed issues, and, undoubtedly, others, will be addressed as 
the present work unfolds. 
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Chapter 2: Idolatry and the Knowledge of God 
 
Idolatry was, for Barth, an issue which emerged within discussion of, and was most 
fundamentally concerned with, the question of the knowledge of God, i.e., the question 
of the source of true κοινωνία between God and human beings.1 For Barth, the answer 
to that question was exclusively God’s special revelation in the person of Jesus Christ. 
This chapter demonstrates that and how Barth’s critique of idolatry and his 
understanding of idolatry and the idol were derived from his understanding of 
revelation, how they were shaped by being so derived, how material changes in Barth’s 
doctrine of revelation lead to changes in his critique of idolatry, and how his idolatry-
critique was leveled against one form of what, for him, was a reality which per 
definitionem based itself upon an illegitimate source of knowledge of God, natural 
theology. 
 
2.1 Revelation and Idolatry 
In Barth’s thinking from time of Romans II (1922) on (and, in many cases, even before 
Romans II), the basic features of the relationship between revelation on the one hand 
and his idolatry-critique, and his understanding of idolatry and the idol, on the other, 
remained constant. Section (2.1.1) analyses these mostly constant features in a largely 
synchronic fashion. As Barth’s thinking developed during this time, he came to describe 
idolatry and the idol in relation to revelation in new ways, e.g., with reference to the 
                                                          
1 While knowledge of God was no doubt cognitive, and not merely affective, for Barth, it was 
also neither merely intellectual nor the answer to an independent epistemological question. Gustaf 
Wingren (Theology in Conflict: Nygren, Barth, Bultmann (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1958), e.g., 
p.125) seems wrongly to think that it was these latter in his criticism of Barth’s doctrine of revelation. 
George Hunsinger (Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000), 170), by contrast, rightly argues that knowledge of God for Barth ‘is essentially a form of 
koinonia.’  
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doctrine of das Nichtige. This did not represent a fundamental change in his basic way 
of thinking about these realities, but rather a deepening and further specifying of it. 
Works from before 1922 are also cited as they help to establish features of Barth’s 
thinking which were constant throughout his career after this time, but not all of the 
section’s claims apply to Barth’s thinking during this time. Section (2.1.2) considers the 
ways in which, over time, changes in Barth’s material understanding of revelation 
elicited changes in his idolatry-critique. 
 
2.1.1 Revelation and idolatry in Barth in and after Romans II 
2.1.1.1 Revelation and Barth’s idolatry-critique 
Barth’s convictions about the nature of revelation, and about the proper role of 
revelation in theology, drove his critique of idolatry (most frequently: Götzendienst). 
Both his concern with, and his definition of, idolatry, were derived from what he 
believed he heard in revelation, and the Scriptures which testify to it.2 For the vast 
majority of his career, Barth was convinced that theology must always firstly concern 
itself with being a witness to, and repetition of, revelation,3 which takes as its basis the 
authoritative witness to that revelation, Holy Scripture.4 The critique of idolatry was 
                                                          
2 Fischer, ‘GdB,’ 9-10; Plasger, ‘DBB,’ 67 and passim. Matthias D. Wüthrich’s claim (Gott und 
das Nichtige: Zur Rede vom Nichtigen ausgehend von Karl Barths KD §50 (Zurich: TVZ, 2006), 144) 
that, in Barth’s late §78.2 in particular (an important text for the present discussion), ‘entwickelt Barth in 
dieser Passage keinen explizit christologischen Erkenntniszugang zum Phänomen der herrenlosen 
Gewalten,’ seems to be true as far as it goes, but given the broader context of Barth’s theology, it ought to 
be assumed that such is implicitly present there, too. 
 
3 Barth, CD, 1/2, 814. According to Barth, dogmatics ‘has to be a demonstration and proof, a 
sign and witness of the presence and validity of the Word of God, in whose service alone the human word 
can receive its qualification and attestation, if it is to receive it at all. Dogmatics cannot desire to be 
anything but a witness to this transcendent point of view…’ 
 
4 Barth, CD 1/1, 16: ‘Exegetical theology investigates biblical teaching as the basis of our talk 
about God. Dogmatics, too, must constantly keep it in view…Hence dogmatics as such does not ask what 
the apostles and prophets said but what we must say on the basis of the apostles and prophets. This task 
[that of exegesis] is not taken from us because it is first necessary that we should know the biblical basis.’ 
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thus, for him, at no point an independent interest, but was rather always one which was 
secondary to, and derivative of this primary, positive interest. The following implicit 
statement of the necessarily secondary nature of idolatry critique is indicative of Barth’s 
thinking throughout his career: ‘How can Christian proclamation and theology wish to 
work even incidentally and on the left hand in this direction as well? Do they not need 
both hands for this one task: not to destroy false gods, but to prepare a free way for the 
one God...?’5 
 Yet Barth did believe that he heard within revelation, and in the Scriptures 
which testify to it, a vehement protest against all creaturely objects which hold for 
human beings the role that is properly and objectively held by God in God’s revelation 
alone (the role of the source of ‘knowledge of God’ in the most inclusive sense). 
Implicit within the ‘Yes’ of God’s self-revelation was a ‘No’ to, and displacement of, 
all that which usurped its proper position in human thinking, speaking and acting, an 
assertion of its own exclusivity as a source of true knowledge of God. Thus, as early as 
Römerbrief I (1919), Barth said that ‘...durch das Evangelium nicht weniger als alle 
Götter, alle Throne und Altäre in Frage gestellt werden...’6 Later he spoke of revelation 
as that in which God, ‘...distinguishes himself from all gods and idols,’7 and, later yet, 
he said that when God reveals himself he ‘reveals himself as the sole god. God reveals 
                                                                                                                                                                          
See also Barth, CD 1/2, 821. Barth held this conviction at least as early as Romans II, as evidenced by the 
‘Selber-Denken’ mode of theological speech which he employed there, according to which he sought to 
‘[think] the thoughts of Scripture for [himself]’ (GD 260, 254). 
 
5 Barth, CD II/1, 172. 
 
6 Barth, Romans I, 353. 
 
7 Barth, GD, 327. 
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all other gods as nothings. Their reality falls away before God’s revelation.’8 Barth saw 
that the writers of Scripture, in fulfilling their role as witnesses to revelation, were 
therefore compelled, along with their primary, positive testimony, to also level a 
secondary, negative protest against the human act of holding some object of created 
reality in a role or position that properly belonged to God alone in God’s revelation. In 
their effort to repeat revelation, they had also to consistently repeat the ‘No’ implicit 
therein, and this they did, in their critique of human idolatry. That Barth saw the critique 
of idolatry to be an important, albeit secondary and derivative, concern of Scripture can 
be adduced from the plentiful references to the biblical indictments of idolatry which 
are scattered throughout his works, as well as from his sustained treatments of the 
biblical critique of idolatry, the most notable of which can be found in an important 
exegetical section in his Church Dogmatics §17.9 
 It was because of Barth’s convictions about the duty of theology to repeat 
revelation, and revelation and Scripture’s own concern to combat idolatry, that Barth 
himself was also compelled to level a forceful and persistent, though once again, 
secondary and derivative, critique of it. He did this in an ad hoc fashion throughout 
many of his works, but most pointedly and sustainedly in his polemic against the 
‘service of the No-God’10 in Romans II; in his criticism of what he considered to be, at 
least potentially, the ‘other gods’ which held sway in theology in his 1933 essay, ‘The 
First Commandment as an Axiom in Theology’;11 in his description of the idolatry of 
                                                          
8 Karl Barth, ‘The First Commandment as an Axiom of Theology,’ in The Way of Theology in 
Karl Barth: Essays and Comments, ed. H. Martin Rumscheidt (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 1986), 70. Cf. 
Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 9 and passim. 
 
9 Barth, CD I/2, 303-307. 
 
10 Barth, Romans II, 47. 
 
11 Barth, ‘TFC.’ 
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human religion in §17 of his CD 1/2, in which he sought to demonstrate that what 
‘revelation has to say of religion’ is that in it human beings have been ‘pursuing idolatry 
and self-righteousness’;12 in his description of the ‘lordless powers’ (herrenlosen 
Gewalten), which he explicitly linked to idols which human beings worship and serve, 
in The Christian Life;13 and in a sub-section of the works which he wrote for the Church 
Dogmatics, but which were not ultimately included therein, entitled ‘Gott und die 
Götter.’14 
 
2.1.1.2 Revelation and Barth’s definition of idolatry 
Barth not only adopted what he understood to be revelation and Scripture’s critique of 
idolatry in a formal sense; he also believed that his definition of ‘idolatry’ was derived 
from them. On the basis of texts like Romans 1.25,15 Barth understood idolatry to be the 
substitution, or replacement,16 of God in his revelation with some aspect of created 
reality.17 In this act, the human being ascribes to an aspect of created reality, or created 
reality as a whole, a role, title, or attribute that properly belongs to God alone in God’s 
                                                          
12 Barth, CD I/2, 316. 
 
13 Barth, TCL, 222. 
 
14 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter.’  
 
15 NIV: ‘They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, they worshiped and served things rather than 
the Creator...’ (emphasis added). Barth speaks of this text as a description of idolatry in CD 1/2, 307. 
 
16 As Barth speaks of idolatry, he expresses these ideas of substitution and replacement in a 
multiplicity of ways. At times he uses single words which convey these ideas, such as the terms 
vertauschen (e.g., in Predigten 1918, 252) and Ersatz (e.g., in KD I/2, 331). At other times he conveys it 
using phrases like the following: ‘an die Stelle des göttlichen Werkes ein menschliches Gemächte zu 
schieben.’ (KD I/2, 329) 
 
17 This definition is consistent with (though perhaps more precise than) the language of some of 
Barth’s interpreters when they speak of idolatry in him as being a ‘confusion.’ See, for example, Plasger, 
‘DBB,’ 55. 
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revelation. He saw the first commandment as a prohibition of just such an action, in 
agreement with Luther: 
What does [the first commandment] mean? What are ‘other gods’? According to 
Luther’s explanation which coincides exactly with the biblical view, a god is 
that in which human beings place their trust, in which they have faith, from 
which they expect to receive what they love and to protect them from what they 
fear. A god is that to which one gives one’s heart...Wherever the human heart is, 
in other words, wherever the foundation of our real confidence and hope, the 
primum movens of our vitality and the basis of the security of our lives, there 
also, in all truth, is our god.18 
 
Barth, then, believed that what the first commandment prohibits is idolatry in the sense 
of substitution: it prohibits substituting for God in God’s revelation, who alone is 
worthy of being the object of human trust, faith, hope, confidence, etc., some piece of 
creaturely reality which is not God as that object. Idolatrous substitution can occur in a 
wide variety of ways, not only within the realm of personal piety, but also in the making 
of formal and material theological decisions. Barth’s concept of idolatry is thus highly 
particular in the sense that it is defined in close relation to the particular event of the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, as its replacement. His concept and critique of 
idolatry are, in this way, firmly theological rather than, e.g., philosophical. 
From a slightly different angle, idolatry was, for Barth, the opposite of the faith 
that is the human act which properly corresponds to God’s revelation. Rather than 
placing one’s faith in revelation, the idolater disbelieves it; but this disbelief takes the 
form not of an act of pure negation but rather of substituting that which is created for it. 
Thus, elsewhere, Barth cites the ninety-fifth question of the Heidelberg Catechism in an 
attempt to define idolatry: ‘What is idolatry? Instead of the one true God who has 
revealed Himself in His Word, or alongside of Him, to invent or have some other thing 
                                                          
18 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 69. 
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in which man puts his trust.’19 This citation of Barth’s of the Heidelberg Catechism, 
along with the above-mentioned reference which he made to Luther, demonstrates that 
Barth considered himself to be essentially at one with the Reformation tradition in his 
basic definition of idolatry, and the Reformation tradition, in turn, at one with the Bible 
in its own. 
As suggested both by the etymology of the English term idolatry, and by the 
connection between the German words Götzendienst and Gottesdienst, idolatrous 
substitution in Barth may be understood as a deviant and false form of worship.20 This 
is the case, however, only if the word ‘worship’ is understood broadly enough so as to 
include all modes of human thought, speech and action whereby a title, role or attribute 
which belongs properly only to God in God’s revelation is ascribed or rendered to some 
object. It is not only the physical, cultic veneration of strange gods and their images 
with which much of the OT seemingly took particular issue that constitutes idolatry; so, 
too, does the act of holding mental images of God. For Barth, God in God’s revelation 
is simply other than everything human beings are capable of conceiving, and so the 
avoidance of idolatry requires the abandonment of all such images; if they are held to, 
they can only be substitutes for revelation.21 Beyond the cultic veneration of false gods 
and their images and the holding of mental images of God in place of God’s revelation, 
                                                          
19 Barth, CD 1/2, 819. 
 
20 Barth, for example, links the terms Götzendienst and Gottesdienst, suggesting that he 
understood the former to be a perverted variety of the latter, at Chr.D., 416-417: ‘Es kann so sein, daß 
Religion nicht Götzendienst, nicht Rebellion, sondern wirklicher Gottesdienst ist.’ 
 
 21 Barth, Predigten 1914, 645: ‘Um so klarer und reiner erhebt sich das wahre Bild Gottes 
überall das, sich die Menschen, auch die frommen Menschen, über ihn gedacht haben. Um so deutlicher 
zeigt es sich jetzt, wo die Welt voll ist vom Götzendienst...’ Thus it is the case that, for example, in 
theology, one must ‘alle Gottesbilder...von euch tut, um ganz frei zu werden für das Wort Gottes selber,’ 
(Barth, Predigten 1921-1935, 439), for those who hold to such ‘sind dem Kampf gegen Götzendienst 
nicht gewaschen, weil sie selber noch Götzendienst treiben.’ (Barth, Predigten 1921-1935, 439) 
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the false worship in which an act of idolatrous substitution is committed may also take 
the form of any and all kinds of human action or inaction, for in every case human 
action and inaction implicitly affords to some object the role of the principle of action. 
Since God alone in his revelation ought to hold this role, human action or inaction 
which has as its principle some other object is likewise idolatry. In an early sermon, for 
example, Barth spoke of the way in which idolatry is committed when money and the 
desire for it becomes the principle and driving force of human action.22 All that a human 
being does, in thought, speech, or other act, in the sphere of either the ostensibly sacred 
or the ostensibly secular, is in the broadest sense worship, for all of it, even if only 
implicitly, renders or ascribes that which belongs to God to some object. Every occasion 
of human action or inaction, therefore, has the potential to be an occasion of idolatry. 
For Barth, idolatry is not merely one deviant form of worship among other 
forms of worship, some of which are fitting and proper, having God as their true object. 
The worshiper is not in him- or her-self free to choose between the possibilities of an 
idolatrous form of worship or an anidolatrous one, for all possibilities of human 
worship, human worship in all of its forms, are, without exception, idolatrous.  Idolatry 
is worship which renders to that which is not God that which properly and objectively 
belongs to God alone in his revelation; i.e., it is worship which has as its object that 
which is not God. But the otherness and hiddenness of God are, for Barth, such that God 
in God’s revelation cannot be an object for human beings or their worship: God ‘in 
keiner Weise Objekt ist.’23 And so God must ‘never be identified with anything which 
                                                          
22 Barth, Predigten 1913, 226. ‘Götzendienst geschieht in der Stille. Der Geldgeist lehrt seinen 
Leuten das vielsagende Achselzucken und die zweideutigen Worte, mit denen sie verstecken können, 
worum es ihnen eigentlich zu tun ist.’ 
 
23 Barth, Chr.D., 291. Cf. GD 134-135. 
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we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship as God...’24 If human worship is de 
jure incapable of having God as its object, then it is also the case that every act of 
human worship has as its object that which is not God, i.e., that every act of human 
worship is idolatry. Barth thus spoke of the ‘unavoidable idolatry of all human 
worship,’25 and in so doing, he did not except the worship of either Israel or the Church. 
In the golden calf episode, according to Barth, Israel revealed that one finds in it, too, 
the idolatry which is the universally ‘human side of God’s hiddenness.’26 And it is also 
true, according to him, that ‘our Christian conceptions of God and the things of God, 
our Christian theology, our Christian worship...in short, our Christianity, to the extent 
that it is our Christianity...is seen to be on the same level as the human work in other 
religions’27 – in other words, it is seen to be, along with them, idolatry and works-
righteousness. 
All human worship is, intrinsically, idolatry. And since worship is defined in this 
context broadly enough to include all occasions of human thought, speech, action and 
inaction, insofar as they ascribe to some object a title, position, or role, that properly 
belongs to God in God’s revelation alone – broadly enough, that is, that all human 
beings are to be understood as worshipers – all human beings must also be understood 
to be idolaters: ‘The power to be in the world and a man, as man’s own power, is 
identical with the power to devise and form gods.’28   
                                                          
24 Barth, Romans II, 331. 
 
25 Barth, Romans II, 125. 
 
26 Barth, CD 1/2, 90.  
 
27 Barth, CD 1/2, 327. Emphasis on the word ‘worship’ added. Emphasis on the word ‘our’ 
original. 
 
28 Barth, CD 1/2, 324. 
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Idolatry, in Barth, is in fact not only a universally human reality, it is also a 
reality which he oftentimes referred to in order to describe the totality of the human 
condition as fallen. Reference to ‘idolatry’ is reference to human sin in nuce: for from 
idolatry all other sins flow, and, in them, idolatry is expressed. ‘The transgression of the 
first commandment,’ according to Barth, ‘inevitably involves that of all others.’29 This 
is not at odds, but is rather in accord, with the Reformers’ understanding of ‘unbelief’ as 
the most fundamental of all sins. Barth was in full agreement with Luther that one could 
also describe all sin as essentially an outworking of unbelief in God’s revelation:  
The disobedience and therefore the sin of man was revealed at Golgotha as 
unbelief in this God – but only revealed, for in fact (in Israel or among the 
nations) it was never anything else but unbelief in this God, and whenever and 
wherever there may be men it will never be anything else but unbelief in the 
Word, the Son, in whom God made them His and Himself theirs, unbelief in 
Jesus Christ.30 
 
The reason that Barth could consider both idolatry and unbelief to be descriptions of the 
totality of the human state as fallen was because they were, for him, mutually-
implicating, one being the necessary obverse of the other – idolatry the positive side of 
unbelief in revelation, and unbelief in revelation the negative side of idolatry. As 
suggested above, in other words, unbelief in revelation was never an act of pure 
negation, but always, rather, an act of substituting for revelation that which is created. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Barth, CD 1/2, 314. 
 
30 Barth, CD 4/1, 415. See also Wolf Krötke, Sin and Nothingness in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
trans. Philip G. Ziegler and Christina-Maria Bammel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Theological Seminary, 
2005) 60, where the author describes unbelief as the most fundamental of human sins in Barth’s thought, 
and discusses Barth’s agreement with Luther on this point. 
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2.1.1.3 Revelation and the nature of the idol in Barth 
From revelation,31 it is seen that it is in the human act of idolatrous substitution that the 
idol or false god has its origin. In marked contrast to the true God who exists a se, its 
existence as an idol or false god is dependent upon human subjectivity – it has no 
existence apart from the human being(s) who worships it. ‘[Götzen] ihr leben nur darin 
haben, daß Gott nicht in uns ist.’32 It is when idolatrous substitution or exchange takes 
place, when ‘the qualitative distinction between men and the final Omega is 
overlooked,’ that, ‘the No-God is set up, idols are erected.’33 Barth’s use of the language 
of ‘erecting,’ ‘setting up,’ or ‘giving birth to’ idols or other gods refers to the same act 
of idolatrous substitution which constitutes their worship.  
The idol or false god possesses real, and even quasi-objective, existence as such. 
According to Barth, ‘The very remarkable fact is to be noted that (in harmony with the 
predominant ‘henotheism’ of the Old Testament) Paul not only did not deny the 
existence of many that are called (λεγόμενοι) gods and lords in heaven and on earth (1 
Cor. 8.5), but actually affirmed it: ὥσπερ εἰσὶν θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοί.’34 Once 
erected through the power of human subjectivity, the idol, in Barth’s thinking, slips 
from the realm of the purely subjective, in that it becomes a force which exercises real, 
objective, quasi-independent power, and must be reckoned with. So while, for example, 
the idol of mammon has no existence as such apart from the fact that it is worshiped, 
because it is worshiped and therefore does have existence as such, it exercises 
                                                          
31 The precise way in which revelation determines the nature of both idolatry and the idol will be 
seen in 2.1.1.4. 
 
32 Barth, Predigten 1915, 71. 
 
33 Barth, Romans II, 50-51. 
 
34 Barth, CD II/1, 454. See also Barth, CD I/2, 389; TCL, 215. 
 
26 
 
 
 
undeniable power over the course of history and over individual human lives; to live in 
a world where it is worshiped is to be forced to reckon with its reality. Barth illustrates 
this process, by which the idol of human making escapes from the realm of human 
subjectivity and power, and comes to exercise its own power over and against human 
beings, by referring to Goethe’s ballad The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.35  
Idols, which Barth refers to with the terms Götzen, Götter, and herrenlosen 
Gewalten, among others, are for him closely related to the faces of das Nichtige, the 
demons as described in the CD §51, but they are not identical to them. Several of 
Barth’s interpreters, including Hailer,36 Wüthrich,37 van Wyk,38 and McDowell,39 seem 
to have not properly understood the relationship between idols and the demons, the 
faces of das Nichtige, in Barth’s thought, claiming, assuming or implying that Barth 
intended to refer to the same reality with both terms. They have thus explained the 
differences in the way in which Barth describes the Götter in his unpublished §42 and 
the way in which he describes das Nichtige and the Dämonen in CD §50 and §51 
respectively, and the differences in the way in which he describes the latter and the 
herrenlosen Gewalten in §78.2, either by downplaying them (McDowell speaks of the 
difference between §§50-51 and §78.2 as a mere change in metaphors40) or by reference 
                                                          
35 Barth, TCL, 214-215. 
 
36 Hailer, ‘GudG’; Götzen, 275-303. 
 
37 Matthias Wüthrich, Gott und das Nichtige; ‘Das »fremde Geheimnis des wirklich Nichtigen«. 
Karl Barths einsamer Denkweg in der Frage des Bösen,’ in Karl Barth im europäischen Zeitgeschehen 
(1935-1950): Widerstand – Bewährung – Orientierung, ed. Michael Beintker et al. (Zurich: TVZ, 2010), 
395-411.  
 
38 Van Wyk, ‘Gatg,’ 1595. 
 
39 John C. McDowell, ‘Much Ado about Nothing: Karl Barth's Being Unable to Do Nothing 
about Nothingness,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology 4, 3 (2002): 319-335. 
 
40 McDowell, ‘MAaN,’ 334. 
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to purported development or self-contradiction within Barth’s thinking on idolatry and 
the idol (Hailer, Wüthrich and van Wyk).41 
There are indeed real, substantial differences between the Götter of the 
unpublished §42 and the Dämonen of §51, and between the latter and the herrenlosen 
Gewalten of §78.2, which cannot be explained by claiming that Barth merely changed 
his metaphors. On this point, one must agree with Hailer, Wüthrich and van Wyk 
instead of McDowell. The major differences are that (1) the Dämonen of §51 do not 
belong to realm of created being, but rather that of Das Nichtige, that which God did not 
will in God’s creative act,42 while both the Götter of the unpublished §42 and the 
herrenlosen Gewalten of §78.2 are somewhat paradoxically identified both as elements 
of the realm of ‘nothingness,’ and as creatures43; and (2) that both the Götter of the 
unpublished §42 and the herrenlosen Gewalten of §78.2 have their origin in sinful 
human subjectivity,44 while the Dämonen of §51 have their origin (along with das 
Nichtige in general) in God’s not-willing of them.45 
These differences, however, do not, with Hailer, Wüthrich and van Wyk, 
represent a substantial change in Barth’s thinking concerning idolatry, because Barth 
was not attempting to refer to the same reality in each of these three passages. When 
Barth spoke of the Götter in the unpublished §42 and of the herrenlosen Gewalten in 
§78.2 he was not referring to the same reality as when he spoke of the Dämonen in §51. 
                                                          
41 Hailer, ‘GudG,’ 62-63, 66, and passim; Wüthrich, Das Nichtige, 144-146, 224; van Wyk, 
‘Gatg,’ 1595. In the case of van Wyk, he suggests that it was development in Barth’s though which 
accounts for the difference between the unpublished §42 and the CD §§50-51. 
 
42 Barth, CD III/3, 302, 352-354, 361, 366, 521-524. 
 
43 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 9, 17; TCL  213, 218, 224, 233. 
 
44 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 63-64, 84; TCL, 213-215. 
 
45 See Wüthrich, Das Nichtige, 145. 
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The Götter of the unpublished §42 and the herrenlosen Gewalten of §78.2 should be 
classed together as attempts on Barth’s part to speak of the reality of ‘idols.’ The 
Dämonen of §51, while closely related to idols in Barth’s thinking – as evidenced, for 
example, by the fact that Barth also speaks of idols as Nichts – are not the same as idols. 
This explains the major the differences across these three works. In the unpublished §42 
and §78.2 Barth speaks of idols, which can also be called creatures and at least in some 
sense have their origin in human subjectivity. In §§50-51 he speaks of das Nichtige and 
the demons, which cannot and do not.  
It is true that, at times, Barth’s language seems to obscure the difference 
between idols and the demons. It appears, in some places, as if idols, like demons, 
belong wholly to the realm of das Nichtige; he can write for example, that, ‘Die Götter 
sind die Exponenten der Selbstbehauptung und Offenbarung des Nichts.’46 And demons 
are often mentioned in places where Barth is discussing the idol and idolatry, sometimes 
in such a way that it appears that the terms ‘demon’ and ‘idol’ are interchangeable for 
him.47 It must therefore be explained precisely how it is that, in Barth’s thinking, das 
Nichtige and the demons of §§50-51, on the one hand, and the idols (especially in the 
unpublished §42 and in §78.2, but also elsewhere), on the other, are related to one 
another in such a way that (1) idols may both be called ‘creatures,’ but also be closely 
related to das Nichtige and the demons which are clearly not creatures, and may in some 
sense even to be identified with the latter, that (2) idols are both ‘creatures’ of God and 
products of human subjectivity, and that (3) idols are understood as having their origin 
                                                          
46 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 9. 
 
47 For example: Barth, UCR II, 340-341; CD 3/3, 408; TCL, 218-222, 224; 
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in human subjectivity, unlike das Nichtige and the demons, while still being in some 
sense identical to them. 
 Barth does not directly address the question of the relationship between the idol 
on the one hand, and das Nichtige and the demons on the other, but he does leave clues, 
on the basis of which the following proposal, which also has enormous explanatory 
power with reference to the three above-mentioned questions, may be made: the idol is 
a piece of created reality, or created reality as a whole, which has been subjected to 
nothingness’ manifestation, the demon, by the human being. Barth speaks of the 
‘revelation’48 of the demonic – the fact that the demonic kingdom of nothingness desires 
to ‘reveal itself alongside of [God],’49 and in this way, among others, to imitate God.50 
As the revelation of God occurs through creaturely media, so too does the revelation of 
das Nichtige and the demons, and the idol is one site of this occurrence.  In other words: 
the idol is a piece of creaturely reality which is, in a particular way, demon-possessed. 
In still other words: the idol or god exists as such due to the perversion of its 
creatureliness which occurs through its subjection to nothingness, in the form, i.e., in 
the demon – for the demon is nothing other than nothingness ‘to the extent that it has 
form...’51 – of the ‘divinity’ that God denied it in making it to be a creature.52 This 
explanation makes clear both how the demon and the idol are related and yet to be 
differentiated, and (1) why it can be said both that the idol is the ‘Offenbarung des 
                                                          
48 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,‘ 9. 
 
49 Barth, CD III/3, 525. 
 
50 Barth, CD III/3, 528. 
 
51 Barth CD III/3, 523. 
 
52 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 17. 
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Nichts’53 and that it is a creature. Idols reveal ‘nothingness,’ and it can even be said that 
they are ‘nothingness’ in that their existence as such owes itself to their subjection to a 
false ‘divinity’ which is a demon, a form of nothingness. Idols are creatures in that even 
this subjection, which perverts their creatureliness, can never truly be its transcendence 
or abnegation.  
This subjection of the creaturely object to nothingness, in which it has its 
existence as an idol, is an act perpetrated by the human being – thus the fact that Barth 
can emphasise that the idol’s existence is the product of human subjectivity and that the 
location of the idol’s existence as such is the human imagination.54 Thus, also, the fact 
that (2) the idol can be understood as both a creature of God and the product of human 
subjectivity. The human being, in the act of idolatry, subjects creaturely reality to 
nothingness by ascribing to it that which has been denied it in God’s creative act, 
thereby making it an idol. Here it may be seen that this way of describing the idol and 
idolatry does not contradict, but rather complements the descriptions above of idolatry 
as the ascription of a role or title which properly belongs to God alone in God’s 
revelation to that which is merely creaturely (making of it an idol). In slightly different 
terms: the human being, in the act of sin (rejection of grace) and idolatry which creates 
the idol, yields to the demons of §§50-51, allowing them to manifest themselves in 
idols. The rejection of grace is necessarily a yielding to the incursion of nothingness and 
the demons in the form of the idol in which they manifest themselves, because 
nothingness is nothing other than ‘the antithesis to the grace of God.’55 Thus the above 
                                                          
53 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 9. 
 
54 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 28; TCL, 214. 
 
55 Barth, CD III/3, 331.  
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discussion of the way in which both unbelief and idolatry can be understood as the most 
fundamental of sins, the one being the necessary obverse of the other. The herrenlosen 
Gewalten of §78.2 (and, one may also add, the Götter of the unpublished §42) are ‘no 
more than exponents of the rebellion that separates man from God,’56 but this rebellion, 
the rebellion of sin, is itself ‘surrender’ to the encroachment of the ‘alien power’ of 
nothingness,57 in which the idol is born. It is now also clear how it is that (3) idols have 
their origin and their location of existence in human subjectivity unlike das Nichtige and 
the demons, while still being closely related to them: it is the human being who ‘opens 
the door’58 to the nothingness, rejecting God’s grace and revelation through unbelief, 
and allowing the advance of the nothingness which transforms creatures into idols.59  
The Götter of the unpublished §42 and the herrenlosen Gewalten of §78.2 may 
be classed together and considered ‘idols.’ The Dämonen of §51 may not, at least not 
without careful qualification. It is notable in this connexion that the differences across 
these three works which Barth’s interpreters have noted have been almost exclusively 
differences between the unpublished §42 and §§50-51 and between §78.2 and §§50-51. 
Differences between the unpublished §42 and §78.2, while not absent, are few, and 
mainly matters of emphasis. The claim that all three works were attempts to speak of 
the same reality, viz., idols, and that Barth underwent significant development between 
the unpublished §42 and §§50-51, only to in large part revert back to his original stance 
in §78.2 ought to be rejected in favour of the simpler and better evidenced thesis that the 
idol, as spoken of in both the unpublished §42 and §78.2, is for Barth differentiated 
                                                          
56 Barth, TCL, 233. 
 
57 Barth, CD III/3, 310-311. 
 
58 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 78. 
 
59 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 78-79.  
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from, but also related to, nothingness and the demon as enumerated above, and thus that 
Barth’s understanding of the nature of the idol was largely unchanged during this 
portion of his career. The major objection to this thesis is that, once more, in certain 
places, the term Dämonen seems to be used interchangeably with the terms Götter (in 
the unpublished §42) and herrenlosen Gewalten (in §78.2). Each of these occasions, 
however, may be explained by the close relationship – one may venture to call it a 
relationship of ‘indirect identity’ – between the demon and the idol in which it reveals 
itself. 
 
2.1.1.4 Revelation and the overcoming of idolatry and the idol in Barth 
While all human worship is inherently the idolatrous worship of an idol for Barth there 
is nevertheless, for him, a victory over idols which renders true worship possible. While 
it has been expedient to leave the discussion of the overcoming of idolatry and the idol 
in Barth until after the discussion of his idolatry-critique and his understanding of 
idolatry and the idol, it must now be said that the order of Barth’s thinking was 
otherwise: Barth defined idolatry and the idol, and engaged in idolatry-critique, only 
from the perspective of the knowledge that idolatry and the idol had already been 
effectively overcome. 
But this is only to say once again, but in a different way, that Barth critiqued 
idolatry, and defined idolatry and the idol, from the perspective of revelation, since 
revelation was, for him, objectively the victory, and subjectively the knowledge of the 
victory, over idolatry and the idol. ‘Das war die Offenbarung, die Jesus brachte: der 
lebendige Gott, der über alle Teufel und Götzen triumphiert.’60 The victory over idols 
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has, for Barth, already been won, objectively, in the objective revelation of Jesus Christ. 
Jesus Christ is himself objectively that victory, in that in him God asserts Godself as 
God, thereby, negatively, displacing false gods, and affirms God’s creation as such, 
thereby, negatively, negating the ‘nothingness’ which God did not create, including the 
‘divinity’ of the idol, revealing it, and therefore the idol as such, as what it is: 
‘nothingness,’ ‘fiction,’ ‘illusion,’61 and causing the idol to be seen, once again, as what 
it in truth always was: merely a creature.62 The subjective overcoming of the idol occurs 
in the event of God’s subjective revelation of Godself in Jesus Christ to the human 
being. While the human destruction of an idol can only mean its displacement with 
another, Jesus Christ alone can overcome idolatry by displacing the idol with himself, 
he himself being not another idol but truly the revelation of God. The idol has been 
defeated objectively, and is now and will be in the future defeated subjectively, as such 
in the same way that nothingness has been defeated objectively and is now and will be 
defeated subjectively, because it is nothingness which made and makes the idol an idol; 
but this does not mean that the idol and nothingness are identical: when the idol is 
destroyed as such, a creature remains. For Barth, it is from reflection upon the idol’s 
displacement and destruction as such (i.e., upon revelation), that its true nature (that of a 
mere creature subjected to the nothingness of creaturely divinity, i.e., substituted for 
                                                          
61 Barth, ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 89-91. 
 
62 It is particularly clear that this is the nature of the idol’s defeat in ‘Gott und die Götter,’ where 
Barth writes, for example, that (9): ‘Die Offenbarung Gottes des Schöpfers ist die Götterdammerung, in 
der die Götter ihre göttliche Autorität verlieren, ihre göttlichen Ansprüche aufgeben müssen, ihrer 
göttlichen Macht entkleidet werden, in der sie sich als Götter auflösen, in der ihr unrsprünglich nicht-
göttliches, sondern kreatürliches Wesen wieder sichtbar wird.’ The triumph of Jesus Christ over the idols 
means his triumph over their existence as such, i.e., his triumph over their supposed ‘divinity’ which is a 
demon, a form of nothingness. The creaturely object which had been perverted in its having been made 
into an idol, i.e., in its subjection to nothingness’ demon, is restored to that which it always was. On this 
point see also Scott Thomas Prather, Christ, Power and Mammon: Karl Barth and John Howard Yoder in 
Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 51-52. 
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God’s revelation, divinized, with no real existence as such) is understood, and that the 
true nature of idolatry (the act of so substituting created reality to the nothingness of 
creaturely divinity), must be defined and critiqued. 
 Worship is true worship in the event of revelation, and in it does truly have God 
as its object. This latter fact does not mitigate against the fact that this worship, too, is 
intrinsically idolatrous63 in that it has God as its object not because it ceases to be 
intrinsically directed toward another god, but rather because God gives himself to be its 
object in spite of its inherently idolatrous nature. In this sense, the victory over idolatry 
is not its elimination but, in an ongoing fashion, its overcoming by God: ‘...there is a 
knowledge and worship of [the true] God and a corresponding activity. We can only say 
that they are corrupt. They are an attempt born of lying and wrong and committed to 
futile means. And yet we have also to say of them that (in their corruption) they do 
reach their goal. In spite of the lying and wrong committed, in spite of the futility of the 
means applied, God is really known and worshipped.’64 God is truly worshiped in such 
idolatrous attempts only ‘by the grace of God,’65 who in his freedom, and on certain 
occasions, ‘makes himself the object of human contemplation, human experience, 
human thought and human speech.’66 It is the decision on the part of God, and not the 
selection of proper modes of worship, or even the proper intention of the worshiper, 
                                                          
63 The use of the language ‘intrinsically idolatrous’ worship is meant to indicate worship which, 
on the basis only of its own intrinsic characteristics, i.e., apart from God’s miraculous self-giving to be its 
object, has not God, but an idol as its object. Relatedly, the language of an ‘intrinsic object’ of worship, 
which will be used later in the present work, should be understood simply to refer to the object which 
worship has naturally, again on the basis of its intrinsic characteristics, apart from God in God’s 
revelation miraculously displacing that object with Godself. 
 
64 Barth, CD 1/2, 344. 
 
65 Barth, CD 1/2, 344. 
 
66 Barth, CD 1/1, 315. 
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which ‘distinguishes human speaking and hearing as worship of God in spirit and 
truth’67 – as worship, that is, which, while not ceasing to be intrinsically idolatrous, 
becomes something more than mere idolatry. If true worship depends upon God’s 
revelation for its existence, then it follows that it is in the communities which are 
marked by the ongoing, regular, presence of God’s revelation – Israel and the Church – 
that one may expect to most consistently encounter and participate in it – thus the fact 
that, as van Wyk rightly notes,68 the urgency of Christian missions is, for Barth, implied 
by his discussion of idolatry. 
If the only possibility for human idolatry to be overcome (though never 
eliminated) is the ongoing decision of God to give Godself as the object of worship, 
then it also follows that human iconoclasm, whether of the skeptical-atheistic of the 
romantic-mystical variety, will always be ultimately unsuccessful in its crusade against 
the same. Neither the atheist nor the mystic may overcome idolatry, for they, too, are 
implicated in it. The atheist and the mystic, in their very iconoclasm, no less than the 
religionist, ascribe that which belongs to God alone in his revelation to that which is not 
God – the most that they can accomplish is to replace one idol with another. They too 
operate within the ‘magic circle of religion,’69 i.e., within the sphere of idolatry and 
works-righteousness. It should be added that, for Barth, even the theological critique of 
idolatry considered in itself, since it too is an undertaking of idolatrous humanity, 
strictly speaking falls under this same judgment. A truly penetrating critique and 
                                                          
67 Barth, CD 1/1, 60. 
 
68 Van Wyk, ‘Gatg,’ 1605. 
 
69 Barth, CD 1/2, 324. 
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effectual overcoming of idolatry can only come from outside of humanity – that is, from 
God’s revelation of Jesus Christ,70 though theology must repeat that critique. 
The fact that Barth insists that idols and other gods have already been 
objectively defeated,71 i.e., objectively revealed to be what they always were: merely 
creatures, in the person of Jesus Christ, clearly does not mean that they do not continue 
to exercise power. The objective triumph of Christ over them must be appropriated 
subjectively by faith or the human being will remain in important senses subject to 
them. It also does not mean that they only exercise power over those whose minds and 
hearts have not yet been penetrated by the truth of the Gospel (i.e., those who are 
outwith the church). Hailer’s criticism72 that the unpublished §42 seems to imply the 
latter is fair; it may indeed be read in that way, and it may be the case that the fact that it 
can give this impression is what caused Barth to decide not to include it within the 
Church Dogmatics. But §78.2 clarifies any confusion when it affirms that the Christian 
and the church are ‘painfully enough exposed and even subject’73 to the herrenlosen 
Gewalten. This fact may be attributed to the fact that the faith in which Christ’s 
objective defeat of the gods and idols is subjectively realised and appropriated is an 
event and not the static possession of even the believing person and the fact that societal 
idols have a power over society and its movements, the effects of which cannot be 
escaped by anyone who lives in it.74 
                                                          
70 Barth, CD 1/2, 324. 
 
71 Barth, ‘Unterweisung II 1917/18,’ in Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921 (GA I.18), ed. 
Jürgen Fangmeier (Zurich: TVZ, 1987), 240; ‘Gott und die Götter,’ 112-113.; TCL, 218. 
 
72 Hailer, ‘GudG,’ 77. 
 
73 Barth, TCL, 234.  
 
74 Barth, TCL, 216. 
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2.1.2 Changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation and his critique of idolatry 
Changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation over the course of his career led to changes in 
what counted for him as idolatry. This very fact, however, was underlain by the 
constancy, throughout his career, of his formal definition of idolatry, and the formal 
relationship between idolatry and revelation implied therein.75  
 
2.1.2.1 From liberalism to Romans II 
The changes which Barth’s doctrine of revelation underwent at the time of his break 
from liberalism brought about a change in the scope of his critique of idolatry. Prior to 
Barth’s break from liberalism, his doctrine of revelation was essentially Herrmannian. 
Herrmann understood revelation to be only the personal self-revelation of God,76 which 
was mediated by the inner life of Jesus as found in the NT,77 which was received in the 
realm of (and was nearly identified with) religious experience, and which was 
experienced, in particular, as the answer to the human Anfechtungen.78 Barth’s own 
doctrine of revelation during his liberal days was nearly indistinguishable from that of 
Herrmann, as seen, in particular, in his essays, ‘Moderne Theologie und 
                                                          
75 A general understanding of idolatry as substitution is evident in Barth’s thought from very 
early on in his career. In a 1913 sermon, for example, just after insinuating that obedience to the Geldgeist 
constitutes idolatry, he asked, ‘Haben wir nicht alle samt und sonders schon den Geldgeist an die Stelle 
des heiligen Geistes gesetzt?’ (Predigten 1913, 226-227) And there is no reason, textually, to believe that 
Barth’s basic understanding of idolatry was not already in place even prior to 1913.  
 
76 Wilhelm Herrmann writes (‘Der Begriff der Offenbarung,’ in Vorträge der theologischen 
Konferenz zu Gießen gehalten am 9. Juni 1887. (III. Folge) (Gießen: J.Ricker´sche Buchhandlung, 1887), 
10): ‘Alle Offenbarung ist Selbstoffenbarung Gottes.’ 
 
77 Wilhelm Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God: A Discussion in Agreement 
with the View of Luther, trans. J. Sandys Stanyon (London: Williams Norgate, 1895), 59, 77-78, 282. 
 
78 Herrmann, ‘Der Begriff der Offenbarung,’ 4-6. 
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Reichsgottsarbeit’ (1909),79 ‘Ob Jesus gelebt hat?’ (1910),80 ‘Der Christliche Glaube 
und die Geschichte’ (1910),81 ‘La Réapparition de la Métaphysique dans la 
Théologie,’82 (1911), and ‘Religion und Wissenschaft’ (1912).83 Because Barth 
understood revelation in this manner, and because he understood idolatry to be the 
replacement of revelation with that which was not, he critiqued as idolatry the affording 
of a role which properly belonged only to revelation to any reality which did not fit this 
description, from metaphysics84 to the ‘Geldgeist.’85 
                                                          
79 Karl Barth, ‘Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit, 1909,’ in Vorträge und kleinere 
Arbeiten 1905-1909 (GA III.21), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 1992), 
e.g., 342-343: ‘Individuell bedingt ist das Erwachen der Religion, wie wir sie verstehen. Wo ein Mensch 
zur Erkenntnis gekommen ist, daß es ihm faktisch unmöglich ist, das als gut erkannte Sittengebot bei sich 
durchzusetzen, da kann er es erleben, daß ihm in der Überlieferung der christlichen Kirche oder in ihrem 
gegenwärtigen Leben eine Macht begegnet, der er sich in Gehorsam und Vertrauen gänzlich unterwerfen 
muß. Aber wann kommt er zur Erkenntnis jenes Bruches in seinem sittlichen Wollen? Und welche Seite 
der christlichen Überlieferung, welche Lebensäußerungen gegenwärtiger Religion werden ihm die 
Offenbarung, die ihn befreit und unterwirft? Alles Fragen, die nur er selber sich beantworten kann, es gibt 
keinen allgemeingiltigen ordo salutis, aber auch keine allgemeingiltige Offenbarungsquelle, die Einer 
dem Andern demonstrieren könnte. Individuell ist endlich das Leben der auf der Offenbarung beruhenden 
Religion.’ 
 
80 Karl Barth, ‘Ob Jesus gelebt hat? Eine nachträgliche Osterbetrachtung, 1910,’ in Vorträge und 
kleinere Arbeiten 1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 
1993), e.g., 42-43: ‘Das «Leben Jesu», das Grund des Glaubens ist oder das für uns Gottes Offenbarung 
bedeutet, ist nicht die Reihe von äußeren Tatsachen, die von ihm überliefert ist. Das wäre der Rahmen, 
um den sich jetzt der Streit erhoben hat. Sondern Grund des Glaubens ist das persönliche innere Leben 
Jesu.’ 
 
81 For example, Karl Barth, ‘Der Christliche Glaube und die Geschichte, 1910,’ in Vorträge und 
kleinere Arbeiten 1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 
1993), 205: ‘Das Problem der Offenbarung besteht aber im Sehen und Aneignen unmittelbaren Lebens, 
das uns zunächst in der Person eines Andern entgegentritt.’ 
 
82 For example, Karl Barth, ‘La Réapparition de la Métaphysique dans la Théologie, 1911,’ in 
Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt 
(Zurich: TVZ, 1992), 336-337, where he speaks of, ‘…la voie de la foi, de la croyance, de la révélation, 
de l'inspiration ou quel que soit le terme dont nous nous servirions pour désigner l'expérience religieuse 
proprement dite…’ 
 
83 For example, Karl Barth, ‘Religion und Wissenschaft, 1912,’ in Vorträge und kleinere 
Arbeiten 1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 1993), 
435: ‘Die Gottesoffenbarung, die uns in dem Leben der biblischen Menschen entgegentritt[,] und die 
Gotteserfahrung[,] die wir erfahren, wenn wir uns unter ihre Wirkung stellen – das ist der Inhalt des 
Christentums.’ 
 
84 Barth, ‘La Réapparition.’ 
 
85 Barth, Predigten 1913, 226-227. 
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 In Romans II, after his break from liberalism, Barth’s concept of revelation was 
specified in a way which affected the scope of his idolatry-critique. Barth’s concept of 
revelation in Romans II was determined by his desire to understand it as radically 
separate from and, indeed, opposed to, all that belonged to the creaturely world, or 
which could be conceived or perceived directly by human beings.86 Thus, anything 
which was placed in a position which rightly belonged to revelation, but which was not 
opposed to all that was creaturely, or which could be directly perceived, was an idol. 
Indeed, ‘...to be known directly is the characteristic mark of an idol.’87 This meant, 
however, that the objective and subjective sides of what Barth had considered 
‘revelation – the ‘inner life of Jesus’ and ‘religious experience’ – had to be considered 
idols when they were actually held in roles which properly belong to revelation.88 As 
creaturely, directly perceptible, realities they could be no more than substitutes for it. 
The liberal doctrine of ‘revelation,’ and the theology based upon it, including that of 
Herrmann, became for him, in this way, idolatrous.89 
                                                          
86 Barth, Romans II, 98, 103; Hart, ‘Revelation,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, 
ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 50-51. 
 
87 Barth, Romans II, 38. 
 
88 Hans Frei (Giorgy Olegovich, ed., Ten Year Commemoration of the Life of Hans Frei (1922-
1988) (New York: Semenenko Foundation, 1999), 149) rightly sees Barth’s rejection of liberal Protestant 
‘relationalism,’ i.e., its understanding of revelation and the experience of revelation as co-inhering in one 
another, as the most fundamental aspect of his break with liberalism. 
 
89 Barth did not directly critique Herrmann in Romans II, but it is clear that in Barth’s numerous 
denials of the idea that religious experience and revelation could be identified, he had Herrmann in mind, 
at least in part. And while his direct criticisms of Schleiermacher (225, 258-260, 266-267) were not 
couched in the typical terms of an idolatry-critique, it is clear that Barth considered Schleiermacher to be 
a prime example of the entire theological movement which Romans II opposed, and which he described 
throughout as idolatry, the erecting and serving of a ‘No-God.’ (Barth, Romans II, 40) Even before 
Romans II, it had been evident that Barth conceived his new theological understanding, characterised by 
his new doctrine of revelation, as containing a critique of liberal Protestantism as idolatry. He famously 
wrote to Thurneysen in 1920, in close connection with a remark concerning Harnack, ‘Es ist offenbar, daß 
der Götze wackelt.’ (Barth – Thurneysen 1913-1921, 380) 
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 In fact, because of Barth’s understanding of revelation in Romans II, everything 
to which human beings ascribed titles or roles which properly belonged only to 
revelation (i.e., which they worshiped) was an idol. Revelation was, by definition, never 
an object to a human being in such a way that he or she could ascribe to it the titles or 
roles which rightly belonged to it. God can ‘never be identified with anything which we 
name, or experience, or conceive, or worship as God...’90 It is in this way that it came to 
be Barth’s view not only that all human worship is, intrinsically, idolatry, but also that, 
since all human beings worship, all human beings are idolaters. As Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation was specified such that it excluded everything created and perceptible to 
sinful creatures – including the inner life of Jesus and religious experience – his critique 
of idolatry was expanded to include all such realities when they were placed in a role 
which properly belongs only to revelation, i.e., made objects of human worship. 
 
2.1.2.2 From Romans II to the GD (1924)/CD I/1 (1932) 
Further changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation between the time of Romans II on the 
one hand and that of the Göttingen Dogmatics and the CD I/1 on the other (the doctrines 
of revelation in the latter two works were nearly identical) also led to changes within 
Barth’s idolatry critique. These changes can be summarised by saying that, in the latter 
two works, Barth’s doctrine of revelation was more thoroughly christological and 
Trinitarian than it had been in Romans II, and that, in those latter works, it was 
articulated in terms of the ‘threefold form of the Word of God.’ 
In Romans II, Barth’s doctrine of revelation was actually less focussed upon the 
person of Jesus Christ than had been his doctrine of revelation before his break from 
                                                          
90 Barth, Romans II, 331. See also Barth, Chr.D., 291, GD 134-135. 
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liberalism. In his absolute insistence that revelation could be neither identified with nor 
bound to any particular media, Barth relativised the importance of the humanity and 
(contra McCormack91) the events of the life of Jesus of Nazareth, such that these were 
ultimately merely a veil of revelation, among others, even if they were in some sense 
relatively higher or more important than others. The earthly life of Jesus was a ‘crater 
made at the percussion point of an exploding shell,’92 which also exploded and left 
craters elsewhere. ‘In Jesus we have discovered and recognized the truth that God is 
found everywhere and that, both before and after Jesus, men have been discovered by 
Him.’93 ‘We encounter in Jesus the scandal of an eternal revelation of that which 
Abraham and Plato had indeed already seen.’94 
In the GD and the CD I/1 it remained the case both that the content of 
‘revelation’ did not include the human flesh and earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth and 
that revelation was not limited to them as its exclusive media.95 But neither was Jesus of 
                                                          
91 Bruce McCormack argues that, in Romans II, ‘Jesus of Nazareth is the locus of revelation’ 
(Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 253) and that, ‘In the strictest sense, revelation in Romans II is the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ and only the resurrection.’ (KBCRDT, 251; see also McCormack, ‘Revelation 
and History,’ 26) In the latter statement, it is clear that McCormack intends Jesus’ bodily resurrection. In 
actual fact, Jesus of Nazareth is not absolutely unique in Romans II, and when Barth equates the 
resurrection with revelation he is not referring to the bodily resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. The word 
‘resurrection,’ rather, most often functions in Romans II as a way of referring to the supra-historical, 
directly imperceptible event of revelation. (Romans II, 29-30; 37, 40, 44, 88, 94, 96, 97, 116, 166, 177, 
185, 206, 211, 213, 218, 386, 419) It is not merely that the resurrection is non-historical because it is not 
produced by historical causation (McCormack, KBCRDT, 252); it is non-historical because it cannot be 
identified or bound to anything which occurs within history, including the bodily resurrection of Jesus - 
which, it should be said, Barth did believe occurred in history in its own right, as an effect of revelation 
(Barth, Romans II, 29-30). Link also errs, if he means to assert something near to what McCormack 
asserts, when he states that Jesus is ‘das authentische Medium der Offenbarung...’ (Christian Link, ‘Karl 
Barths Römerbrief (1921) als theologisches Signal,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 23, 2 (2007): 
149). Emphasis on the word ‘das’ added.) 
 
92 Barth, Romans II, 29. 
 
93 Barth, Romans II, 97. 
 
94 Barth, Romans II, 277. 
 
95 Barth, GD, 90-91; CD I/1, 323. 
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Nazareth merely a veil of revelation among others; rather, he was the definitive veil, in 
that the incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth became the pattern for all revelation.96 
In both the GD and the CD I/1 Barth patterned his understanding of revelation from 
orthodox Christology rather than – as in Romans II – understanding revelation in Jesus 
Christ (and under all other veils) in terms of a more abstractly conceived doctrine of 
revelation. Because this was the case, he came to believe that – against his statements in 
Romans II – revelation can really and objectively exist in history, albeit still in such a 
way that it is incapable of being directly observed by human beings.97 
Whereas in Romans II Barth’s doctrine of revelation was not overtly 
Trinitarian,98 by the time of both the GD and the CD I/1 Barth believed it necessary to 
speak of the Trinity as both the subject and object (i.e., the content) of revelation. 
Revelation, in fact, was for him the event of human participation in the Trinity’s self-
knowledge, as in it the Holy Spirit, utilising the human cognitive capacities, knows the 
Father through the Son: ‘…we know insofar as God knows himself.’99 In this way, the 
Trinity was for Barth the subject of revelation. The Trinity was also for Barth the 
content, that which is revealed, in revelation: ‘…the content of revelation is God alone, 
wholly God, God himself.’100 Most immediately, the content of revelation is the Son, 
                                                          
96 Barth, GD, 152-167; CD I/1, 315-324. See also Paul D. Jones, The Humanity of Christ: 
Christology in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 23, 51. 
 
97 Barth, GD, 131, 148, 160-161; CD I/1, 325. 
 
98 McCormack (KBCRDT, 259-262) sees the doctrine of revelation in Romans II as being 
‘functionally Trinitarian.’ While this analysis is questionable, McCormack allows that a ‘Trinity of being’ 
is not in view in Romans II, whether in connexion with the doctrine of revelation or otherwise, as it would 
need to be were revelation to have the Trinity as is subject and content. (KBCRDT, 262) 
 
99 Barth, GD, 329. 
 
100 Barth, GD, 88. 
 
43 
 
 
 
but knowledge of the Son was also, for him, mediately, knowledge of the Triune 
God.101 
While in Romans II Barth had radically emphasised the continual, absolute 
freedom of revelation vis-à-vis particular creaturely forms, in the GD and the CD I/1 he 
argued that revelation did exist in a special connection to particular creaturely forms, 
namely Scripture and Christian preaching. While this idea would receive its most 
mature expression in the doctrine of the threefold form of the Word of God in the CD 
I/1,102 it was already present in substance in the GD.103 Scripture and Christian 
preaching were not directly identical to revelation, but were indirectly identical to it, 
and could themselves be called ‘the Word of God.’104 
These three changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation caused changes in his 
idolatry-critique. The fact that revelation came to be conceived in more concretely 
christological terms meant that Barth’s rather abstractly conceived Romans II doctrine 
of revelation had to be rejected. Indeed, since Barth’s doctrine of revelation was in 
Romans II not christologically determined in the way in which he later believed that it 
must be, he would have to reckon with the possibility that, in Romans II, he had 
substituted that which was not revelation but an abstractly conceived idea of otherness, 
futurity, etc., for revelation. ‘It was necessary and right in face of the Immanentism of 
the preceding period to think with new seriousness about God’s futurity. But it was 
neither right nor necessary to do this in such a way that this one matter was put at the 
                                                          
101 Barth, GD, 154; CD I/1, 304, 309. 
 
102 Barth, CD I/1, §4. 
 
103 Barth, GD, §§2, 8. 
 
104 Barth, CD I/1, 117. 
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head of all Christian teaching.’105 Once again, a specifying of Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation excluded a certain reality which he had once understood to be revelation, 
such that his critique of idolatry was expanded so as to implicate his own prior 
conception of revelation.  
The fact that Barth’s doctrine of revelation came to be understood as having the 
Trinity as both its subject and content caused it also to become the case that he 
understood non-Trinitarian ‘revelations’ as not revelation; i.e., as substitutes for true 
revelation, and thus idols. In terms of the ordo cognoscendi the Trinity (both its being, 
and its being as the subject and content of revelation) was derivative of the event of 
revelation, but it was necessarily derivative of it.106 The doctrine of the Trinity was, for 
Barth, ‘indirectly…identical with the statement about revelation,’107 a 
‘necessary…analysis of revelation.’108 To speak of revelation which was not the 
revelation of which the Trinity was the subject and content was to speak of that which 
was not revelation, but a substitute. To speak of God in abstraction from the doctrine of 
the Trinity, even temporarily, was to reveal that one had substituted that which was 
created for revelation as the source of one’s knowledge of God, i.e., that one had 
already committed idolatry. Both those who Barth believed denied that God was Triune 
in God’s immanent life (Sabellius, Schleiermacher and much modern theology which 
followed him109) and those who spoke first of God as One, and then later added the 
information that God was also Triune (much of medieval theology and Protestant 
                                                          
105 Barth, CD II/1, 636. 
 
106 Barth, CD I/1, 308-310. 
 
107 Barth, CD I/1, 309. 
 
108 Barth, CD I/1, 310. 
 
109 Barth, GD, 101; CD I/1, 352-353. 
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Orthodoxy110), Barth believed, committed idolatry along these lines. Barth wrote: ‘We 
must keep vigorously aloof from this tradition, remembering that a Church dogmatics 
derives from a doctrine of the Trinity, and therefore that there is no possibility of 
reckoning with the being of any other God, or with any other being of God, than that of 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as it is in revelation and in eternity.’111 
Barth’s doctrine of the threefold form of the Word of God also implicitly re-
shaped his idolatry-critique. Scripture and preaching were not included within the 
concept of revelation, strictly speaking, but they were loosely speaking in that they were 
held to be indirectly identical to revelation. This doctrine represented a willingness to 
understand revelation as in a certain sense bound – only, to be sure, by the faithfulness 
and constancy of God’s ongoing choice – to particular creaturely media in an ongoing 
way. In Romans II, Barth would have understood ‘revelation’ bound (even in this sense) 
to, or indirectly identical with, creaturely media as not true revelation, and thus an 
idol.112 The doctrine of the threefold form of the Word of God meant that revelation’s 
being in this sense bound to particular creaturely media no longer ipso facto meant that 
it was not true revelation, and thus an idol. At the same time, it specified to which 
creaturely media true revelation was bound and with which it was indirectly identical, 
and, by implication, that ‘revelation’ ongoingly bound to other media was not revelation 
(and thus an idol). It also specified to which creaturely media the human being ought to 
look in expectation of revelation and the overcoming of his or her idolatry. 
 
 
                                                          
110 Barth, CD II/1, 261. 
 
111 Barth, CD II/1, 261. 
 
112 Barth, Romans II, 66. 
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2.1.2.3 From the GD (1924)/CD I/1 (1932) to the CD IV/2 (1955) 
Barth’s later, implicit, doctrine of revelation demonstrated a willingness to bind 
revelation to Jesus of Nazareth in a way in which he did not in Romans II, the GD or the 
CD I/1. This is the case although many treatments of Barth on revelation do not 
acknowledge this significant shift in his later thinking.113 The shift can be seen, with 
particular clarity, in the CD IV/2, §64 (1955). It is clear there, in particular, that Barth, 
by that time, had come to consider the human nature of Jesus of Nazareth, which was 
for him the humanum, human nature itself,114 part of the content of revelation: ‘The 
truth is that this human history, ‘the earthly life of Jesus,’ belongs with the act of God to 
that which is revealed.’115 It became the case for Barth that the incarnation not only 
provided the pattern for revelation, but that it was also its content. The content of 
revelation was not merely God but the union of the human and divine natures in Jesus, 
and also, therefore, the union of God and human beings in general.116  
 In other words, for Barth at this time, a logos asarkos could not be true 
revelation, but only an idol: ‘[Jesus Christ] is God in the flesh-distinguished from all the 
idols imagined and fashioned by men by the fact that they are not God in the flesh, but 
products of human speculation on naked deity, λόγοι ἄσαρκοι.’117 This stands in 
                                                          
113 Hart’s essay on ‘Revelation,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, for example, 
which is perhaps the most definitive recent treatment of Barth’s doctrine of revelation, does not mention 
this change. 
 
114 Barth, CD IV/2, 48. 
 
115 Barth, CD IV/2, 35. 
 
116 Barth, CD IV/2, 100. While the matter cannot be pursued in detail here, there is validity in 
Wingren’s criticism that Barth’s doctrine of revelation meant that the incarnation held a more central 
place in his thinking than that of the crucifixion and resurrection, with questionable biblical justification. 
(Wingren, TiC, 109-122) 
 
117 Barth, CD IV/2, 101. 
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contrast to Barth’s earlier whole-hearted acceptance of the extra Calvinisticum,118 which 
was a corollary to his belief that the human nature of Jesus of Nazareth was not the only 
veil of revelation and that the content of revelation was the divine nature alone. Even in 
1955 Barth was not fully rejecting the extra Calvinisticum – contra, e.g., te Velde119 the 
logos asarkos undoubtedly had an ongoing ontological existence for him – but rather 
the idea that the logos asarkos could be known as such, apart from the flesh of Jesus of 
Nazareth.120 
The only revelation to which human beings had access was, for Barth at this 
time, the logos ensarkos, the revelation of the union of the divine and human in Jesus 
Christ. To afford to a supposed ‘revelation’ which did not have the human nature of 
Jesus of Nazareth as part of its content, a logoi asarkoi, a place that properly belonged 
to revelation alone, would therefore be to replace revelation with that which was not 
revelation, i.e., to commit idolatry. One must, therefore, according to the Barth of this 
time, hold to the logos ensarkos and the knowledge of the relationship between God and 
human beings disclosed in revelation if idolatry is to be avoided. Barth himself did not 
do this sufficiently, by his own later standard, in Romans II, in the GD or in the CD I/1 
(where he accepted the existence of the logos askarkos not only as an ontological reality 
but also as a noetically accessible one and understood the divine nature alone to be the 
                                                          
118 Barth, GD, 158-160. 
 
119 Dolf te Velde, Paths Beyond Tracing Out: The Connection of Method and Content in the 
Doctrine of God, Examined in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School (Delft: Eburon, 
2010), 360. 
 
120 Barth, CD IV/2, 101-102. Barth connects his denial of the logos asarkos to his denial of the 
possibility of legitimate natural religion, natural theology, and natural law. Yet as Barth does not deny the 
ontological existence of the logos asarkos, but only its noetic accessibility to sinners, so also (as will be 
seen) does he not deny the theoretical possibility of natural theology, etc., but only their impossibility in 
practice due to the human inability to access the logos apart from the logos ensarkos. 
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content of revelation), and was thus liable in those works to his own later idolatry-
critique, i.e., to the claim that he substituted for revelation that which was not. 
 
2.2 Idolatry and Natural Theology 
2.2.1 What Barth meant by ‘natural theology’ 
Over the course of Barth’s career, one phenomenon that he held, with remarkable 
consistency, to be based upon an illegitimate source of knowledge of God (i.e., one 
which replaced genuine revelation) was natural theology. Thus, from at least 1911 up 
until the end of his career he criticised natural theology as idolatry.121 When Barth 
spoke of natural theology he meant the purported exposition of God, and/or creation in 
relation to God, which has as its source and/or norm, in whole or in part, revelatio 
naturalis, i.e., any purported source of knowledge of God other than revelatio specialis. 
This formal definition is reflective of Barth’s own throughout his career, even in spite of 
material changes in his understanding of the terms which comprise it.122 Further, 
‘revelatio specialis’ was always, though in different senses throughout Barth’s career, 
bound up with the person of Jesus Christ, such than Hüttenhoff is also right to say – at 
least from the time he came under Herrmann’s influence on – that, ‘Eine natürliche 
Theologie liegt nach Barth immer dann vor, wenn einer „Instanz" neben der 
                                                          
121 Barth, GD, 343-349; ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 55; CD II/1, 86. 
 
122 This formal definition fits with both Barth’s earlier (pre-Romans) thinking (though he did not 
expressly define natural theology during that time period) and the more material definitions which Barth 
would offer of natural theology between 1934 and 1940 (see below), but those later material definitions 
do not completely agree with all of Barth’s pre-Romans thinking. It is also to be admitted that, as will be 
seen below, Barth held to a form of negative natural theology during a certain portion of his career which 
fit into this definition, but which he did not identify as natural theology at the time. He later abandoned it 
and identified it as such. This was not due to a change in his definition of natural theology, but rather to a 
more rigorous application of it. 
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Offenbarung in Jesus Christus, wie sie die Bibel bezeugt, eine selbstständige Bedeutung 
für die theologische Erkenntnis zugeschrieben wird.’123 
 In order for the first definition of natural theology offered above to be an 
accurate reflection of Barth’s own understanding over the vast majority of his career, it 
must be specified that the term ‘revelatio specialis’ has to be understood as referring to 
actual special revelation, and not merely to a principle or concept of such, to a reality 
which is claimed as such, or which satisfies an abstract, a priori criteria for being such. 
Thus, revelatio naturalis, because defined as ‘any purported source of knowledge of 
God other than revelatio specialis,’ must be understood to include not only not only the 
knowledge of God which is purportedly generally and statically available to the human 
being in nature and reason,124 but also that which is called special revelation or meets an 
abstract criteria for being such, but which from the perspective of actual special 
revelation must be judged not to be.125 By extension, even those theologies which have 
as their source and norm ostensible or purported, but not actual, special revelation, must 
be judged from the perspective of actual revelation to be instances of theologia 
naturalis. In spite of the fact that Barth seemed in his 1937-1938 Gifford Lectures to 
express agreement with Gifford’s own statement to the effect that natural theology is a 
science constructed, ‘without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special 
                                                          
123 Michael Hüttenhoff, ‘Im Kampf gegen die Einheitsfront der natürlichen Theologie: Karl 
Barth und seine Gegner 1932 bis 1935,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 26, 1 (2010): 13. See 
Herrmann, CCwG, 59, 77-78, 282; Barth, ‘Religion und Wissenschaft,’ 434; ‘Der Christliche Glaube und 
die Geschichte,’ 203-205. 
 
124 Definitions like this one of that form of ‘revelation’ which is the ground of natural theology 
are common. See, e.g., John Macquarrie, ‘Natural Theology,’ in The Blackwell Encyclopedia, ed. Alister 
E. McGrath (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 402; Rodney Holder, The Heavens Declare: Natural 
Theology and the Legacy of Karl Barth (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton, 2012), 35. 
 
125 Barth, GD, 91. 
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exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation,’126 he elsewhere understood even 
theologies based on ‘supposed’ or ‘so-called,’ but not actual, special revelation to be 
natural theologies. 
 A prime example of this is Barth’s critique of the ‘theology’ of National 
Socialism as an idolatrous natural theology.127 Barr,128 and Holder129 and Grant130 
following Barr, criticise Barth’s identification of National Socialist ideology with 
natural theology,131 on the grounds that it based itself on, as Barth himself said, ‘a 
specific new revelation of God,’132 and thus would be better characterised as an instance 
of revealed theology. Their criticisms fail to take into account that Barth distinguished 
between natural and revealed theology not, as they do,133 on the basis of a theology’s 
claims to special revelation or claims to a ‘revelation’ which might fit into such a 
category, abstractly defined, but of the objective presence or absence of actual special 
revelation. While Barth was fully aware that the proponents of National Socialism 
                                                          
126 Barth, KGSG, 3-4. 
 
127 See, e.g., Barth, CD II/1, 173. 
 
128 James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: The Gifford Lectures for 1991: Delivered 
in the University of Edinburgh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 112-113. 
 
129 Holder, THD, 36-37. 
 
130 Colin Grant, ‘Why Should Theology be Unnatural?’ Modern Theology 23, 1 (2007): 95-96. 
 
131 Barth, CD II/1, 178: ‘The question [of natural theology] became a burning one at the moment 
when the Evangelical Church in Germany was unambiguously and consistently confronted by a definite 
and new form of natural theology, namely, by the demand to recognise in the political events of the year 
1933, and especially in the form of the God-sent Adolf Hitler, a source of specific new revelation of God, 
which, demanding obedience and trust, took its place beside the revelation attested in Holy Scripture, 
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132 Barth, CD II/1, 173. 
 
133 E.g., Holder, THD, 35. According to Holder, in National Socialism’s ‘theology,’ ‘two very 
distinctive features of natural theology are quite absent... – namely, rationality and the tendency to 
universality,’ and thus it ought not be called natural theology. 
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claimed to be in possession of a ‘special revelation,’ he judged that their ‘theology’ was, 
in fact, wholly devoid of actual special revelation, and was thus by implication based on 
that which was merely, in the broad sense, ‘natural.’ 
 For the vast majority of Barth’s career, and with especial clarity in his 1929 
essay ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’134 and his 1933 ‘The First Commandment as an 
Axiom of Theology,’135 Barth’s insistence that it was the presence of absence of special 
revelation in the relevant roles in a theology which determined whether it was a natural 
or revealed theology meant that there was for him a sense in which all human theology, 
including his own, was as such ‘natural theology.’136  This was because no human 
theology – undertaken as it always was, by the natural human being with his or her 
natural concepts – could as such possess revelation and utilise it as its direct source or 
intrinsically conform to it as its norm – finitum non capax infinitum. Theology, for 
Barth, was not merely natural, but revealed theology only by virtue of God’s election, 
i.e., of God’s ongoing choice to give revelation to it as its (indirect) source, and to cause 
it to have God as its object, in spite of its intrinsic naturalness. ‘Real theology of God’s 
Word…gets underway only if, no, only when God is underway…If I am called to do 
this theology, then so I am…not because my dialectics are great, but because God 
condescends to make use of me and this my doubtful tool.’137 Barth held that God’s 
                                                          
134 Karl Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ in The Way of Theology in Karl Barth: Essays and 
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135 Karl Barth, ‘TFC.’ 
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election did leave intrinsic marks upon and within revealed theologies, but these could 
only distinguish revealed theology relatively, and never absolutely, from natural 
theology. Considered according to their intrinsic natures, the distinction between 
revealed and natural theology was not between truth and error, the knowledge of God 
and idolatry, but between two forms of idolatry.  
 Barth himself reserved the term ‘natural theology’ for those theologies which 
were only natural, i.e., which were non-elect, and which, therefore, did not bear the 
intrinsic marks of election. Even so, his definition of natural theology was very broad 
and inclusive. He showed little interest in discussing in detail the merits and demerits of 
the various forms of natural theology; for most of his career, instead, as will be seen, he 
simply rejected all natural theology as idolatry a priori. For this he has again been 
criticised by Barr.138 This can only be a valid criticism, however, if Barth was, in the 
first place, wrong in his claim, to be discussed below, that obedience to revelation 
forces the theologian to reject all natural theology as idolatry a priori. 
 
2.2.2 The formal relationship between revelation, natural theology, and idolatry 
Idolatry, revelation, and natural theology were formally inter-related in Barth’s thinking 
throughout his career in such a manner that changes in Barth’s material understanding 
of revelation ipso facto brought about changes in his material understanding of natural 
theology and its relation to idolatry. This was true in at least two ways. In the first place, 
Barth’s answer to the question of whether or not true revelation included within it 
genuine revelatio naturalis controlled Barth’s evaluation of natural theology and his 
understanding of its relationship to idolatry. Since idolatry is the substitution of that 
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which is not God’s revelation for that which is, the nature of true revelation determines 
the scope of potential idols. The exclusion of a certain reality from being genuine 
revelation means the inclusion of it in the field of that which might be improperly (i.e., 
idolatrously) substituted for revelation; but the inclusion of a particular reality in the 
concept of revelation means that it is not a potential idol; it cannot be idolatrously 
substituted for revelation because it is itself revelation. The inclusion of a genuine 
revelatio naturalis – i.e., a source of genuine knowledge of God apart from revelatio 
specialis – in the concept of revelatio would mean that theologies could, while taking 
revelatio naturalis as their source and norm (i.e., while being natural theologies), truly 
have revelation as their source and norm (roles which, for Barth, belong properly and 
objectively in theology only to revelation). If, on the other hand, the concept of 
revelation was specified to exclude all revelatio naturalis then all theologies which took 
revelatio naturalis as their source and norm (i.e., all natural theologies) would not have 
truly given those roles to revelation, but would rather have committed idolatry – 
affording to that which is not truly revelation roles which properly belongs to revelation 
alone. Natural theology would be de jure idolatry. 
 In the second place, changes in Barth’s understanding of what constituted 
revelatio specialis would necessarily affect the scope of what counted as natural 
theology. Natural theology is that theology which takes as its source and norm revelatio 
naturalis – defined broadly as a real or purported source of the knowledge of God other 
than revelatio specialis. Thus, the way that Barth defined revelatio specialis determined 
the scope of what counted as revelatio naturalis, which, in turn, determined the scope of 
what counted as theologia naturalis.  
54 
 
 
 
 In both of these ways, it was Barth’s understanding of revelation which 
demanded, drove, and controlled the idolatry-critique as it applied to natural theology. 
Specific examples of the fact that, and the way in which, changes in Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation and his understanding of special revelation led to changes in his evaluation of 
natural theology (as idolatrous or non-idolatrous) and to changes in the scope of what 
counted as natural theology will be discussed below in detail. 
 
2.2.3 Four early turns in Barth’s idolatry-critique as related to natural theology 
Despite great continuity in Barth’s rejection of natural theology as idolatry across his 
career, four early ‘turns’ can be identified. These are (1) his initial rejection of natural 
theology as idolatry under the influence of Herrmann (2.2.3.1); (2) his expansion of his 
critique of natural theology as idolatry such that his liberal teachers and his own earlier 
theology was implicated in it (2.2.3.2); (3) his rejection of the negative natural theology, 
which he had previously accepted, as being idolatrous (2.2.3.3); (4) his grounding of his 
rejection of natural theology as idolatry as a consequence of the noetic effects of sin 
(2.2.3.4).  
 The first and third of these turns are material examples of the first way in which 
it was specified formally above that changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation 
necessarily affected his view and critique of natural theology, i.e., they are examples of 
Barth’s narrowing of what counted as revelation, such that natural theology (first 
seemingly in general, with a specific emphasis on metaphysics, and then also, 
specifically, negative natural theology, which he had come to accept) had to be judged 
as idolatry. The second of these turns is a material example of the second way in which 
it was specified formally above that changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation affected 
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his understanding of natural theology, i.e., it is an example of Barth’s specifying of 
what counted as revelatio specialis such that the scope of what counted as natural 
theology came to include that which it previously had not. These four turns were 
completed by the 1924 Göttingen Dogmatics, where the mature form of his rejection of 
natural theology as idolatry was solidified, and after which it remained constant.  
   
2.2.3.1 Barth’s initial rejection of natural theology as idolatry 
Barth’s first turn was from an early, critical acceptance of the legitimacy of natural 
theology to a rejection of it as idolatry. This turn was elicited by a specifying of his 
doctrine of revelation such that it excluded revelatio naturalis. It can be made visible by 
a comparative analysis of two of Barth’s early essays: his 1907, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit 
des Paulus nach der Darstellung der Apostelgeschichte,’139 and his 1911, ‘La 
Réapparition de la Métaphysique dans la Théologie.’ In the former essay, there is 
evidence of an early acceptance of the idea that genuine revelation includes revelatio 
naturalis. Barth could speak, for example, of, ‘jener natürlichen Offenbarung, die auch 
[Paulus] anerkennt,’140 and he could write that, ‘Gerade die hier vorgetragene 
Auffassung von der vorchristlichen Religiosität bei Juden und Heiden war doch wohl 
auch die des [Paulus], nämlich: auch sie ist Offenbarung ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν 
(Rom 1, 19).’141 Thus, the preaching of Christ, according to Barth, was not opposed to, 
but was rather the ‘fulfilment’ [Erfüllung] of and ‘supplement’ [Ergänzung] to that 
                                                          
139 Karl Barth, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit des Paulus nach der Darstellung der Apostelgeschichte,’ 
in Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1905-1909 (GA III.21) ( Zurich: TVZ, 1992), 217. 
 
140 Barth, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit,’ 217. 
 
141 Barth, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit,’ 214. See also p. 213. 
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which could be known of God from nature.142 In other words, because Barth’s 
understanding of revelation was broad enough to include genuine natural revelation, 
natural theology was not de jure idolatry, although, to be sure, it could be de facto.143 
Theology, while having natural revelation at its source and norm – i.e., while being 
natural theology – could be truly have revelation in those roles, and could thus be non-
idolatrous. 
 The 1911 essay shows that Barth had performed an about-face on these matters 
by that year. The difference was Herrmann. The 1907 essay was written in May of that 
year, while Barth was a student at Berne: just after he had become a serious reader of 
both Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Herrmann,144 and just before he went to 
Marburg to study under Herrmann in April 1908.145 Herrmann belonged to a tradition – 
to which Schleiermacher and Ritschl also belonged – which understood revelation in 
such a manner as to exclude the possibility of what they understood to be revelatio and 
therefore theologia naturalis (predominantly metaphysical theology). Schleiermacher 
did this by locating the reception of revelation in the realm of neither thinking nor 
doing, but feeling [Gefühl].146 Ritschl, urging that revealed, religious knowledge came 
by way of value-judgments,147 polemicised sharply against metaphysics in theology.148 
                                                          
142 Barth, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit,’ 214. 
 
143 Barth, ‘Die Missionsthätigkeit,’ 214. 
 
144 Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. John 
Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1976), 40-41. 
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Development of the Doctrine, ed. H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macauley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1902), 
212-213. 
57 
 
 
 
Herrmann was faithful to this tradition in his own way, holding that God was not 
accessible to human beings in nature or history as such, but only in God’s own 
historical, revelatory act.149 
 In the 1911 essay, Barth appeared as a faithful follower of Herrmann and this 
tradition more broadly as he sought to combat the existence of metaphysics in theology, 
an issue which he closely linked to, if not identified with, natural theology.150 In 
contrast to his 1907 essay, he insisted that special revelation was the only form of 
revelation that existed: ‘La réalité de l'Absolu, de Dieu, est donnée par la religion, soit 
par la révélation historique.’151 He therefore said of metaphysics/natural theology, ‘c'est 
ériger une idole («einen Götzen aufrichten und anbeten») selon l'expression qui revient 
souvent sous la plume de Ritschl et de Herrmann...’152 This change is an example of the 
first way in which it was specified above that a material change in Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation would affect his view of natural theology; namely, it was a specifying of 
Barth’s doctrine of revelation such that it was exclusive of ‘natural revelation’ which 
led to the belief that natural theology involved the substitution of that revelation with 
that which was not, and, therefore, to the critique of natural theology as de jure idolatry.  
Barth would continue to critique natural theology as being necessarily, wholly 
idolatrous in this way throughout the remainder of his career.153 
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2.2.3.2 Barth’s expansion of his critique of natural theology as idolatry such that 
his liberal teachers and his own earlier theology were implicated 
A specifying of Barth’s understanding of special revelation was the impetus for this 
second turn in his critique of natural theology as idolatry, which was an expansion in 
the scope of what for him counted, and by this time had to be critiqued as, natural 
theology, implicating not only his former liberal teachers in that critique, but also his 
earlier self. As has been suggested, since roughly 1908 Barth had in large measure 
accepted the liberal, Herrmannian conception of revelation. Under this conception, 
revelation was understood to include only special revelation, but there was a tendency 
toward identifying that special revelation with religious experience.154 The core of 
Barth’s break from liberalism, as Frei has rightly suggested, was his rejection of this 
tendency.155 McCormack’s placement of that break in the year 1915 is likely proper,156 
but it is in the 1922 Romans II that it received its clearest and most complete early 
expression. 
 In Romans II, Barth spoke of revelation as that which is totally free from, and 
wholly other than, all that is created and exists within the world of time including, 
crucially, religious experience and even the actual experience of being a recipient of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide a Unified Response (Downers 
Grove: Intervarsity, 2014), 194-195), and that ‘…Barth’s rejection of natural theology…should be 
understood only as a rejection of the possibility of an intimate and genuine knowledge of God outside of 
active, triune self-disclosure through gracious, personal and transformative encounter with Jesus Christ by 
the ministry of the Spirit.’ (Epistemological Dilemma, 194) Barth’s did not see the undertaking of natural 
theology as merely inadequate but, rather, as being an act of idolatry. 
 
154 See, for example, Barth’s 1909 statement in Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921 (GA I.18), 
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von Seiten Gottes Offenbarung.’ 
 
155 Hans Frei, ‘The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of Karl Barth, 1909-1922: The Nature 
of Barth’s Break with Liberalism’ (PhD diss., Yale University, 1956), 111-115. 
 
156 McCormack, KBCRDT, 123. 
 
59 
 
 
 
revelation.157 But if actual special revelation is wholly other than religious experience, 
then the ‘revelation’ of liberal Protestantism and the earlier Barth, could not be special 
revelation. It could only be something ‘natural,’ and their theologies which were built 
upon it natural theologies. Barth did not in Romans II specifically critique the theologies 
of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann, or his earlier self as natürlich Theologie, and 
thus idolatry. He would, however, do so later, and the groundwork for that critique was 
already laid in Romans II.158  
 This turn was an example of the second of the two ways in which it was 
specified above that changes in Barth’s understanding of revelation would necessarily 
lead to changes in his understanding of the scope of what counted as natural theology, 
i.e., it was a specifying of what counted as revelatio specialis which led to the inclusion 
as theologia naturalis of forms of theology which he had previously not understood as 
such. In particular, Barth’s doctrine of special revelation was specified such that it 
excluded anything which could be identified, or even understood as continuous with, 
religious experience, making it merely natural, and the theologies based upon it 
idolatrous natural theologies.  
 Barr criticises Barth’s identification of Protestant liberalism as natural theology 
as ‘somewhat misleading’159 because ‘one of the main features of Modern Protestantism 
– let us say, since the mid‐eighteenth century – was its departure from the tradition of 
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natural theology which had, in fact, been highly influential in Protestantism.’160 While 
there is a kernel of truth in this – as has been seen, Barth did first reject natural theology 
because of his dependence upon the liberal Protestant tradition – it is unfair to Barth to 
call his rejection of liberal Protestantism as natural theology misleading. He did not 
deny that liberal theologians outwardly disavowed natural theology. He simply adopted 
a certain conception of special revelation which led him to see them as being also 
(unwittingly) implicated in it. 
 
2.2.3.3 Barth’s rejection of the negative natural theology which he had previously 
accepted 
The third turn in Barth’s idolatry-critique as it related to natural theology was his 
subjection of negative natural theology – which he had for a time accepted as valid – to 
the same critique as the positive form of it. In Romans II, Barth believed in the 
existence of a genuine negative natural revelation – a negative knowledge of God, and 
self and world in relation to God available apart from special revelation, and in 
particular, in the realm of existential experience. Thus, while he completely rejected as 
idolatry all forms of positive natural theology, he accepted it in a negative form. 
McCormack errs in stating that there is no truth in Stadtland’s claim that, in Romans II, 
‘Barth ‘made a place for a ‘negative’ natural theology.’161 Within Romans II, perhaps 
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the clearest evidence of this is found in Barth’s comments on Romans 1.19-21. These 
verses, which are often thought to provide warrant for natural theology, are in Romans 
II interpreted by Barth as allowing for only a negative natural theology. He writes, for 
example, that: ‘By calm, veritable, unprejudiced religious contemplation the divine ‘No’ 
can be established and apprehended. If we do not ourselves hinder it, nothing can 
prevent our being translated into a most wholesome KRISIS by that which may be 
known of God.’162 Other passages in Romans II confirm this interpretation.163  
 The later Barth also helps to confirm it. In his 1934 Nein! to Brunner he claimed 
that Brunner, in an earlier essay164 held to a belief in a negative theologia naturalis 
along these same lines.165 According to Barth: 
 It seemed, then, that Brunner was not speaking, as he is now, of a directly 
 observable continuity between nature and grace, reason and revelation, but of a 
 continuity which at the same time was discontinuity, which provided both a 
 contact and a contrast. The latter was said to be so great that the continuity was 
 subordinate to the discontinuity, the contact to the contrast...All natural 
 knowledge of God is – so Brunner then said – essentially a knowledge of the
 wrath of God. And being subject to the wrath of God meant the same thing 
 objectively as a bad conscience or despair subjectively...The ‘contact’ made in
 the natural knowledge of God consists in the fact that it involves ‘a loss of 
 certainty’...The question is this: has Brunner abandoned that merely indirect or 
 negative significance of the natural knowledge of God? 166 
 
Barth went on to lament the apparent fact that he had, and then made the admission that, 
‘...around 1920, and perhaps even later, I might still have succumbed to [this view]. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rustin Brian (Covering up Luther: How Barth’s Christology Challenged the Deus Absconditus that 
Haunts Modernity (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2013), 66-67) rightly affirm it. 
 
162 Barth, Romans II, 46.  
 
163 E.g., Barth, Romans II, 47, 245, 251. 
 
164 Emil Brunner, ‘Die Frage nach dem ‘Anknüpfungspunkt als Problem der Theologie,’’ 
Zwischen den Zeiten 10 (1932): 505-532. 
 
165 Barth, ‘No!,’ 113-114. 
 
166 Barth, ‘No!,’ 113-114. 
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And who knows whether one could not find passages in the Epistle to the Romans in 
which I have said something of the sort myself?’167 Barth did indeed say something of 
the sort; his above description of Brunner’s negative theologia naturalis is very nearly a 
description of his own in Romans II.168 
 The idea that there existed a negative form of natural revelation contained within 
the idea of true revelation, represented an inconsistency within Barth’s thinking in 
Romans II. If God and God’s revelation were as wholly other as Barth held them to be 
at the time, then negative knowledge of them should have been naturally just as out of 
the reach of the human as that of the positive sort. It ought to have been the case, as it 
was for Barth later, that, in the words of Schwöbel, ‘the ‘beyond’ of God is not the 
‘beyond’ of the human mind,’169 and thus that negative natural theology was no less 
idolatrous than the positive form of it. This feature of Barth’s thinking fit poorly with 
the rest of it, and is likely a product of the influence of Kierkegaard (the influence of 
whom on Romans II, it is interesting to note, in light of the fact that McCormack denies 
the existence of a negative natural knowledge of God in Romans II, McCormack 
downplays170). 
 This inconsistency – which Barth likely simply recognised to be such – was 
largely corrected by the time of the 1924 Göttingen Dogmatics. This can be seen in §4, 
‘Man and his Question,’ in which he made clear that God’s ‘answer’ may in no sense be 
                                                          
167 Barth, ‘No!,’ 114-115. 
 
168 As Gilland shows, Brunner had also perceived a certain kind negative natural theology in 
Barth’s earlier theology (David Andrew Gilland, Law and Gospel in Emil Brunner’s Earlier Dialectical 
Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 74-76, 266). 
 
169 Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Theology,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John 
Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 26. 
 
170 McCormack, KBCRDT, 216-217, 235-240. 
 
63 
 
 
 
conceived of as the answer to the human question conceived independently of it.171 It 
can be seen, further in, §15, ‘The Knowability of God,’ and particularly in Barth’s 
treatment therein of Romans 1.19-20. In Romans II, Barth had interpreted this passage 
as meaning that human beings had access only to a negative natural knowledge of God. 
In the GD, by contrast, he interpreted it as meaning that as human beings we have the 
ability to, ‘be aware of the limit of our knowledge in relation to relation to God,’ but 
with the clear caveat that such negative knowledge is truly continuous with negative 
knowledge of God only in the event of revelation.172 There being no negative 
knowledge of God available outwith special revelation, by the time of the GD negative 
natural theology was left in the same position the positive sort; it was considered to be, 
like it, idolatry.  
 Once more, this was a material example of the first way, described above, in 
which changes in Barth’s doctrine of revelation necessarily meant a change in his view 
of natural theology: his concept of revelation was specified, this time such that it 
excluded also negative natural knowledge of God, meaning that even a negative natural 
theology – that theology based upon negative natural revelation – had to be considered 
to be idolatry. Unlike the first two turns, this change was more the resolution of an 
internal inconsistency in Barth’s thinking than a fundamental change in Barth’s doctrine 
of revelation. 
 
                                                          
171 Barth, GD, 69. The thesis of §4 runs as follows: ‘God's revelation, which is the basis of 
Christian preaching, is the answer to our question how we can overcome the contradiction in our 
existence, which we have to view not as our destiny but as our responsible act, and which we know that 
we cannot overcome. But we know ourselves in this regard only as God makes himself known to us. We 
would not ask about God had not God already answered us. Because of this, we can neither evade the 
question about God nor settle it in any sense.’ Elsewhere within the same paragraph Barth asks (the 
implicit answer clearly being ‘no’): ‘Can man know himself except as he is primarily known by God 
himself?’ (83) 
 
172 Barth, GD, 341-342; 325. 
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2.2.3.4 Barth’s grounding of his rejection of natural theology as idolatry as a 
consequence of the noetic effects of sin 
The fourth turn in Barth’s idolatry-critique as it was brought to bear upon natural 
theology was his specifying that all natural theology must of necessity be idolatry 
because of the noetic effects of sin. In other words, it came to be made clear that the 
reason that purported natural revelation could not truly be revelation, and that the 
practice of natural theology must, therefore, by definition, be an act of idolatrous 
substitution, was not the fact that natural revelation did not in any sense exist, but rather 
the fact that it might as well not exist, because the human being as sinner could not 
subjectively appropriate it. This turn can once again be made most clearly visible 
through a comparative analysis of Romans II and the Göttingen Dogmatics. 
 As matters were presented by Barth in Romans II, positive natural theology 
necessarily constituted idolatry because supposed natural revelation was not true 
revelation, and supposed natural revelation, in turn, could not be true revelation because 
of the absolute ontological distinction between God and nature. For this reason, natural 
theology was necessarily the idolatrous substitution of revelation with that which was 
not. Barth did not state this in Romans II in so many words, but the radical ontological 
dualism between God and the world, which is so characteristic of this work, forces the 
conclusion that this was his thinking.173 There was no positive likeness between God 
and the world, no ongoing analogy which could be the basis of positive natural 
knowledge of God and by extension a legitimate positive natural theology.  
 By the time of the GD Barth’s view had changed: the world in theory could, and, 
in fact, objectively did, reveal God, though many interpreters – including Holder, 
                                                          
173 Barth, Romans II, 36, 39, 53, 103. 
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Berkouwer, and Berkhof174  – have missed the fact that this was Barth’s mature 
position. A non-idolatrous natural theology was thus, in theory possible. In actual 
practice, however, the natural revelation present in the world could never be 
subjectively appropriated by human beings, even in part, due to the noetic effects of 
sin.175 According to Barth, special revelation: 
                                                          
174 Holder shows that he misses this shift when, in an attempt to speak of Barth’s thinking during 
the Church Dogmatics period, he writes that for him natural theology is impossible because, ‘God is 
unknowable because of the ontological difference – the ‘infinite, qualitative distinction,’ as Kierkegaard 
put it – between God the Creator and man the creature, and because sin has corrupted man’s nature.’  
(THD, 27) This was true of Barth’s thinking in Romans II, but not in the GD and after. G.C. Berkouwer 
(General Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 30) wrongly claims that Barth, even in his mature 
position, is to be sharply distinguished from Calvin, in that the latter believed in the objective ability of 
the cosmos to furnish knowledge of God which was unable to be appropriated due to the noetic effects of 
sin. This was also Barth’s mature position. Hendrik Berkhof (‘Barths Lichterlehre im Rahmen der 
heutigen Theologie, Kirche und Welt,’ in Karl Barths Lichterlehre (Zurich: TVZ, 1978), 32-33) similarly 
errs when he writes that, ‘...die Lichtlosigkeit der Welt ist bei Barth nicht die Folge einer boshaften 
Blindheiten des Menschen, sondern einer grundsätzlichen Sprachlosigkeit der guten Schöpfung Gottes’ 
and claims that Barth’s position changed such that it aligned with Calvin’s belief in an objective general 
revelation only very late in his career. (‘Lichterlehre,’ 35) Similarly, Diller’s claim that, ‘It is safe to 
conclude that the fundamental difference between Barth and Brunner is not over their estimation of the 
noetic effects of sin…’ (Epistemological Dilemma, 191) should not be accepted; this was exactly the 
fundamental difference between them. John Henderson, for one, rightly sees this (‘The Controversy 
between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner Concerning Natural Theology’ (PhD diss., Edinburgh University, 
1940), 123), as does George Hunsinger (‘The Yes Hidden in Barth’s No to Brunner: The First 
Commandment as a Theological Axiom,’ in Evangelical, Catholic, and Reformed: Doctrinal Essays on 
Barth and Related Themes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 97). Terry Cross (Dialectic in Karl Barth’s 
Doctrine of God (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 101) points to the years 1925-1927 as the time in which 
Barth softened the ontic dialectic between God and the world in his thinking, but this had actually 
happened, in the way described above, already by 1924.  Cornelis Van der Kooi’s criticism (As in a 
Mirror: John Calvin and Karl Barth on Knowing God. A Diptych, trans. Donald Mader (Leiden: Brill, 
2005), 277-278) of Barth’s (according to van der Kooi, unbiblical) absolute opposition of the form (e.g., 
the human flesh of Jesus of Nazareth) to the content of revelation, and the apparently consequent 
arbitrariness of revelation’s form misses the point that, for Barth, the form of revelation was not selected 
arbitrarily by God, nor was it absolutely opposed to revelation’s content. The creaturely form of 
revelation was, rather, at least to a certain degree unpredictable, and could not provide knowledge of God 
apart from God’s act, due to human sin.  
 
175 Clark Pinnock (‘Karl Barth and Christian Apologetics,’ Themelios (1977): 69) notes that this 
was Barth’s position in his A Shorter Commentary on Romans (trans. D.H. van Daleen, ed. Maico M. 
Michielin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)), and allows that this may have been his position prior to that 
commentary, writing that, ‘...there Barth acknowledges what he may always have believed concerning 
general revelation, though loathe to admit it earlier, that there is a witness to God in the world to which all 
people have access, though they have not profited from it.’ Cf. Barth, A Shorter Commentary on Romans, 
14-15. In fact, the 1959 statements of Barth’s to which Pinnock refers were reaffirmations of what he had 
been happy to admit since 1924. Since this is the case, Bettis is perhaps misleading when he writes that 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology ‘arises as a direct result of who God is.’ (Joseph Dabney Bettis, 
‘Theology in the Public Debate: Barth’s Rejection of Natural Theology and the Hermeneutical Problem,’ 
Scottish Journal of Theology 22 (1969): 389)  
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 ...takes place because of the fall, to reverse the fall, to redeem us from evil, from
 guilt and its penalty. It is because of man and his contradiction that revelation 
 must be made objectively possible instead of simply being possible and actual. It
 is because of man and his contradiction that God must leave his self-resting 
 deity for a second time after creation and come into action. Man as God created 
 him, paradisal man, needed no divine revelation or incarnation.176 
 
Since, due to the fall, the natural revelation which was objectively present was 
subjectively inaccessible, the non-idolatrous natural theology which was in theory 
possible was in practice impossible.177  
 In close connection with Barth’s belief in an objective natural revelation, which 
could not be subjectively appropriated due to the noetic effects of sin, he also, from the 
time of the GD on, implied the existence of a kind of ontological analogia entis which 
was noetically inaccessible to human beings. He implied this most clearly in §17 of the 
GD, in which he set forth his doctrine of the attributes of God. He wrote there that, 
‘there are...qualities of God of which we may see obscure vestiges, analogies and 
similar effects in the creature, for example, God’s life, wisdom, will, power and 
goodness.’178 Barth was (contra Brunner179) not a nominalist. Forms existed, for him, 
first in God, and then were participated in, in an analogous way, by created being. This, 
however, implies the existence of at least some form of an ontological analogia entis 
and the objective possibility of gaining knowledge of God through creation. 
                                                          
176 Barth, GD, 155. 
 
177 Barth, GD, 343-349. See also Karl Barth, A Late Friendship: The Letters of Karl Barth and 
Carl Zuckermayer, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 42. Paul Molnar 
(‘Natural Theology Revisited: A Comparison of T.F. Torrance and Karl Barth,’ Zeitschrift für 
dialektische Theologie 21, 1 (2005): 81-82) notes that it was the fact that Barth took sin more seriously 
than T.F. Torrance in their respective discussions of natural theology which caused them to diverge.  
 
178 Barth, GD, 397. 
 
179 Emil Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace,’ in Natural Theology: Comprising ‘Nature and Grace’ by 
Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply ‘No!’ by Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel (Eugene, OR: 
Wipf and Stock, 2002), 53-54. 
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 The analogia entis was not for Barth, however, noetically accessible to the 
human being. In particular, the cognitive condition of the perpetually sinful human 
being was such that he or she could not think the concepts or forms properly – as they 
actually existed in God and were objectively participated in by created being – as he or 
she would have to do were the analogy to be noetically established. Barth spoke, for 
example, of the concept of ‘life,’ stating that, ‘The life of God cannot consist of 
participation in the reality of life in general. It must be the reality of the life in which all 
that lives apart from God merely participates.’180 His juxtaposition of ‘life in general’ 
with ‘the life of God’ in which creatures participate has in view the necessary contrast 
between the form ‘life’ which exists in the sin-affected human mind and the form ‘life’ 
which truly exists in God and analogously in creation. If the human being could think 
the form ‘life’ (and the other forms) properly of his or her own volition, then he or she 
would have access to the analogy, and thus to natural knowledge of God, and would 
thus be capable of undertaking a non-idolatrous natural theology. In actual fact, under 
the conditions of sin, he or she can only think forms improperly, and is thus inherently 
incapable of knowing either God or, in the truest sense, creation. 
 That this was Barth’s thinking is made even clearer in his 1940 CD II/1, and 
particularly in his discussion therein of his analogia fidei. Though this paragraph was 
written significantly after the GD it did not depart from it on the matters under 
discussion, but rather developed the ideas which were already present (manifestly or 
latently) therein. Barth wrote in the CD II/1 that human views, concepts and words are, 
as human, used, ‘improperly and pictorially,’181 and are, therefore, inapplicable to 
                                                          
180 Barth, GD, 403. 
 
181 Barth, CD II/1, 229. 
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God.182 In the event of revelation, however, he claimed that human concepts are 
elevated, and restored to their proper sense, so that the human being is enabled to think 
them such that they are applicable to God and, analogously, to creation.183 The most 
natural way to interpret these statements is to say that special revelation, for Barth, 
enables the human being to do what he or she could not do naturally due to sin: to think 
concepts or forms such that the already-existing ontological analogy between God and 
created being can be noetically established; the analogia fidei, as von Balthasar rightly 
claimed, presupposed the analogia entis as its ontological basis.184 
 In spite of Barth’s own later, well-known denunciations of the analogia entis, 
and in spite of claims within the secondary literature to the contrary,185 the basis of 
                                                          
182 Barth, CD II/1, 182. 
 
183 Barth, CD II/1, 227-233. 
 
184 The following words of Surin may be helpful here: ‘...Barth gives us the eschatological 
dimension essential to a proper understanding of Aquinas’ analogy of being, while the ‘ontological’ 
analogy theory of Aquinas’ gives us the requisite ontological foundations for Barth’s analogy of faith. Or 
to put it even more briefly: analogy from the perspective of God is analogy of being, analogy from the 
perspective of man is analogy of faith...’ (Kenneth Surin, ‘Creation, Revelation, and the Analogy Theory,’ 
Journal of Theological Studies 32, 1 (1981): 420) See also Henry Chavannes, The Analogy between God 
and the World in Saint Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, trans. William Lumley (New York: Vantage, 
1992), 199-211 and passim. Understanding Barth in the way presented here helps to explain why, for 
Barth, knowledge of creation is given with knowledge of God. Created being participates in the forms 
which first exist in God. In order to understand created being then, one must be able to think those forms. 
The sinner, as such, cannot do so, and thus can not only not know God, but also cannot understand 
creation. In the knowledge of God given in special revelation, the ability to think those forms are given, 
such that through them the human being can both know God and, analogously, understand the created 
world. Further, understanding Barth in this way guards him against the insinuation of Jay Wesley 
Richards (‘Barth on the Divine ‘Conscription’ of Language,’ The Heythrop Journal 38, 3 (1997): 263-
264) that his actualism is in conflict with his realism. 
 
185 Those who claim that Barth rejected the analogia entis in both its ontological and noetic 
senses and/or the objective reality of natural revelation either forever or well into the CD (through at least 
II/1) include Pinnock, ‘KBCA,’ 69; G.C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl 
Barth: An Introduction and Critical Appraisal (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1956), 181-195; Battista 
Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1963), 164ff; Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of 
the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1983), 282; Wilfried Härle, Sein und Gnade: Die Ontologie in Karl Barths kirchlicher 
Dogmatik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 173ff; Bruce McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Version of an 
‘Analogy of Being’: A Dialectical No and Yes to Roman Catholicism,’ in The Analogy of Being: 
Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2011), 117; Keith L. Johnson, Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 178ff; 
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Barth’s critique of natural theology as idolatry from the GD on was not the non-
existence of natural revelation or even every form of an ontological analogia entis, both 
of which he accepted even if only implicitly, but rather the sinful human being’s 
intrinsic inability to subjectively appropriate natural revelation and make use of that 
analogy. It is not necessary to prove that Barth was perfectly consistent on this point,186 
but this was certainly his main line of thinking. The CD II/1 has already been cited as 
evidence of continuity in Barth’s thinking on this point and it could cited further toward 
that same end.187 Other works which came between 1924 and 1940 also provide 
evidence of this claim.188 Of Barth’s well-known rejection of Przywara’s analogia entis, 
Roger White rightly observes that: ‘...when Karl Barth declared, ‘I regard the analogia 
entis as the invention of the Antichrist,’ it looks very much as if, under the influence of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Trevor Hart, ‘A Capacity for Ambiguity?: The Barth – Brunner Debate Revisited,’ Tyndale Bulletin 44, 2 
(1993): 296-297; Te Velde, Paths Beyond Tracing Out, 363. Wingren wrongly claims that, ‘It is 
characteristic of Karl Barth’s thinking that God and man are understood as two different kinds of being.’ 
(TiC, 23; c.f. Barth, CD II/1, 242) Hans Urs von Balthasar (The Theology of Karl Barth (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 1992), 97), Henri Bouillard (The Knowledge of God, trans. Samuel D. Femiano (New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1968), 122), Wolfhart Pannenberg (‘Zur Bedeutung des Analogiegedankens bei Karl 
Barth,’ Theologische Literaturzeitung 78 (1953): 18-23), Roland Chia (Revelation and Theology: The 
Knowledge of God in Balthasar and Barth (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 214), Chavannes (The Analogy, 210) 
and Stanley Hauerwas (With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), e.g., p. 158), among others, seem to have seen at least some of the early 
signs of Barth’s implicit acceptance of an ontological form of the analogia entis, i.e., of the fact that his 
analogia fidei necessarily had some form of analogia entis as its ontological presupposition (whether or 
not Barth admitted the same). 
 
186 Karl Barth, ‘Church and Culture,’ in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, 
trans. Louise Pettibone Smith, 334-354 (London: SCM Press, 1962), 342 may represent an occasion of 
inconsistency, as might his comments on p. 5 of The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life: The Theological 
Basis of Ethics, trans. R. Birch Hoyle (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993). Yet, they 
also may be (and, in light of Barth’s statements elsewhere, should be) interpreted in a way which causes 
them to conform with the main line of Barth’s thinking set forth here. And indeed, even on p. 342 of the 
former work there are suggestions that natural revelation is an objective reality which simply cannot be 
subjectively appropriated as such. Barth speaks, for example, of the Word of God bringing to light the 
‘buried and forgotten truth of the creation.’ It is by no means clear that Diller, for example, is correct in 
his suggestion that what Barth intended by this statement and others like it was simply that creation can 
be and is the media of special revelation, and is, as such, not unimportant. (Diller, Epistemological 
Dilemma, 180) 
 
187 E.g., Barth, CD II/1, 242. 
 
188 E.g., Barth, Anselm: Fides Quarens Intellectum: Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in 
the Context of his Theological Scheme (London: SCM Press, 1960), 117; CD 1/1, 130; ‘No!,’ 108. 
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discussions with Erich Przywara, he was concerned with an epistemological issue...’189 
And it is noteworthy that Barth had only positive words to say about the analogia entis 
of Söhngen, who had demonstrated it could coexist along with the analogia fidei.190 
Barth’s 1940 rejection of the Quenstedt’s analogia attributionis intrinsecae in favour of 
the analogia attributionis extrinsecae,191  which has often been interpreted as a denial of 
the analogia entis (e.g. by Berkouwer,192 McCormack193 and Johnson194) should not be 
taken in this way. In the first place, this passage in unclear; as Roger White notes, 
Barth’s use of terms in it does not seem to follow their historical usage.195 For this 
reason, it should be interpreted in light of clearer passages, which indicate that Barth did 
accept some form of ontological analogia entis. And it is very easy to interpret the 
passage in this way, because, within it, Barth frequently gives the impression that his 
concern with the analogia attributionis intrinsecae is focussed upon noetic issues.196 It 
is likely that when Barth opted for the terminology analogia attributionis extrinsecae he 
                                                          
189 Roger M. White, Talking about God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious 
Language (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 9. Emphasis original. Quotation of Barth from CD I/1, xiii. 
Cf. Barth, CD I/1, xiii, 41. See also Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace, 80. 
 
190 Söhngen expressed his understanding of the doctrine of analogia fidei in two 1934 essays: 
‘Analogia Fidei: Gottähnlichkeit allein aus Glauben?,’ Catholica 3, 3 (1934): 113-136 and ‘Analogia 
Fidei: Die Einheit in der Glaubenswissenschaft,’ Catholica 3, 4 (1934): 176-208. English translations of 
these essays are available: ‘Analogia Fidei: Likeness to God from Faith Alone?,’ trans. Kenneth Oakes, 
Pro Ecclesia 21, 1 (2012): 56-76; ‘Analogia Fidei: Unity in the Science of Faith,’ trans. Kenneth Oakes, 
Pro Ecclesia 21, 2 (2012): 169-194. Barth wrote (CD II/1, 82) that if Söhngen’s understanding of the 
doctrine of the analogia entis was a true expression of the Roman Catholic doctrine, then, ‘naturally I 
must withdraw my earlier statement that I regard the analogia entis as ‘the invention of the Antichrist.’’ 
 
191 Barth, CD II/1, 237-243. 
 
192 Berkouwer, TTG, 188. 
 
193 McCormack, ‘Barth’s Version,’ 117. 
 
194 Johnson, KBAE, 187-188. Even von Balthasar, who sees Barth as holding implicitly to 
analogia entis is disturbed by this passage, and finds Barth to have involved himself in contradiction 
within it. (Von Balthasar, TKB, 110) 
 
195 Roger White, Talking about God, 154. 
 
196 Barth, CD II/1, 239-242. 
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meant only that the power that causes the creature to be an analogue of God within the 
mind is extrinsic, i.e., that the creature does not have the power to efficaciously 
communicate God to sinners because of their sin, and also, perhaps, that the essence of 
the creature is determined extrinsically by its relationship to Jesus Christ.  
 From the time of the Göttingen Dogmatics until the end of his career, then, 
Barth considered natural theology to be necessarily idolatrous because the natural 
revelation which was by definition its source and norm was not revelation at all, and 
was therefore a substitute for it. The purported natural revelation which was its source 
and norm was not true revelation not because of the objective inexistence of natural 
revelation or an analogia between God and created being, but rather because the natural 
revelation which objectively existed, and the analogia which was an ontological reality, 
could not be accessed by sinful human beings. 
 
2.2.3.5 Consistency after the four turns 
These four turns having been completed by 1924, Barth’s mature idolatry-critique as it 
related to natural theology was in place. Thus the many scholars who argue that Barth’s 
criticism of natural theology as idolatry was in some way a product of his involvement 
in the German Kirchenkampf of the early 1930s err,197 even if the events of that time 
period led to Barth emphasising, and adopting a more urgent tone in, that criticism. ‘The 
Barmen Declaration’198 and Nein!, likely Barth’s two most well-known anti-natural 
                                                          
197 E.g., Friedrich Wilhelm Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Barths 
(Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1985), 263; Webb, RFT, 168; Grant, ‘Unnatural,’ 99; Barr, BFNT, 116. 
Wingren also errs in asserting, more generally, that it was in 1932 that Barth ‘began his attack on natural 
theology.’ (TiC, 39)  
 
198 Karl Barth, ‘The Theological Declaration of Barmen,’ in The Constitution of the Presbyterian 
Church (U.S.A): Part I: Book of Confessions (Louisville, KY: The Office of the General Assembly 
(PCUSA), 2014), 280-284. Barth (CD II/1, 172-178) stated that the Barmen Declaration was directed not 
only against the ‘German Christians,’ but also against natural theology more broadly. 
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theology documents, contained nothing substantially new;199  they were applications of 
the same critique which had long been a part of Barth’s thought to a relatively new 
phenomenon. 
 
2.2.4 Further aspects of Barth’s mature idolatry-critique in relation to natural theology 
2.2.4.1 Barth’s critique of natural theology as idolatry was exegetically driven 
That Barth believed that the subjection of natural theology to an idolatry-critique was 
demanded by revelation meant, in part, that he believed that it was demanded by the 
authoritative witness to revelation found in Scripture. For Barth, special revelation 
declares its own exclusivity as revelation, and, by implication, that that which it is not 
must not take the place which belongs to revelation; Scripture, according to Barth’s 
exegesis, correspondingly understands true revelation to be exclusive of natural 
revelation and, as a necessary implication, criticises natural theology as idolatry. And 
Barth himself, in an attempt at obedience to Scripture in its testimony to revelation as 
understood through exegesis sought also to hold to special revelation as the only form 
of revelation, and therefore claimed that natural theology is idolatry.200 Critics of 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology, like Westermann201 and Barr202 have regularly 
argued that it was insufficiently grounded in exegesis, but this could not be further from 
                                                          
199 Barth’s 1934 Nein! to Brunner in particular was the culmination of disagreements with him 
which had had been evident for a decade, as John Hart and McCallum have convincingly demonstrated. 
See John Hart, Karl Barth vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a Theological Alliance, 
1916-1936 (New York: Peter Lang, 2001); ‘The Barth – Brunner Correspondence,’ in For the Sake of the 
World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology, ed. George Hunsinger (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 19-43; J. Bruce McCallum, ‘Modernity and the Dilemma of Natural Theology: The 
Barth – Brunner Debate, 1934’ (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1994). 
 
200 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 77. ‘The fight against natural theology...is a fight for right obedience in 
theology.’ 
 
201 Claus Westermann, ‘Eine Kontroverse um die Theologie Naturalis. Emil Brunner – Karl 
Barth (1934),’ Evangelische Theologie 47, 5 (1987): 386-395. 
 
202 Barr, BFNT, 130. 
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the truth, at least from the early 1920s on. In important ways, Romans II set forth the 
groundwork for Barth’s mature rejection of natural theology. It must be remembered, 
however, that Romans II was a biblical commentary, i.e., a work of biblical exegesis.203 
Further, for the rest of his career, Barth derived and substantiated his rejection of natural 
theology as idolatry from exegesis, including that undertaken in his other early biblical 
commentaries.204 
 Barth’s exegesis of the passages typically understood to provide warrant for 
natural theology,205 such that they were not so understood was truly biblical exegesis. It 
has been frequently argued that Barth’s exegesis of these passages was spurious, i.e., 
that it was not exegesis at all, but, rather eisegesis206 or that it was simply wrong.207 
Those criticising Barth in this way have failed to understand how Barth’s interpretation 
of these passages could be anything other than eisegesis or mere error because they have 
not taken into account the ontology of Scripture and corresponding hermeneutical 
presuppositions which drove it.208 For the same reason, they remain unconvincing. 
                                                          
203 This obvious, but often overlooked, claim is defended in John Webster, ‘Karl Barth,’ in 
Reading Romans through the Centuries: From the Early Church to Karl Barth, ed. Jeffrey P. Greenman 
and Timothy Larsen (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 205-223. 
 
204 E.g., Karl Barth, Erklärung des Epheser- und des Jakobusbriefes 1919-1929 (GA II.46), ed. 
Jörg-Michael Bohnet (Zurich: TVZ, 2009), 84-90; Witness to the Word: A Commentary on John 1. 
Lectures at Münster in 1925 and at Bonn in 1933, ed. Walther Fürst, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 39-40; 126-127. 
 
205 Esp., Psalm 19, Romans 1.19-20 (and its broader context), and Acts 17.16-34. 
 
206 E.g., Barr, BFNT, 20, 130; Bouillard, Knowledge, 30-31, 42-60. 
 
207 Hans Küng, Does God Exist? An Answer for Today (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2006), 
526-527; Holder, THD, 44. 
 
208 Nothing approaching a comprehensive account of Barth’s ontology of Scripture or 
hermeneutics can be provided as part of the present work. Several recent studies, however, have 
contributed to this task, e.g., Bruce McCormack, ‘Historical Criticism and Dogmatic Interest in Karl 
Barth’s Theological Exegesis of the New Testament,’ in Biblical Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective, 
ed. Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 322-338; Richard E. Burnett, 
Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Principles of the Römerbrief Period (Grand 
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Barth understood Scripture to be a unified witness to God’s self-revelation in Jesus 
Christ, which had to be interpreted as such. That this understanding drove his 
interpretation of the supposedly natural theology-endorsing biblical passages can be 
seen most clearly in his discussion of them in the CD II/1,209 where Barth interpreted 
the ‘main line’ of Scripture as testifying to the exclusivity of special revelation, and 
denied, on that basis and on that of the unity of the Scriptures in their testimony to 
revelation, that the exegete could allow for an independent ‘side-line’ testifying to the 
existence of a truly available revelatio naturalis.210 Barth’s interpretation even of the 
supposedly natural theology-endorsing passages was thus not the result of a merely 
willful eisegesis, but rather, of his broader exegetical project, as different as it may have 
been from that which is limited to the methodologically agnostic application of the 
various textual criticisms.   
 
2.2.4.2 The critique of natural theology as idolatry in relation to the doctrines of 
sin and salvation 
The entire question of the knowledge of God was, for Barth, mapped onto the 
categories, as Barth interpreted them, of the classically Protestant doctrine of salvation. 
That the human being could not know God at all of him- or herself was a product of his 
or her being a sinner. That God enabled the human being, in the event of revelation, to 
know God was an act of justification.211 That the human remained always peccator even 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004); Webster, ‘Karl Barth,’ in Reading Romans; Hunsinger, ed., Thy Word is Truth: 
Barth on Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012). 
 
209 Barth, CD II/1, 101-124. 
 
210 Barth, CD II/1, 101-124. 
 
211 Barth, CD II/1, 213; 239-243. 
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in and after justification meant for Barth, however, that the knowledge of God never 
became a human possession: that the noetic effects of sin were never left behind such 
that either special revelation became his or her possession, or such that the forms could 
be thought properly, the ontological analogia entis noetically accessed, and non-
idolatrous natural theology established as a possibility. The noetic effects of sin were, 
rather, only overcome by grace in the event of revelation, and even then not in such a 
way that they were, even in part, eliminated in an ongoing way in the human mind. 
Barth believed that it was the fact that he understood the noetic effects of sin to be 
absolutely devastating in this way and that Brunner did not, that was the root of their 
disagreement concerning the propriety of natural theology in Nein!212 The human being 
remained, for Barth, always completely dependent upon the alien righteousness of God, 
which for him could only mean the ongoing occurrence of special revelation, if he or 
she were to truly encounter revelation, true knowledge of God. The attempt to know 
God apart from special revelation, i.e., natural theology, involved the substitution of 
revelation for that which was not, a refusal to cling by faith to God’s grace and therefore 
works-righteousness.213  
 Because of the fact that human beings were, for Barth, always fully under the 
power of the noetic effects of sin, there was a sense for him in which the idolatry of 
natural theology was an inevitable human reality.214 ‘It is the one heresy which is 
                                                          
212 Barth, ‘No!,’ 87, 89, 98. 
 
213 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 55. As Brouwer rightly perceives, ‘...Barth conceived of 
his own struggle against natural theology...as the application of the reformational Doctrine of Justification 
to the topos of theological epistemology.’ (Rinse H. Reeling Brouwer, ‘‘Nowadays we are not Dealing 
with Pelagians in our Churches’ Karl Barth and the Janus Face of the Doctrine of Justification in the 
Current of ‘Reasonable Orthodoxy,’’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie Supplement Series 6 (2014): 
60. 
 
214 Barth, CD II/1, 141-142. See also Hailer, Götzen, 280. 
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necessary by its very nature.’215 To be human was, for Barth, to have a ‘god’ and to that 
extent to be a theologian.216 To be a human theologian, however, was to be a natural 
theologian, since no human theology could possess special revelation as its direct source 
or conform to it as its norm.217 And to be a natural theologian was to be an idolater, 
since the natural revelation which ‘natural theology’ has as its source and norm is, due 
to the fact that the human being is a sinner and cannot possess true natural revelation, 
not revelation at all, but a substitute. 
 
2.2.5 The consistency of Barth’s rejection of natural theology as idolatry 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology as idolatry remained consistent both in general and 
in detail from 1924 up until the end of his career, though many of his interpreters have 
argued that he implicitly retracted it in his later works. Brunner218 and von Balthasar219 
argued that this occurred in Barth’s CD III/2 (1948). The statements therein on which 
the substantiation of this claim depends, however, do not substantiate it. Some of the 
confusion seems to derive from a failure to recognize that when Barth spoke of ‘real 
man’ as capable of perceiving God, he was not claiming that actual ‘concretely sinful 
man’ could perceive God out of his or her own powers, but rather that the human being 
was created to perceive and in fact does perceive God in the event in which he or she is 
                                                          
215 Barth, CD II/1, 141. 
 
216 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, trans. Grover Foley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1963), 3. 
 
217 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 120-121; ‘TFC,’ 78. 
 
218 Emil Brunner, ‘Der neue Barth: Bemerkung zu Karl Barths Lehre vom Menschen,’ Zeitschrift 
für Theologie und Kirche 48, 1 (1951): 90-91 and passim. 
 
219 Von Balthasar, TKB, 152.  
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the recipient of special revelation.220 Barth remained clear that there is no capacity 
within the sinful human being as such for revelation, whether real or special,221 and he 
did not allow the propriety of natural theology. 
 Barr,222 Küng,223 Anderson,224 and Hart225 point to Barth’s CD IV/3, §69.2 – 
and, in particular, Barth’s discussions therein of the true words which are spoken extra 
muros ecclesiae and of the ‘lesser lights’ – as evidence of a retraction of Barth’s earlier 
criticism of natural theology as idolatry. These passages do not represent any such 
retraction, however. The first indication of this is that §69.2 begins with an extended re-
affirmation of the idea that God is known only in the person of Jesus Christ in the event 
of special revelation.226 Barth’s discussion of the true words spoken extra muros 
ecclesiae had nothing to do with natural theology,227 because Barth insisted that they are 
true only as God gives them truth, i.e., in the event of special revelation. Barth had 
always allowed that God could speak through media extra muros ecclesiae,228 so what 
he said there was not new. Further, he reassured his readers that, ‘...in order to perceive 
that we really have to reckon with such true words from without, we have no need to 
                                                          
220 Barth, CD III/2, 399-406. 
 
221 Barth, CD III/2, 403. 
 
222 Barr, BFNT, 19. 
 
223 Küng, DGE, 527 
 
224 Ray S. Anderson, ‘Barth and a New Direction for Natural Theology,’ in Theology Beyond 
Christendom: Essays on the Centenary of the Birth of Karl Barth, May 10, 1886, ed. John Thompson 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 1986), 246. 
 
225 Hart, ‘A Capacity,’ 296. 
 
226 Barth, CD IV/3, 38-110. 
 
227 Contra Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of 
God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 60. 
 
228 Barth, CD I/1, 55. 
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appeal either for basis or content to the sorry hypothesis of a so-called ‘natural 
theology.’’229 Barth’s discussion of the ‘lesser lights’ of creation, which he went so far 
as to call ‘revelations,’ likewise had nothing to do with the question of the propriety of 
natural theology. Barth spoke as early as 1927 of worldly ‘revelations’ which had to be 
understood as wholly different than the revelation of God,230 and this is what he meant 
when he spoke of the ‘lesser lights’ of creation. They were intra-worldly lights, truth, or 
revelations (such as natural laws), which could provide no knowledge of God or 
creation in relation to God. Natural revelation, in the sense of a source of knowledge of 
God actually receivable by human beings under the conditions of sin, outwith special 
revelation, remained non-existent for Barth, and the practice of natural theology thus 
remained necessarily an act of idolatry. 
 
2.3 Critique  
Previous criticisms of Barth’s complete a priori rejection of natural theology as idolatry 
and the doctrine of revelation which underlay it have proven unconvincing. It has 
already been argued that the biblical critique has for the most part foundered upon the 
unwillingness of its advocates to be attentive to Barth’s ontology of Scripture and 
associated hermeneutical principles. Some, most recently Holder,231 have criticised 
Barth’s rejection of natural theology and its underlying doctrine of revelation on the 
grounds that it supposedly entails the irrationality of theology and thus the isolation of 
                                                          
229 Barth, CD IV/3, 117. 
 
230 Karl Barth, ‘Gottes Offenbarung nach der Lehre der Christlichen Kirche, 1927,’ in Vorträge 
und kleinere Arbeiten 1925-1930, ed. Hermann Schmidt (Zurich: TVZ, 1994), 273. 
 
231 Holder, THD, 46-53. Others instantiations of this basic line of critique are found in David 
Jenkins, A Guide to the Debate about God (London: Lutterworth Press, 1966), 81; John Bowden, Karl 
Barth (London: SCM Press, 1971), 111; Pinnock, ‘KBCA,’ esp. 69-71.  
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theology vis-à-vis other disciplines. This critique also falls short because Barth’s 
theology is ‘irrational’ only in the sense that Barth did not uncritically adopt a 
rationality derived in independence of theology’s proper object and that for him extra-
disciplinary intelligibility and relevance cannot be a first-order concern in theology, and 
because his theology did not actually imply theology’s unintelligibility to those outside 
of the discipline. Its rationality, though perhaps distinct in many ways, was, unlike 
revelation itself, human and thus not ‘wholly other’ in relation to other forms of human 
rationality. Others, most recently Grant,232 have argued that Barth’s rejection of natural 
theology was itself based upon natural theology, namely (in Grant’s critique) an a priori 
philosophical assumption of an ontological dualism between God and the world. As has 
been argued, however, it was not an ontological dualism of this kind which logically 
grounded Barth’s mature rejection of natural theology, but, rather, his firmly theological 
convictions concerning the noetic effects of sin. Critics of Barth’s rejection of natural 
theology typically have not addressed their criticisms to the decisions which Barth made 
in the doctrines of sin, salvation, and revelation which formed its logical basis, and 
which are also the points at which it is most vulnerable.  
 Indeed, Barth’s complete a priori rejection of natural theology as always only 
idolatry should not be accepted because of problems with the decisions he made within 
the doctrines of sin, salvation and revelation which ground it. When these problems are 
corrected, it is seen both that idolatry is not an inevitable human reality in general and 
that a particular form of natural theology must be allowed as at least potentially non-
idolatrous. This particular form is a Christian natural theology, i.e., a natural theology 
                                                          
232 Grant, ‘Unnatural,’ 96-98 and passim. Other instantiations of this basic line of critique are 
found in Paul Althaus, Die Christliche Wahrheit: Lehrbuch der Dogmatik (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 
1952), 56; Wingren, TiC, 42-44, 108-109; Berkhof, ‘Lichterlehre,’ 38-39; Barr, BFNT, 128-132. 
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undertaken by a human being who has been a recipient of revelatio specialis.233 It may 
be recalled that, for Barth natural theology is any exposition of God and/or creation in 
relation to God which has as its source and norm anything other than revelatio specialis. 
Christian natural theology may be defined as an exposition of God and/or creation in 
relation to God which has as its source and norm that which may be known of God and 
creation in relation to God from reason and the observation of nature and history, where 
the capacities for the proper exercise of reason and the accurate perception of nature and 
history have been bestowed upon the human being by God in the event(s) of revelatio 
specialis.  
 Barth could not accept a Christian theologia naturalis along these lines; he 
explicitly mentioned and summarily dismissed it.234 It could be, for him, no better than 
natural theology of any other kind; like all natural theology, it, too, was for him idolatry. 
The reason Barth rejected Christian natural theology as idolatry was the same reason he 
rejected all natural theology as idolatry: the absolutely devastating noetic effects of sin, 
which, as mentioned above, were never overcome, even in the Christian, except in the 
event of revelation. The Christian and the non-Christian, the one who in the past had 
received special revelation and the one who had not, were on equal footing: both 
equally under the power of the noetic effects of sin, both wholly unable to think 
concepts or forms such that the ontological analogia between God and created being 
                                                          
233 This seems to be, at least in part, that which is desired by Brunner (‘Nature and Grace,’ 27; 
Gilland, Law and Gospel, 203), Thomas F. Torrance (‘The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought 
of Karl Barth,’ Religious Studies 6, 2 (1970): 133; Alister McGrath, T.F. Torrance: An Intellectual 
Biography (London: T&T Clark, 1999), 192ff ); and McGrath (Alister McGrath, The Open Secret: A New 
Vision for Natural Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008)). Hauerwas (WGU, 142) wants a 
‘theological metaphysics,’ which he equates with natural theology, and suggests that Barth provides this 
in the CD. His proposals lack the detail necessary to determine with any level of certainty whether or not 
Barth would allow them as prescriptive of a kind of theology of nature, or reject them as a call for natural 
theology. 
 
234 Barth, ‘No!,’ 97-98, 122, 128; CD II/1, 98—140. 
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could be noetically established, both thus wholly incapable of apprehending natural 
revelation, and both thus wholly unable to practise natural theology without ipso facto 
practising idolatry. For both, only in the divine justification of their concepts in the 
event of special revelation could the noetic effects of sin be overcome and God be 
known. 
 The problem with Barth’s line of thinking was that he spoke of the noetic effects 
of sin as never to any extent overcome in an enduring way within the mind of the 
human being, even that of the one who had previously received revelation, and, 
therefore, of revelation and the knowledge of God as never given, but always to be 
given.235 He spoke, that is, of the justification of human knowing and its concepts in 
relation to God in the discrete events of God’s self-revelation, but not at all of the 
sanctification (in the sense of the impartation or infusion of righteousness) of human 
knowing and its concepts by revelation. This is reflective of a broader problem within 
Barth’s theology which will re-emerge at multiple points throughout the present work’s 
interpretation of him: his strong emphasis upon divine justification was accompanied by 
a very weak doctrine of sanctification, and he openly protested against the idea of 
infused or imparted righteousness.236 Sanctification, however, does involve 
                                                          
235 Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life, 5. Some have even suggested that, on Barth’s 
account, there might not be any true human knowledge of God at all; see, for example, Leonard de Moor, 
‘The Concept of Revelation in Barthianism,’ The Journal of Religion 17, 2 (1937): 145. This is too 
strong; though perhaps not as clear to de Moor at his time of writing in 1937, it is clear now that in the 
moment of revelation, for Barth, there is undoubtedly true human knowledge of God; the problem is that 
that same true knowledge does not endure in the mind of the human recipient outside of that moment. 
 
236 E.g., Barth, Epheserbrief, 84 (emphasis original): ‘Gott segnet. Er spricht ein Verheiβsungs- 
und Gnadenwort. Das ist Alles. Keine gratia infusa.’ Barth has a tendency to refer the dramatic NT 
language concerning the change which God works in the believer in sanctification to Jesus Christ. (CD 
IV/2, 583) In a certain sense, sanctification, like justification, was alien for Barth. (See Katherine 
Sonderegger, ‘Sanctification as Impartation in the Doctrine of Karl Barth,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische 
Theologie 18, 3 (2002): 313-314) Barth did not deny that revelation produced changes in actual, concrete 
human existence (and, in this case, thinking), but this was always a relative change, from one form of sin, 
idolatry, error, etc., to another and not a change from those to righteousness in the strict sense and the 
knowledge of God. 
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righteousness being imparted to and infused within the human being, the human being’s 
liberation from sin and its effects. Sanctification does not leave the human being under 
the power of sin such that his or her concrete relationship to sin is ultimately no 
different than that of the unsanctified person. This is true both in general and in terms of 
the human being’s cognitive capacities. If the noetic effects of sin are absolutely 
devastating for the human being who has not received revelation, they are so no longer 
for those who have been and are being sanctified by it. If human thinking is justified in 
the event of special revelation, such that human concepts are made to apply to God, then 
it is also sanctified, such that the human being is enabled, at least to some extent, to in 
an ongoing way think them in application to God. If knowledge of God and revelation 
are imputed, then they are also imparted, truly given and not always only to be given. 
 If, however, human beings are in special revelation truly given a perduring 
knowledge of God in revelation then human worship is not necessarily idolatrous, nor 
are all human beings necessarily idolaters – or, at least, they are not all such absolutely 
and therefore equally. Again, if human beings are truly given knowledge of God in 
revelation, i.e., if their minds are truly sanctified (the noetic effects of sin to some extent 
overcome) such that they can think concepts properly, as they apply to God and thus 
also to the real world which participates in God, then the sanctified human being has 
ongoing access to the analogia between God and created being, and therefore to real 
natural revelation. This means, however, that, contra Barth, natural theology as 
practised by those who have been and are being sanctified by revelation is not 
necessarily idolatrous. 
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Chapter 3: Idolatry and the Doctrine of God 
 
Many of Karl Barth’s most important and salutary acts of self-differentiation from both 
the classical tradition and from Protestant liberalism took place within his doctrine of 
God, and were expressed negatively through his critique of idolatry within it. This is the 
case even though his material expositions of the doctrine of God did not always 
conform to the formal convictions he expressed concerning the way in which the 
doctrine of God had to be developed were it to avoid idolatry, and even though there are 
some significant problems with his critique of idolatry within it.  
 In order to demonstrate these claims, this chapter will analyse Barth’s critique of 
idolatry within the doctrine of God, especially as found within the 1924 Göttingen 
Dogmatics, §§16-17, and the 1940 Church Dogmatics II/1, §§29-31. Barth’s 1926 
lectures on Feuerbach, his 1929 essay ‘Fate and Idea in Theology’ [‘Schicksal und Idee 
in der Theologie’], and his 1933 essay ‘The First Commandment as an Axiom in 
Theology’ [‘Das erste Gebot als theologisches Axiom’], will also be of particular 
importance to the analysis of Barth’s mature thought on these issues. It will be shown 
that, for Barth, idolatry within the doctrine of God contained both subjective and 
objective components, and that all doctrines of God were for him intrinsically 
idolatrous, though not all were merely idolatrous. A number of directives in accordance 
with which Barth believed the doctrine of God had to be developed were it to avoid 
idolatry will then be described. Finally, an evaluation and critique of Barth’s thinking 
on the topic of idolatry within the doctrine of God will be offered. 
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3.1 Subjective and Objective Components of Idolatry within the Doctrine of God 
For Barth, what may be called the subjective component of idolatry (the presence of, 
broadly speaking, an intrinsically improper mode of worship) necessitated the existence 
of what may be called objective idolatry (the fact that one’s worship possessed 
intrinsically, as its object, that which was not God) and vice versa.1 Idolatry was not, for 
Barth, a matter of either false worship of the true God, or of an otherwise proper mode 
of worship being directed toward a false god or idol.2 It was, rather, both subjectively an 
act of improper worship (i.e., of worship which failed to conform to revelation) which 
was ipso facto, objectively, the worship of a false god, since the true God could not be 
the object of false worship, but suffers himself, rather, to be worshiped only in 
conformity with revelation.3 In other words, idolatry was not for Barth the breaking of 
either the first commandment or the second commandment (broadly interpreted) and not 
the other, but rather always the breaking of them both, since the breaking of one 
necessarily meant the breaking of the other.4  
 This manner of thinking may be observed in Barth’s idolatry-critique within the 
doctrine of God, in particular. The latter may be separated into two parts: (1) his critique 
                                                          
1 This is confirmed, for example, by Barth’s interpretation of the golden calf incident in the CD 
IV/1, 427-432. Barth understood that incident to be archetypal of all sin and idolatry (418), and 
interpreted it as such. According to Barth’s presentation, the Israelites, in the worship of the golden calf 
sought to worship Yahweh, but their false mode of worship (i.e., their worship which did not correspond 
to revelation (418)), meant that the object of their worship was not Yahweh, but, rather, a piece of created 
reality which ‘replaced Yahweh.’ (432) 
 
2 These are the two species of ‘superstition’ that Thomas names. (Aquinas, ST, II.92.2) For 
Thomas, the former is idolatry instead of the latter. (Cf. Clough, ‘Karl Barth on Idolatry,’ 214) 
 
3 Barth, CD I/2, 304. Barth’s position has as its precedent the characteristically reformed 
assertion of the regulative principle of worship (and, in particular, its assertion that images must not be 
utilised in worship) and its assumption that the violation of the same constitutes objective idolatry. See 
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1, trans. John Allen (Philadelphia: Presbyterian 
Board of Publication, 1844), 97-113. 
 
4 Against, e.g., Aquinas (ST, II.92.2), and all who suggest that one can break one of the first two 
commandments without breaking the other, i.e., that one can worship the true God in an undue mode or a 
false god in an otherwise proper mode. 
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of subjective idolatry which, as manifest within the doctrine of God, he most frequently 
called ‘speculation’ (3.1.1), and (2) its necessary corollary, objective idolatry which, as 
manifest within the doctrine of God, he most frequently described in terms reminiscent 
of Feuerbach’s projection thesis, e.g., as the holding to a god who was merely a 
‘hypostatised reflection of man’5 (3.1.2). As in general, so too in the doctrine of God, 
subjective idolatry (speculation) always necessitated, and, indeed, was the root of, 
objective idolatry (projection).6 
 
3.1.1 The subjective idolatry of speculation 
Barth’s regular way of referring to subjective idolatry within the doctrine of God 
(especially in his most developed account of that doctrine in the CD II) was to speak of 
‘speculation,’ whether with the noun Spekulation or the adjective spekulativ. An 
analysis of Barth’s uses of these terms demonstrates that he meant by them to indicate 
thinking or speaking (purportedly) of God’s immanent nature and attributes either 
wholly or in part without reference to God’s special revelation in Jesus Christ. 
Speculation is the failure, within the doctrine of God, to engage in, and limit one’s self 
to, ‘obedient reckoning with the One whom Jesus Christ called His Father, and who 
called Jesus Christ His Son.’7  
                                                          
5 Barth, CD II/2, 3. See also Barth, CD II/2, 4. 
 
6 See Barth, GD, 358-362, 373; CD II/1, 259, 261, 315, 329; CD II/2, 3. See also Hailer, Götzen, 
279. Hector’s description (‘God’s Triunity and Self-Determination: A Conversation with Karl Barth, 
Bruce McCormack, and Paul Molnar,’ in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. 
Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 31) of Molnar and McCormack’s thought is also true of 
Barth’s: ‘If claims about God are not based upon God’s work [i.e., are speculative], they are ipso facto 
based on a human projection of ‘God.’’ 
 
7 Barth, CD II/1, 24. See also GD, 363, 427, 430, 432; CD II/1, 293, 316, 319, 457, 625; CD II/2, 
69, 135. This conclusion is also supported by the helpful study of James Gordon (‘Is it Possible and 
Desirable for Theologians to Speculate after Barth?’ The Heythrop Journal (2013): 1-11. 
DOI: 10.1111/heyj.12060). Gordon mentions five ways in which Barth spoke of speculation (summarised 
on p. 33), all of which were forms of insufficient or inconsistent derivation of one’s speech about God 
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To the extent that a doctrine of God was, for Barth, speculative, it took not 
revelation as its source and norm as it ought to have done in obedience to revelation, but 
rather afforded those roles to some aspect of created reality. It was thus per definitionem 
an act of (subjective) idolatry: it was an act of worship in an undue mode, one 
disobedient to revelation.8 Barth held (with particular emphasis in the doctrine of God 
found in his CD II/1) that a great number of scholastic and Protestant Orthodox 
theologians were, in their respective doctrines of God, guilty of the idolatry of 
speculation, in that they looked away from revelation (even if only temporarily), and to 
general, philosophical conceptions of deity, in constructing them. Barth wrote, for 
example, that:  
When [Melanchthon] later decided to take up again in his Loci the doctrine of 
God, he began to create it from another source than from the revelation of God, 
namely, from an independently formed and general idea of God. He therefore 
began to consider the mysteria divinitatis apart from their connexion with the 
beneficia Christi. In this he fell right into the magnum periculum of which he 
had been afraid in 1521, and was all the more guilty of the very error which in 
his first act of rashness he had had a right instinct to avoid as opposed to late 
medieval scholasticism, thus affording a disastrous example to the whole of 
Protestant orthodoxy.9 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
from revelation. He writes that speculation, for Barth, ‘is not the act of talking about God in terms of 
metaphysical categories; rather, speculative theology for Barth is determined by which categories and 
concepts the theologian uses and whether (and how) she allows those concepts to be formed, shaped, and 
otherwise transformed by God’s work in Jesus Christ.’ (7) This statement is not in itself false, but it 
would have been clearer had he specified that ‘which categories and concepts the theologian uses’ 
determines whether or not a theology is speculative according to whether or not those categories and 
concepts are chosen in obedience to revelation. 
 
8 It may also be noted that speculation was an occasion of ‘natural theology’ as described in 
chapter 2, in that it was a piece of theology which took as its source and norm something other than 
revelatio specialis. In general, ‘speculation’ seems to be a term that Barth used to refer to natural theology 
as it was manifest within the doctrine of God in particular. 
 
9 Barth, CD II/1, 259-260. See also pp. 287-288, 339. 
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It was with a wariness of what Barth believed was the very prevalent speculative 
idolatry of the tradition which preceded him that he undertook the formulation of his 
own doctrine of God. 
 While Barth’s most vigorous criticisms of what was for him the idolatry of 
speculation are found in his major dogmatic treatments of the doctrine of God, and 
especially in the CD II, he had long before the time of those treatments learned to 
criticise speculation as being and/or leading necessarily to idolatry. He learned this from 
his liberal teachers: from Herrmann, and, in large part through Herrmann, from 
Schleiermacher and Ritschl. All of these rejected speculation in the doctrine of God in it 
is scholastic and Protestant orthodox forms.10 As early as his 1910/1911 ‘Lebensbilder 
aus der Geschichte der Christlichen Religion,’ Barth showed himself to be a true 
disciple of his liberal forbears on this matter, as he criticised speculation (closely tied, if 
not identified with, metaphysics there) as leading to a god who was not, in fact God; of 
Irenaeus, for example, he wrote: ‘Irenäus hat in richtiger Weise die Einheit Gottes u. 
d[er] Offenbarung gegenüber der unrel. Spekulation der Gnost[iker] vertreten. Er 
spekuliert aber selbst unreligiös, sofern er von einem Gottesbegr[iff] ausgeht u. zu 
einem Erlösungsbegriff gelangt, die beide physisch-metaphys[ischer] Art sind. Dieser 
Gott kann nicht Sache christl. Erfahrung sein.’11 And Barth’s 1911 essay ‘La 
Réapparition de la Métaphysique dans la Théologie’ is again important in this 
connexion; it is clear in that essay that the metaphysical idols that he was concerned to 
                                                          
10 Schleiermacher, TCF, 748; Ritschl, TCDJR, vol. 3, 225-227; Wilhelm Herrmann, ‘Die Lage 
und Aufgabe der evangelischen Dogmatik in der Gegenwart,’ in Schriften zur Grundlegung der 
Theologie, vol. 2, ed. Peter Fischer-Appelt (Munich: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1967), 33. 
 
11 Karl Barth, ‘Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte der christlichen Religion, 1910/11,’ in Vorträge 
und kleinere Arbeiten 1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: 
TVZ, 1993), 100. The editors have completed some words from the original manuscript, as indicated by 
the parts of words which are enclosed in brackets. Barth went so far as to show sympathy with Sabellius 
and others over against early ‘spekulativen Monotheismus.’ (110)  
 
88 
 
 
 
counter were those which were produced by speculation (‘…la notion de Dieu, que la 
science spéculative formule…’12). He spoke, further, in that same essay, of the 
‘spekulative Fälschung der religiösen Lehre.’13 Throughout Barth’s career, he would 
never cease to criticise the speculation of the doctrines of God of the ‘older theology’ as 
idolatrous – this was an inheritance from liberalism which survived his break with the 
latter.14 
 Yet Barth would come to realise that it was not the older theology alone which 
was guilty of the subjective idolatry of speculation within the doctrine of God. Rather, 
he eventually came to consider the theology of liberalism, and Herrmann himself, as 
speculative, and therefore idolatrous, and this in at least two ways. In the first place, as 
argued in chapter 2, he came to believe that liberalism was engaged in natural theology, 
in that it actually looked away from Jesus Christ (though it would have denied this) and 
to human feeling (Schleiermacher), value-judgments (Ritschl), and experience 
(Herrmann) as the source of its theology, including its doctrine of God.15 When Barth 
came to separate radically revelation from (and, indeed, in the time surrounding Romans 
II, oppose it to) all that was human, he came to believe that the liberal doctrine of God, 
because it had its source in these realities, had as its source that which was not 
revelation, and that it was, ipso facto, speculative and subjectively idolatrous.16 
                                                          
12 Barth, ‘La Réapparition,’ 349. 
 
13 Barth, ‘La Réapparition,’351. The text indicates that the editors completed some words which 
were abbreviated by Barth by putting their additions in brackets as follows: ‘Spekulat[ive] Fälschung der 
rel[igiösen] Lehre.’ 
 
14 See, e.g., Barth, CD II/1, 261. 
 
15 See 2.2.3.2 of the present work. 
 
16 See 2.1.2.1 of the present work. 
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 In the second place, Barth came to believe that the nominalism of liberalism’s 
doctrine of God was also speculative. A particular way in which Barth’s teachers 
ostensibly avoided older forms of speculation in their own theologies was by a retreat 
into nominalism, i.e., by focussing exclusively upon God’s self-revelation to the extent 
that they refused to venture any positive claims about Deus in se at all. The relationship, 
for them, between Deus pro nobis, i.e., God as known in God’s self-revelation, and 
Deus in se was unknown and unknowable. Theology had, therefore, to content itself 
with speech about Deus pro nobis.17 Since speech about Deus in se could not be based 
upon the knowledge of Deus pro nobis, it could only be speculative; it had, therefore, to 
be avoided. The essence and attributes of Deus in se were, therefore, ever shrouded in 
mystery.18  
 Barth, during his liberal phase, followed his liberal teachers in this kind of 
nominalism. But he came to see that the liberal, nominalistic, doctrine of God was not a 
way of truly avoiding idolatrous speculation, but, rather, another form of it. It, too, was 
                                                          
17 This insistence represented a radicalisation of the early Melanchthon’s focus upon the 
beneficia Christi to the exclusion of speech concerning God in se; see Philip Melanchthon, The Loci 
Communes of Philip Melanchthon, trans. Charles Leander Hill (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007), 67-
69. For Ritschl’s reception of Melanchthon, see his ‘T&M,’ 204-208. Samuel M. Powell (The Trinity in 
German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 103) and Rowan Williams (Wrestling 
with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology, ed. Mike Higton (London: SCM Press, 2007), 122) 
rightly note the connection between Melanchthon on the one hand, and Schleiermacher and the liberal 
Protestant tradition to which he was a father, on the other. Barth himself also noted this connection, citing 
the early Melanchthon’s statement that, ‘mysteria divinitatis rectius adoraverimus, quam vestigaverimus. 
Immo sine magno periculo tentari non possunt.’ (Barth, CD II/1, 259) Though liberalism could claim 
continuity with Melanchthon in its rejection of speculation by way of a focus upon Deus pro nobis, it, 
unlike that of Melanchthon, was driven, at least in part, by a Kantian epistemological scepticism. 
 
18 See Schleiermacher, TCF, 748; Ritschl, TCDJR, vol. 3, 204, 212, 219 (cf. J.H.W. 
Stuckenberg, ‘The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl,’ American Journal of Theology 2, 2 (1898): 275; Gerald 
McCulloh, Christ’s Person and Life-work in the Theology of Albrecht Ritschl: With Special Attention to 
the Munus Triplex (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), 52-53; Bruce McCormack, ‘The 
Person of Christ,’ in Mapping Modern Theology: A Thematic and Historical Introduction, ed. Kelly M. 
Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012) 166-169); Wilhelm Herrmann, Systematic 
Theology, trans. Nathaniel Micklem and Kenneth A. Saunders (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2013), 97-
98; Brian D. Asbill, The Freedom of God for Us: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Divine Aseity (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 63-64. 
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an example of natural theology within the doctrine of God, though in a less obvious 
way. In refusing to make positive claims concerning the nature and attributes of Deus in 
se, it, even if implicitly, made negative ones: that Deus in se was unknowable, etc. 
These claims were themselves not based in revelation, and were thus natural, 
speculative and idolatrous. This was Barth’s meaning when, at the time of the GD, he 
wrote of the way in which ‘Schleiermacher and other modern theologians’ held that 
behind God as known in the economy ‘God’s essence is concealed as something 
different and higher,’ and that they were, therefore, guilty of denying revelation and 
‘inventing a God.’19 And his liberal teachers were surely in mind when Barth inveighed 
against the notion of a Deus absconditus, calling such a concept, for example, an ‘image 
of God which we have made for ourselves,’20 i.e., merely out of our own resources, and 
not on the basis of revelation. 
Barth’s realisation that liberal nominalism was also speculative, and his own 
self-correction in light of it, did not occur instantaneously in 1915, the year most 
correctly connected to his break from liberalism, but rather, over a period of time 
between that year and the 1924 GD. Indeed, Barth’s writings in the years immediately 
following 1915 display an ongoing reticence to speak of God in se, especially when 
they are compared with Barth’s treatments of the doctrine of God in the GD and the CD 
II. An excellent illustration of this fact is Barth’s 1917 essay, ‘The New World within 
the Bible,’ which was first delivered as a lecture in the church at Leutwil.21 The final 
pages of that essay are dedicated to providing an answer to the question ‘Who is 
                                                          
19 Barth, GD, 101. See also Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early 
Theology, 1910-1931 (London: SCM Press, 1962), 115. 
 
20 Barth, CD IV/1, 52. 
 
21 Karl Barth, ‘The New World in the Bible, 1917,’ in The Word of God and Theology, trans. 
Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 15. 
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God?’22 In those pages, Barth demonstrated a commitment – which, as will be seen, 
endured for the remainder of his career – to derive his answer to that question from the 
Bible.23 Further, Barth demonstrated therein a commitment to describing God as a ‘new 
thing’24 vis-à-vis the world. His answer to the question was even formally Trinitarian.25 
The difference, however, between Barth’s answer to this question in 1917 and his 
answers to it in his later treatments of the doctrine of God, is that in 1917 Barth 
restricted himself to speech about God’s economic acts, to the exclusion of direct claims 
concerning God’s immanent nature and attributes.  He wrote: 
Who is God? He is the heavenly Father! Indeed. But he is the heavenly Father 
on earth and on earth really the heavenly Father! The One who does not want to 
split life into ‘this side’ and ‘that side.’ The One who does not want to leave it 
up to death to set us free from sin and suffering. The One who wants to bless us 
with the powers of life not with the powers of the Church…He is the One who 
does not have just any old idea in his head but who constructs a new world.26 
 
Thereafter Barth proceeded to describe the Son and the Holy Spirit in the same way, 
with reference only to the economy. His reluctance to speak of Deus in se in answering 
the question ‘who is God?’ was almost surely the result of his ongoing aversion to 
speculation in its older forms. It left him, however, within the realm of liberal 
nominalism.  
What Barth needed, by his own later standard, in order to truly avoid idolatry, 
was a way to avoid the speculative idolatry of nominalism without resorting to 
speculation in any other form, i.e., without in any way looking away from Jesus Christ. 
                                                          
22 Barth, ‘TNW,’ 26. 
 
23 Barth, ‘TNW,’ 27. 
 
24 Barth, ‘TNW,’ 26. 
 
25 Barth, ‘TNW,’ 28. 
 
26 Barth, ‘TNW,’ 28. 
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In other words, if he was to avoid the idolatry of speculation altogether, he needed a 
way of truly speaking of Deus in se through reflection upon Jesus Christ, Deus pro 
nobis. This he found, at least by the time of Romans II (1922), in the ostensibly simple, 
yet weighty assertion of what Gunton calls the ‘realism of revelation’27: that Deus pro 
nobis is identical in content to Deus in se. Indeed, that identification was, according to 
Barth in 1922, the very ‘content of the epistle to the Romans.’28 Thus, the immanent 
nature and attributes of God could be known and spoken of (avoiding the idolatry of 
nominalism, which, as mentioned above, he came to criticise as such by the time of the 
1924 GD29) while not looking away from revelation (avoiding the idolatry of the older 
forms of speculation).  
Even with the assertion of the realism of revelation formally in place in Romans 
II, however, Barth’s material claims there concerning the immanent being and attributes 
of God were insufficiently grounded in revelation (again by his own later standard30), as 
evidenced by his over-emphasis upon negative predications of God.31 His doctrine of 
                                                          
27 Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl 
Barth (London: SCM Press, 2001), 129. 
 
28 Barth, Römerbrief II, 408: ‘Daß der Deus absconditus als solcher in Jesus Christus Deus 
revelatus ist, das ist der Inhalt des Römerbriefes (1, 16-17).’ The rendering of the English translation 
(Romans II, 422) is questionable, but still conveys the basic idea: ‘The Epistle moves round the theme (i. 
16,17) that in Christ Jesus the Deus absconditus is as such the Deus revelatus.’  
 
29 In addition to the above quotation from the GD, 101, see p. 359, where Barth distances himself 
from liberalism by asserting that theologians are ‘commanded to talk about God.’ The account of Barth’s 
development here, i.e., that he found the key to overcoming nominalism by the time of Romans II (and 
did overcome nominalism in an even fuller way in the 1924 GD), runs counter to that of Brian, who 
suggests (CUL, 82) that Barth’s Anselm represents his overcoming of nominalism, or was at least a 
significant step in that direction. 
 
30 See Karl Barth, ‘The Humanity of God,’ in The Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Thomas 
and Thomas Wieser (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960), 44-45. 
 
31 Positive claims about God’s immanent being are scarce in Romans II. McCormack rightly 
notes, for example, that while it may be argued that revelation in Romans II had a Trinitarian structure, 
there was within it, ‘not yet a Trinity of being.’ (McCormack, KBCRDT, 262) And Heron (‘God,’ 80) 
rightly notes that, ‘What [Barth] emphasizes here [in Romans II], however, is less the nature of God than 
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God remained, therefore, to some extent, speculative, and, to that same extent, 
subjectively (and therefore also objectively) idolatrous. Though the formal key to 
overcoming speculation was present in Barth’s thinking by 1922, it was in large 
measure not until the 1924 Göttingen Dogmatics (§§16-17), and even more fully in the 
CD II/1 (§§28-31), that Barth (once again, by his own standard) overcame speculation 
materially, as will be described below.32 It was a shortcoming of Barth’s that he did not 
specify how strictly the identity of content between revelation and Deus in se was to be 
understood, and what it owed itself to. As will become clear below, this ambiguity 
became particularly problematic when Barth, in his later Christology, came to include 
Jesus of Nazareth within the content of revelation, and remains problematic for the 
current attempts at interpreting Barth’s doctrine of election.  
  
3.1.2 The objective idolatry of projections 
The objective idolatry which was the necessary counterpart to speculation within the 
doctrine of God was most frequently described by Barth in the terms of the projection 
thesis of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).33 For Feuerbach ‘God’ was a human creation 
which, lacking objective existence, was merely a conglomeration of the attributes of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the antithesis between God and everything else...’ Even the term ‘freedom’ seemed, as a predicate of God, 
to have a mainly negative content. (Barth, Romans II, 66, 342, 386). 
 
32 Barth’s treatments of the doctrine of God between 1924 and 1940 are all undergirded by the 
conviction that God is in God’s immanent being who God is known to be in revelation. The first sentence 
of Barth’s thesis in his GD §16 (‘The Nature of God’) reads as follows: ‘We know God's nature in his 
own Word to us.’ (351) Cf. Barth, GD, 356. The first sentence of Barth’s thesis in §9 of the Chr.D. (‘Gott 
in seiner Offenbarung’) states: ‘Gottes Wort ist Gott in seiner Offenbarung.’ (165) And the first sentence 
of Barth’s thesis in his CD §28 (‘The Being of God as the One who Loves in Freedom’) reads as follows: 
‘God is who He is in the act of His revelation.’ (257) See also the CD I/1, 479. 
 
33 See Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1957). See also 4.1.2 in the present work. 
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hypostatised human being.34 Barth was familiar with Feuerbach on some level very 
early on in his career. In his 1913 essay, ‘Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott,’ for 
example, he demonstrated familiarity with the basics of Feuerbach’s thought, and even 
used it, as he would throughout his career, in order to criticise his own theological 
opponents: in this case, Siebeck and Lotze.35 Barth lectured on Feuerbach in 1926, 
during his time at Münster, in the course of a series of lectures on the history of modern 
theology.36 His response to Feuerbach was remarkably appreciative there. Though for 
Barth Feuerbach’s atheology was in a certain sense ‘almost offensively trivial,’37 he 
believed that his critique of the idolatry of self-hypostatisation provided to theology a 
‘most true reminder, most necessary also for the knowledge of true God.’38 Both before 
and after these lectures Feuerbach made regular appearances within Barth’s writings. 
Barth’s major dogmatic treatments of the doctrine of God, in particular, made regular 
mention of him,39 and Barth’s frequent criticisms of the idolatrous introduction of 
human self-hypostatisations and apotheoses into the doctrine of God bear witness to 
Feuerbach’s ongoing influence upon him. 
                                                          
34 See Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity. See also 4.1.2 in the present work. 
 
35 Karl Barth, ‘Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott, 1913,’ in Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 
1909-1914 (GA III.22), ed. Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ, 1993), 545-547. 
 
36 The portion of these lectures dealing with Feuerbach have been published in English as, Karl 
Barth, ‘Ludwig Feuerbach,’ in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, trans. Louise 
Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962). The historical background information in this volume (p. 
217) wrongly states that these lectures were given in 1920. According to Busch (Karl Barth, 169) they 
should be dated to 1926. 
 
37 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 227. 
 
38 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 232. 
 
39 Explicit references to Feuerbach are made in Barth’s treatments of the doctrine of God in the 
GD (358, 361,399, 400, 424 and 425), the Chr.D. (182), and the CD II/1 (292, 293, 449, 467, 494, 612). 
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It was primarily Feuerbach who provided Barth with the categories through 
which he thought about the objective component of idolatry within the doctrine of 
God,40 although, of course, he believed that what Feuerbach helped him to describe was 
also a reality described by Scripture. Barth clearly had Feuerbach in mind when he 
made statements such as this one: ‘Our starting-point in [the] first part of the doctrine of 
God was neither an axiom of reason nor a datum of experience. In the measure that a 
doctrine of God draws on these sources [i.e., is speculative], it betrays the fact that its 
subject is not really God but a hypostatised reflection of man.’41 This statement, indeed, 
demonstrates not only Barth’s reliance upon Feuerbach in describing the objective 
component of idolatry within the doctrine of God, but also the necessary connection 
which existed in his thinking between it and speculation, idolatry’s subjective 
component.  
 If Barth’s break from liberalism involved a perception of its two-fold speculative 
idolatry, it also involved his perception of objective idolatry within it, i.e., of the fact 
that the god described by its doctrine of God was not God, but an idolatrous human 
projection. His well-known early tautology ‘God is God’ was meant, at least in part, as 
a protest against the ‘gods’ of human projection which he believed characterised liberal 
Protestant theology,42 and he more or less explicitly criticised the liberal Protestant 
doctrine of God by appeal to Feuerbach throughout his career. The problem raised by 
Feuerbach, according to Barth in 1926, ‘can be seen as a general attack on the 
                                                          
40 This is not to say that Barth never used this kind of Feuerbachian language to describe the 
subjective act of idolatry; the act of self-projection or apotheosis was necessarily implied in the act of 
looking away from Christ, i.e., in speculation. 
 
41 Barth, CD II/2, 3. 
 
42 According to Busch (‘God is God,’ 101), Barth first used this phrase in a sermon in 1916, the 
year after his break with liberalism. Busch goes on to say that (107): ‘The equation ‘God is God’ seeks 
initially to avoid the equating of God and our concepts of God.’  
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methodology of the theology of Schleiermacher and of post-Schleiermacher theology.’43 
And according to Barth in 1940: 
We can see how here the mystery of the modern doctrine of God – that the being 
of God is the predicate of the human subject – was long ago carelessly exploded 
by a philosopher who derived from the school of Idealism, but was no longer 
interested in the Church. We may well wonder that his objection did not make 
more impression on those who denied the personality of God in so far as he also 
and particularly attacked their positive assertions. But we must wonder even 
more how its defenders, with their references to the longing of the human heart, 
the infinite value of the human personality in spiritual and world history, with 
their quite open and express projection of human self-consciousness into the 
transcendent, could expose themselves so openly this objection of Feuerbach 
without apparently taking any account of its existence.44 
 
To be sure, the doctrine of God of liberal Protestantism was not alone in being on the 
receiving end of this kind of critique. Any doctrine of God which looked away from 
Jesus Christ, i.e., which was speculative even for a moment, was also guilty, in Barth’s 
mind, of describing a human projection. 
 It is not sufficient to say merely that Barth embraced Feuerbach and utilised him 
against his theological opponents, as true as this statement is. Barth’s material response 
to, and appropriation of, Feuerbach was, in fact, more nuanced. Essentially, it was two-
fold, and the two sides of his response to him correspond to a two-foldness in his 
critique of idolatry within the doctrine of God, which will be described presently. 
 
3.2 Two Forms of Idolatry-Critique within the Doctrine of God 
A distinction must be introduced at this point between two ways in which Barth 
understood doctrines of God to be idolatrous, and spoke of them as such. For Barth, all 
doctrines of God were intrinsically idolatrous (3.2.1), while some doctrines of God were 
only idolatrous (3.2.2). 
                                                          
43 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 227. 
 
44 Barth, CD II/1, 293. See also Romans II, 36; ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 223; CD II/1, 270. 
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3.2.1 The intrinsic idolatry of all doctrines of God 
In the first place, for Barth, all doctrines of God had to be judged as completely 
intrinsically idolatrous.45 Revelation, in the strict sense, was not, for Barth, a datum 
which could be possessed and exploited in the formulation of doctrine, including the 
formulation of the doctrine of God. Thus, all doctrines of God had as their source and 
raw material human images, concepts and modes of thought which were not revelation. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, every doctrine of God was intrinsically speculative, and 
also, correspondingly, intrinsically idolatrous objectively, the object of its description 
being that which is not God, viz., a human projection. Even Barth’s own doctrine of 
God was not exempt from this judgment, as he himself noted.46 These ideas were 
implicit in Barth’s thinking from at least the time of Romans II in which the absolute 
otherness of God vis-à-vis creation (including all created concepts) was stressed. Barth, 
however, presented them with particular explicitness in his essays, ‘Fate and Idea in 
Theology’ (originally delivered as lectures in 1929) and, ‘The First Commandment as 
an Axiom in Theology’ (written in 1933 near the height of his battle with natural 
theology and National Socialism). In the former, Barth asked rhetorically: ‘How could 
my God-concept ever be a witness to God?’47 In the latter, Barth argued that, without 
exception, ‘Every theology has ‘other gods’ as well...,’ and that ‘theology is never 
justified by what it intends to think and say as its work of right obedience, as fulfillment 
of the law, according to its best knowledge and conscience’48; in other words, that no 
                                                          
45 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 59-60; ‘TFC,’ 78. It is not true, as Chia (Revelation and 
Theology, 122) suggests, that Barth assumes human beings ‘possess an adequate concept of God.’  
 
46 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 59-60; ‘TFC,’ 78. 
 
47 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 59. 
 
48 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 77. 
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doctrine of God has the true God as its object intrinsically, on the basis of its own 
formulations and characteristics. 
 This judgment that all doctrines of God are intrinsically idolatrous corresponds 
to one of the two sides of Barth’s response to Feuerbach. For Barth agreed, on the one 
hand, with Feuerbach’s judgment that every doctrine of God is without exception 
composed of idolatrous human projections. According to Barth, ‘There is a test of 
whether or not we stand on this base [of revelation], of whether we are able to admit to 
Feuerbach that he was right on the whole line of his religious interpretation so far as it 
related to religion as an experience of men.’49 Clearly, Barth meant by this statement 
also to affirm, in particular, Feuerbach’s interpretation of the doctrine of God insofar as 
it was a doctrine held by human beings. If the discussion concerned human doctrines of 
God in and of themselves, Barth believed that Feuerbach’s critique was simply 
universally applicable. 
 
3.2.2 The complete idolatry of some doctrines of God 
Yet Barth more frequently, especially in and after the 1924 Göttingen Dogmatics, 
censured doctrines of God for being idolatrous not when and because they were 
intrinsically idolatrous (though he never denied that they all were) but rather when and 
because they were only idolatrous. Not all doctrines of God were idolatrous in this 
sense. The theologian could avoid idolatry in his or her doctrine of God in this second 
sense by relating his or her thinking and speech concerning God’s being and attributes 
to revelation in the way proper to and possible for sinful, created intelligence.  
                                                          
49 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 236-237. 
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The relating of one’s thinking and speech to revelation in the way proper to and 
possible for created intelligence did not mean avoiding intrinsic idolatry. ‘There are no 
exceptions! Every theology has ‘other gods’...’50 Simply, for Barth, a certain form of 
subjective idolatry – i.e., a certain form of the utilisation of a source other than actual 
revelation in one’s doctrine of God – was the correspondence to revelation proper to and 
possible for the creature.51 In other words, the relation of the created intellect to 
revelation proper to and possible for the created intellect was in the absolute sense 
improper; but it was improper in a specific way, i.e., in a way which (humanly) 
corresponded to and followed after revelation.52 This is why, for Barth, the doctrine of 
God undertaken in ‘right obedience’ to revelation still had other gods, and ‘Even this 
theology will never be justified by its work but only, if at all, by the forgiveness of 
sins.’53 When undertaken in this way, the doctrine of God was still, in the strict sense 
intrinsically idolatrous, but it was at the same time something more than mere idolatry, 
even subjectively: it was idolatry ‘put under the order of revelation.’54 
 The sense in which the doctrine of God developed in this way was for Barth 
something more than mere idolatry is made clearer still when it is asked what, in his 
                                                          
50 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 77. 
 
51 This is an aspect of broader problem Barth’s thought: the fact that he did not distinguish 
adequately between creatureliness and sinfulness. 
 
52 Barth explicitly uses the language of theology – the doctrine of God in particular – 
corresponding to God’s revelation at CD II/1, 287, but throughout Barth’s main treatments of the doctrine 
of God in the GD and the CD it is clear that Barth was concerned to ensure that all that he said did so. 
Indeed, that all theology had to correspond to God’s revelation by being a ‘thinking after’ it [nachdenken] 
was a principle in Barth’s theology generally from at least the time of Romans II on, which he first 
expressed as such in the GD, 151. See also Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian 
Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. John Webster (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 
2014), 9-10. 
 
53 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 78. 
 
54 Barth, CD I/2, 360. 
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mind, its object was. Intrinsically, the object of its description could still only be an idol, 
i.e., a human projection. Since even doctrines of God which are, subjectively, developed 
in creaturely obedience to revelation remain in the strict sense subjectively idolatrous 
they also remain intrinsically, objectively idolatrous. But because they conform to 
revelation subjectively in the way possible for the creature, one may, according to Barth, 
have confidence that God will graciously give Godself to be their object, thus making 
them not merely idolatrous objectively. ‘When we are obedient, according to our 
capacity and even our incapacity, we have the promise that God Himself will 
acknowledge our obedience in spite of capacity or even incapacity, and this means that 
He will confer on our viewing, conceiving and speaking His own veracity.’55 This is the 
meaning of Barth’s assertions that the ‘fight for right obedience in theology’ ‘can be 
fought properly only in common hope,’56 and that, even more strongly, ‘...for theology 
there is no other justification than justification by faith. Or, to put it another way, 
theology is justified only by obedience.’57 Thus, while doctrines of God which 
correspond to revelation remain intrinsically idolatrous both subjectively and 
objectively, they are not merely idolatrous; rather, they can be said to operate, ‘in the 
sphere of truth and not of falsehood.’58 
                                                          
55 Barth, CD II/1, 213. 
 
56 Barth, ‘TFC,’ 77; 78. Emphasis added. 
 
57 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 60. 
 
58 Barth, CD II/1, 336. Of course there always remained, in theory, the possibility that a doctrine 
of God could conform to revelation in the way proper to and possible for the created intellect, and God 
could still not give Godself to be its object. To assert otherwise would compromise the freedom of God’s 
grace. But Barth, certainly by the time of the CD II/1, came to emphasise the reliability and constancy of 
God, in such a way that had confidence that speech about God which was based upon revelation would be 
attended by God’s grace, and, therefore, have God as its object. 
 
101 
 
 
 
 That Barth believed that some doctrines of God avoid idolatry in this sense (that 
of being only idolatrous) corresponds to the other side of his response to Feuerbach. For 
while, on the one hand, he agreed with Feuerbach that all doctrines of God are instances 
of idolatrous projection, he also held that the doctrine of God can, ultimately, escape 
Feuerbach’s critique: ‘...so long as all talk ‘of God being in man’ is not cut off...we 
have no reason to disagree with Feuerbach.’59 It is clear that if certain standards are 
adhered to within the doctrine of God, in at least a certain sense Feuerbach’s critique 
will not ultimately apply. These two apparently contradictory responses of Barth to 
Feuerbach can be explained as suggested above: Barth believed Feuerbach was right in 
his judgment that all doctrines of God are, intrinsically, idolatrous projections, but that 
he was wrong to assume that the fact that doctrines of God are intrinsically idolatrous 
meant that they were only ever idolatrous. The error of Feuerbach’s account, for Barth, 
lay in leaving out the reality of divine grace, which justifies the idolater (and the 
idolatrous doctrine of God such that it truly describes of God), and which can be 
counted on by the theologian who faithfully follows after and depends upon it.60 
 Barth took great pains to avoid idolatry within his own doctrine of God: not, to 
be sure, to avoid intrinsic idolatry, for he knew that idolatry in that sense could not be 
avoided. Rather, he sought to avoid idolatry in the second sense – the sense of being 
only idolatrous. This meant that he sought to propound his doctrine of God in in a way 
that corresponded (humanly) to revelation, knowing that it was only in so doing that he 
could be confident that God would give Godself to be its object. The question of what 
                                                          
59 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 237. Emphasis added. 
 
60 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 236-237. For further discussion of how Barth’s reckoning with 
Feuerbach affected his doctrine of God, see Jan Štefan, ‘Gottes Vollkommenheiten nach KD II/1,’ in Karl 
Barth im europäischen Zeitgeschehen (1935-1950): Widerstand – Bewärung – Orientierung, edited by 
Michael Beintker, Christian Link and Michael Trowitzsch (Zurich: TVZ, 2010), 87-89. 
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this meant, both formally and materially, for his doctrine of God will occupy most of 
the remainder of the present chapter. 
 
3.3 Barth’s Directives for Avoiding Idolatry within the Doctrine of God  
Bath’s concerns over idolatrous speculation and projection within the doctrine of God 
were addressed in a number of ways within his own treatments of the doctrine of God. 
In the first place, and most obviously, they contained asides directed against what he 
considered speculative approaches to the doctrine of God.61 Secondly, and positively, 
Barth sought to avoid idolatry by setting his own doctrine of God in the relationship of 
proper creaturely correspondence to revelation. In order to answer the question of how 
Barth believed that the doctrine of God must be developed in order to avoid idolatry 
(and how Barth himself did develop his doctrine of God in an attempt to avoid idolatry) 
one must answer the question of what it meant to Barth for a doctrine of God to be 
developed, both formally and materially, in proper creaturely correspondence to 
revelation.    
 In an attempt to answer these questions, attention will be directed toward Barth’s 
two most important treatments of the doctrine of God – that found in the GD §§16-17 
and that found in the CD §§28-31 – though other of Barth’s works will also be 
referenced when appropriate. At many points to be discussed, there is little difference 
between the doctrine of God in the GD and the doctrine of God in the CD. Unless 
otherwise noted, it should be assumed that the interpretation of Barth offered below is 
meant to be representative of his thinking in both. It will be seen that, for Barth, a 
number of directives had to be adhered to within the doctrine of God if the latter were to 
                                                          
61 E.g., Barth, GD, 365-366; CD II/1, 261, 293-294. 
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correspond to revelation in the way proper to and possible for created intelligence, and 
thereby avoid being merely idolatrous. The first two directives to be mentioned are 
formal, and the remainder are material, i.e., they are ways in which the doctrine of God 
will look materially if the formal directives for its development are adhered to, and it is 
not, therefore, speculative. 
 
3.3.1 The doctrine of God must be derived by reflection upon revelation if it is to avoid 
idolatry 
If, for Barth, a doctrine of God was to obediently correspond to revelation, and therefore 
avoid being mere idolatry, it had to be derived by way of reflection upon the event of 
revelation, i.e., have revelation alone as its source. This is the positive correlate to 
Barth’s critique of speculation as idolatry.  ‘The ...object of any idea of God formed 
otherwise than in view of God's revelation in Jesus Christ, is necessarily other than He 
who is Lord and salvation, and therefore the object of the faith of the Church and the 
only true God’62 – thus to avoid idolatry, one must develop one’s doctrine of God solely 
from the source of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.  
It has already been argued, however, that, strictly speaking, a doctrine of God 
could not be derived directly from actual revelation, or have actual revelation as its 
source. Its derivation could only be a matter of thoroughly human (and therefore wholly 
incommensurate) ‘recollection’63 of and ‘reflection’64 upon revelation. That is, it could 
be derived from, and have its source in, only a human concept of revelation, which as a 
                                                          
62 Barth, CD II/1, 298-299. 
 
63 Barth, CD II/1, 54. 
 
64 Barth, CD II/1, 4. 
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human concept was wholly other than actual revelation, though it was shaped by it.65  
Yet it was when the doctrine of God was so derived that it was elaborated in 
correspondence to actual revelation, and that actual revelation was allowed it is proper 
place, i.e., that of source and norm, in human thinking about God’s being and attributes, 
in the way proper to and possible for created intelligence. The statement that doctrines 
of God must be so derived if they are to avoid idolatry is the most general way of 
describing the manner in which for Barth the doctrine of God had to be developed if 
idolatry was to be avoided. The remaining directives concerning how, in Barth’s mind, 
it must be developed if idolatry is to be avoided are all particular ways of adhering to 
this one. None of this is to say that the primary reason behind Barth’s insistence upon 
the derivation of the doctrine of God by reflection upon revelation (Jesus Christ) was 
his aversion to idolatry; this was secondary to his primary desire to simply be obedient 
to revelation. Yet it was also true that disobedience to revelation in this manner 
necessarily meant idolatry, while obedience to revelation in this way meant the right to 
hope for the overcoming of it by God.  
 Barth’s own treatments of the doctrine of God in the GD and the CD represent 
thoroughgoing attempts to put this principle – that ‘we know God’s nature [only] in his 
own Word to us’66 – into practice. Barth helpfully offered insight into the way in which 
he arrived at many of the formulations which constitute his doctrine of God. It is clear, 
                                                          
65 To anticipate the next chapter, it is telling to note that Barth saw the fundamental task within 
the theological discussion of religion to be the reversal of the order of the concepts of religion and 
revelation. (Karl Barth, On Religion: The Revelation of God as the Sublimation of Religion, trans. Garrett 
Green (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 52) The concept of religion, in his mind, had usurped the role of 
the concept of revelation – and this meant idolatry. What is important, for present purposes, however, is 
that Barth realised that the most that could be done humanly, within theology, in the attempt to 
correspond to revelation, was to afford a human concept of revelation the role of source and norm in 
theology, rather than a different concept – though doing so was no less intrinsically idolatrous than 
affording that role to any other concept. 
 
66 Barth, GD, 351. See also pp. 368, 381; CD II/1, 261-262. 
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for example, that when Barth in the GD utilised the terms ‘personality’ and ‘aseity’ as 
the two determinants of God’s nature, 67 he did so because he believed that the attempt 
to reflect faithfully upon the event of revelation immediately demanded their 
employment. Barth wrote that ‘the first and decisive description of the nature of God 
[the description of God as ‘person’] arises out of the fact that God is knowable to us 
through his Word. Address cannot be for me a neutral thing. It involves a person.’68 
And the predicate of Lordship (or aseity) must be applied to God because ‘The I that 
addresses us in revelation is free.’69 
The same line of reasoning lay behind Barth’s use of the terms ‘love’ and 
‘freedom’ in order to denote the two determinants of the divine nature in his doctrine of 
God within the CD II/1.70 ‘By the reality of the divine act we are summoned to give an 
account of the essence of this act, and thereby of the essence of God Himself. And led 
by Holy Scripture itself, we may and must venture to bring the concept of love...into the 
service of our present task, the declaration of the act and therefore of the being of 
God.’71 Revelation:  
...permits and indeed commands us to speak of a life and love, of a living and 
loving I, defining, attesting and proclaiming it. But permitting and commanding 
us to do so, He also requires us to understand and name Him beyond all our 
insights and ideas as the I who lives and loves in His unique way, to give Him 
the honour which cannot even remotely accrue to any but the living and loving 
being known to us, but which we must specifically deny to all other living and 
loving beings known to us, because it is properly and originally His honour 
alone...72 
                                                          
67 Barth, GD, §16; 351, 367-374. 
 
68 Barth, GD, 367. 
 
69 Barth, GD, 369. 
 
70 Barth, CD II/1, 272-316. 
 
71 Barth, CD II/1, 276. Emphasis added. 
 
72 Barth, CD II/1, 298. 
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The predication of ‘freedom’ of God was Barth’s attempt to obediently give testimony 
to this second aspect of revelation.73 Even the fact that in the CD II/1 Barth considered 
the perfections of the divine loving before he considered the perfections of the divine 
freedom was the result of his belief that this order of exposition followed the logical 
order of revelation itself: the way of treating the doctrine of God demanded by God’s 
being and revelation ‘can consist only in our thinking first of the love of God as it really 
exists in His freedom and then of His freedom as it really exists in His loving. But the 
‘first’ and ‘then,’ the sequence, can be reversed only arbitrarily and at the cost of great 
artificiality and misapprehension.’74 By Barth’s logic, it would have been idolatrous to 
consider them the other way round, because such an arrangement would not have been 
derived from reflection upon revelation. 
 The formal relationship between revelation, idolatry, and the doctrine of God 
remained constant in Barth’s thinking throughout his career: it was always the case that 
a (speculative) doctrine of God not derived from revelation was idolatrous. Thus, in that 
changes in Barth’s understanding of the content of revelation brought about changes in 
his understanding of what was and was not derived from revelation, they also brought 
about changes in the scope of his critique of idolatry within the doctrine of God. It has 
already been argued above that it was a change in Barth’s doctrine of revelation that 
caused him to perceive idolatry within the doctrines of God of Protestant liberalism.75 It 
must be added at this point that another, later, change in Barth’s doctrine of revelation 
                                                          
73 Barth, CD II/1, 301. 
 
74 Barth, CD II/1, 352. Te Velde (Paths Beyond Tracing Out, 309) is right in saying that: ‘Barth 
discusses the perfections of the divine love emphatically in the first place, before the perfections of divine 
freedom. The reason is that the gospel of Jesus Christ preaches God’s love first and foremost, and that 
only by the love of God we learn about his freedom.’ 
 
75 See section 3.1.1 of the present work. 
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caused another change in Barth’s critique of idolatry within the doctrine of God. This 
occurred between the time of the CD II/1 (1940) and the time of the CD IV/1 (1953). 
During this time period, as noted previously, Barth came to include within the content 
of revelation the humanity of Jesus of Nazareth (and, therefore, humanity in general). 
Not only this: Barth also came to see a more positive relationship between the human 
and divine natures in Jesus Christ.76 What this meant in practice was that events from 
the life of Jesus Christ, existing on the human, historical plane, were read by Barth back 
into the life of the eternal Trinity.77 This new way of thinking is reflected in Barth’s 
statement that, ‘It is only the pride of man, making a god in its own image, that will not 
hear of a determination of divine essence in Jesus Christ.’78  
So, for example, that Jesus Christ was, during his earthly life, subject to the 
Father became the grounds for Barth’s late acceptance of some form of immanent, 
functional subordination79 of the Son to the Father within the eternal Trinity. He wrote 
in the CD IV/1, for example, that, ‘We have not only not to deny but actually to affirm 
                                                          
76 See section 2.1.2.3 of the present work. 
 
77 Paul Molnar (Faith, Freedom and the Spirit: The Economic Trinity in Barth, Torrance and 
Contemporary Theology (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2015), 142, 333-339) perceives this in Barth and 
criticises him for it. McCormack also senses a change along these lines, given expression in the CD IV/1, 
but surely overstates this change when he says that, ‘What is new in Barth [in the CD IV, vis-à-vis 
theological tradition], I think, is that he has identified the human subject, Jesus of Nazareth, as God...’ 
(Bruce McCormack, ‘Divine Impassibility or Simply Divine Constancy? Implications of Karl Barth’s 
Later Christology for Debates over Impassibility,’ in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human 
Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 165) It is 
more accurate to say that Barth held that every aspect of the life of Jesus of Nazareth was grounded in 
some reality within the life of the eternal Son, and therefore, the immanent Trinity, and that Barth at times 
did not satisfactorily describe the correspondence between the aspects of the life of Jesus of Nazareth and 
the underlying reality of the life of the eternal Son in terms of analogy, thereby adequately holding the 
divine nature apart from the human nature, but rather slipped into univocity. 
 
78 Barth, CD IV/2, 84. 
 
79 Darren O. Sumner (‘Obedience and Subordination in Karl Barth’s Trinitarian Theology,’ in 
Advancing Trinitarian Theology: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred 
Sanders (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 137-138) rightly argues that Barth’s actualistic ontology 
allowed him to hold to an immanent and eternal but not ontological subordination of the Son to the 
Father. 
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and understand as essential to the being of God the offensive fact that there is in God 
Himself an above and a below, a prius and a posterius, a superiority and a 
subordination.’80 That Jesus suffered was also the grounds for Barth’s rejection (at least 
to some degree) of the traditional doctrine of the divine apatheia and for his acceptance 
of a form of theopaschitism. According to Barth in the CD IV/2, ‘...the God who is 
operative and revealed in the acts of Jesus self-evidently places Himself at the side of 
man in this respect – that that which causes suffering to man as His creatures is also and 
above all painful, alien and antithetical to Himself.’81 Further: 
It is not at all the case that God has no part in the suffering of Jesus Christ even 
in His mode of being as the Father. No, there is a particula veri in the teaching 
of the early Patripassians. This is that primarily it is God the Father who suffers 
in the offering and sending of His Son, in His abasement. The suffering is not 
His own, but the alien suffering of the creature, of man, which He takes to 
Himself in Him. But He does suffer it in the humiliation of His Son with a depth 
with which it never was or will be suffered by any man – apart from the One 
who is His Son.82 
 
                                                          
80 Barth, CD IV/1, 200-201. See also p. 211, in particular, and the rest of §59 more generally. 
This has been noted by a variety of interpreters, including Berkouwer (TTG, 304)) and Paul Molnar (‘The 
Obedience of the Son in the Theology of Karl Bart and Thomas F. Torrance,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology 67, 1 (2014): 50-69; Faith, Freedom and the Spirit, 339-340), both of whom reject this move of 
Barth’s, and by McCormack (‘Divine Impassibility or Simply Divine Constancy?’), Jones (THC, 204) 
and Sumner (‘Obedience and Subordination’), each of whom show some degree of agreement with it. 
Phillip Tolliday (‘Obedience and Subordination in Barth’s Trinity,’ in Trinitarian Theology after Barth, 
ed. Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2011)) also believes that Barth’s 
doctrine of election in the CD II/2, and the related change brought about within Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation, led Barth to argue for eternal subordination, although he does not render a clear judgment one 
way or another on this move. Kevin Giles (‘Barth and Subordinationism,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 
64, 3 (2011): 346) argues that Barth’s language concerning subordination in the CD IV/1 cannot be taken 
at face value, and that Barth should not be read as endorsing an eternal subordinationism (even of the 
functional kind), but this does not do justice to Barth’s statements. 
 
81 Barth, CD IV/2, 225. 
 
82 Barth, CD IV/2, 357. Gunton says simply (‘Becoming and Being,’202) that, ‘Barth rejects the 
doctrine of impassibility.’ Berkouwer also (TTG, 29-305) rightly sees this, and criticises Barth for it. John 
M. Russell (‘Impassibility and Pathos in Barth’s Idea of God,’ Anglican Theological Review 70, 3 (1988): 
221), on the other hand, perceives in Barth a denial of divine impassibility and an affirmation of divine 
suffering, and holds that this accords well with Scripture. He rightly argues that, for Barth, God is 
externally impassible, i.e., that God cannot be affected from without, but internally passible, i.e., that God 
can affect Godself with emotion and suffering. (226-228) Robert B. Price (Letters of the Divine Word: 
The Perfections of God in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 69-70) also 
expresses sympathy with this view. 
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 Tendencies toward the rejection of the divine apatheia and the affirmation of 
subordination within the Trinity were already present in Barth’s thinking in the doctrine 
of God set forth in the CD II/1,83 but these tendencies received this new grounding in 
the inclusion of the humanity of Jesus in the content of revelation by the time of the CD 
IV/1.84  
 This change in Barth’s understanding of revelation meant that it became 
idolatrous to claim that aspects of Jesus’ human life were not indicative of closely 
corresponding (at times, it seems for Barth, nearly identical) realities in the life of the 
immanent Trinity. Continuing with the previous examples, it became the case that due 
to Barth’s new understanding of revelation the affirmation of the divine apatheia or the 
denial of the eternal subordination of the Son had to be understood as being derived 
from a source other than revelation, and therefore as being speculative and idolatrous.85 
As a part of Barth’s discussion of the relationship of super- and sub-ordination within 
the Trinity in the CD IV/1, he had, for example, this to say:  
 God is God only in these relationships and therefore not in a Godhead which 
 does not take part in this history, in the relationships of its modes of being, 
 which is neutral towards them. This neutral Godhead, this pure and empty 
 Godhead, and its claim to be true divinity, is the illusion of an abstract 
 ‘monotheism’ which usually fools men most successfully at the high-water mark 
 of the development of heathen religions and mythologies and philosophies.86 
 
                                                          
83 Barth, CD I/1, 412; II/1, 370-371. 
 
84 McCormack, in his essay, ‘Divine Impassibility or Simply Divine Constancy?,’ carefully 
attends to Barth’s various mentions of the concept of impassibility within the CD, and rightly argues that 
even in the earlier volumes of the CD Barth did not seem to approve of the concept of divine 
impassibility, and that the Christology of the CD IV/1 logically eliminated the possibility of any positive 
use of the concept of impassibility on Barth’s part. 
 
85 Again, this was already the case to some extent earlier in the CD. The difference in volume IV 
is that there it was the case due to Barth’s understanding of the way in which the human nature of Jesus 
revealed God, whereas in volume II it was due primarily to the Scripture principle. 
 
86 Barth, CD IV/1, 203. 
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For Barth at this time, a god in which there is not subordination is not God, but an idol, 
because such a god is not known from Jesus Christ, since Jesus Christ is known from 
his earthly life to be subordinate to the Father. In the CD IV, a god in whom there is no 
subordination can only be known by looking away from revelation, and therefore 
speculatively and idolatrously. This assertion will be taken up again below (section 3.5). 
 In spite of changes in his doctrine of revelation, and corresponding changes to 
his critique of speculation and idolatry within the doctrine of God, Barth’s formal 
commitment to the derivation of the doctrine from special revelation, i.e., Jesus Christ, 
as the only means of avoiding complete idolatry never changed. Attention will now be 
turned to more specific examples of what it meant and looked like, for Barth, for a 
doctrine of revelation to be derived from revelation, and thereby avoid idolatry. 
 
3.3.2 The doctrine of God must be derived from Scripture if it is to avoid idolatry 
If a doctrine of God was to avoid speculative idolatry in the way possible for and proper 
to the created (and invariably sinful) human intellect, it had, for Barth, to be developed 
in obedience and correspondence to revelation. But for it to be developed in obedience 
and correspondence to revelation it had, for Barth, to be developed in obedience and 
correspondence to the authoritative witness to revelation, Holy Scripture.87 In the case 
of those theologians whose doctrine of election Barth felt the need to contest, for 
example, he allowed that their formulations were ‘meant to be an exposition of 
                                                          
87 There is no conflict between the idea that the doctrine of God must be derived from Scripture, 
including the OT as Gerhard Bergner notes (Um der Sache willen: Karl Barths Schriftauslegung in der 
kirchlichen Dogmatik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupert, 2015), 104), and the idea that the doctrine of 
God must be derived from revelation, i.e., Jesus Christ, because all Scripture is, and must be understood 
as, a witness to Jesus Christ. 
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Scripture, and therefore a testimony to the revelation of the triune God.’88 The 
beginnings of this formal conviction are evident in Barth’s thought both before and at 
the time of his two Romans commentaries, and it became even more solid and 
materially determinative in his thought as his career progressed.89  
Barth’s particular way of understanding what it meant for the doctrine of God to 
be properly derived from Scripture differentiated him from many of his contemporaries 
and forebears. It may be both discovered directly, and read off of his material 
formulations, within his treatments of the doctrine of God within the GD and the CD II. 
First, it meant for him the use of biblical concepts in the attempt to describe the 
nature and attributes of God. Within the doctrine of God in the GD Barth took it for 
granted that the concepts used to describe God must be biblical ones, as seen, for 
example, in his discussion of the attribute of ‘holiness.’ He wrote, for example, that, 
                                                          
88 Barth, CD II/2, 24. Emphasis added. 
 
89 In the wake of Romans I, Barth was charged with ‘biblicism’ – a charge which he was willing 
to accept if he was permitted to explain the term’s meaning. Barth understated the degree to which the 
label of ‘biblicist’ could be applied to him when he said in the preface to Romans II (12) that, ‘When I am 
named a ‘Biblicist,’ all that can rightly be proved against me is that I am prejudiced in supposing the 
Bible to be a good book, and that I hold it to be profitable for men to take its conceptions at least as 
seriously as they take their own.’ In truth, even before Romans II, it was Barth’s a priori assumption that 
the exposition of Scripture was the surest way to arrive at an accurate conception of God and creation in 
relation to God. This is evidenced both by the fact that Barth exerted so much energy in the task of 
expositing Romans, and by his earlier writings (it is an implication, for example, of his 1917 essay ‘The 
New World within the Bible.’) Nevertheless, Barth allowed in Romans II that there was a possibility of 
obtaining a conception of God which was at least to some degree true outwith the exposition of Scripture 
(though not in contradiction to it; see, e.g., p. 277). Furthermore, his over-emphasis upon negative 
predications of God meant a departure from Scripture. In the GD, as was claimed in section 2.1.2.2 of the 
present work, Barth understood there to be a strong ongoing relationship between Scripture and 
revelation, which meant that the development of a doctrine of God from revelation meant its development 
from Scripture (see, e.g., §§ 1 and 10). Barth’s doctrine of God in the GD was, in fact, a more faithful 
representation of the biblical picture than that of Romans II, because it dropped his a priori commitment 
to describing God as, above all else, other than the world. In the doctrine of God in the CD II/1, Barth is 
even more explicit that obedience to revelation means the derivation of the doctrine of God from 
Scripture, and that the alternative is disobedience to revelation and idolatry. See pp. 6, 8-9, 23, and 
passim. It may also be mentioned here that Barth’s definition of natural theology in his 1934 Nein! (and it 
should be remembered that the idolatry of speculation was for Barth nothing other than the practice of 
natural theology within the domain of the doctrine of God) ran as follows: ‘By ‘natural theology’ I mean 
every (positive or negative) formulation of a system which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine 
revelation, whose subject, however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose 
method therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture.’ (74-75)  
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‘We can continue at once and say that this will of God is a holy will. The biblical 
concept of the Holy is, as we all know, the concept of that which is distinct or that 
which is supremely positive in God...90 and went on to say, further, ‘We cannot expunge 
the more detailed OT definitions at this point.’91 Barth, in fact, within the doctrine of 
God of the GD, offered biblical support throughout for his particular selection and 
definition of concepts. In the doctrine of God of the CD II/1, Barth is seen to be even 
more definitely committed to the utilisation of biblical concepts. ‘To attest and expound 
[the] biblical unity of the Lord with His glory is the business of the doctrine of divine 
perfections.’92  Barth’s actual procedure in the development of his doctrine of God (e.g., 
the attempt to understand the meaning of the predicate ‘love’ as it applies to God 
through biblical exegesis93) also demonstrates this commitment.94  
Secondly, it seems to be the case that properly deriving the doctrine of God from 
revelation meant for Barth a preference for the use of biblical terms to denote biblical 
concepts. This can be most effectively demonstrated by simply listing the terms which 
Barth used to denote God’s predicates; in the GD: personality, aseity, life, power, 
wisdom, holiness, righteousness, mercy, love, blessedness, unity, eternity, 
                                                          
90 Barth, GD, 418. 
 
91 Barth, GD, 418-419. 
 
92 Barth, CD II/1, 325. 
 
93 Barth, CD II/1, 276-283.  
 
94 That Barth’s doctrine of God, and in particular, his doctrines of the perfections of unity, 
constancy, and eternity, did in fact have their source in Scripture, with reason and tradition playing 
subservient roles, is, in part, the thesis rightly defended by Todd Pokrifka in his Redescribing God: The 
Roles of Scripture, Tradition, and Reason in Karl Barth’s Doctrines of Divine Unity, Constancy, and 
Eternity (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2010), see, e.g., pp. 41-42. And Bergner rightly states: ‘Hier [in his 
presentation of the divine perfections] arbeitet Barth mit etymologischen Untersuchungen der biblicischen 
Begriffe und mit Konkordanten Aufzählungen von Bibelstellen, er zeichnet Charakterbilder biblischer 
Gestalten und erzählt – vor allem alttestamentliche – Geschichten nach.‘ (Um der Sache Willen, 96) For a 
detailed consideration of the determinative role which biblical exegesis played in Barth’s presentation of 
the divine perfection of patience [Geduld], in particular, see pp. 94-119 of Bergner’s work. 
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omnipresence, constancy and glory; in the CD II/1: love, freedom, grace, mercy, 
patience, holiness, righteousness, wisdom, oneness, constancy, eternity, omnipresence, 
and omnipotence. To be sure, it was by no means an absolute rule that only biblical 
terms could be used in the doctrine of God. Other language indeed had to be used. And 
some concepts such as God’s omnipresence, which were clearly present in the Bible, 
were, for Barth, best denoted by the use of non-biblical terms. When, however, there 
were satisfactory biblical terms available to denote biblical concepts, Barth 
demonstrated that he believed it important to use them; on the other hand, Barth held 
only loosely to non-biblical terms utilised in order to denote biblical concepts. This is 
the reason that though in the GD he utilised the term ‘personality’ to denote one of the 
two determinants of God’s nature, in the CD he ceased to do so and admitted that its use 
was not ultimately important. The concept which it was meant to indicate remained 
important when describing God, but the term itself was not, for Barth, since it was not 
thrust upon the theologian by Scripture:  
...everything depends upon the statement that God is the One who loves. But 
nothing at all depends on the statement that He is or He has personality. The 
second statement is unknown both to the Bible and to primitive and Reformation 
dogma...We can and must, therefore concede that we can do without it so long 
as what is intended in it is assured and accepted.95 
 
If, on the other hand, the term ‘person’ or ‘personality’ was prominently used by 
Scripture to describe God, Barth would not have called it inessential. 
To state matters otherwise, Barth believed that theology, including the doctrine 
of God, in order to be obedient to revelation, had to be a matter of biblical 
                                                          
95 Barth, CD II/1, 296. Christophe Chalamet (Dialectical Theologians: Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl 
Barth and Rudolf Bultmann (Zurich: TVZ, 2005), 30) rightly notes that Barth’s preference for biblical 
terminology in the doctrine of God was even more pronounced in in the CD II/1 than it had been at the 
time of the GD, stating that, by the time of the CD II/1, ‘Barth has lost...any interest in such abstract, non-
biblical and non-dogmatic terminology. He prefers to speak of God as the one who loves.’ 
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‘interpretation,’ and not firstly of ‘illustration,’ where ‘Interpretation means saying the 
same thing in other words’ and ‘Illustration means saying the same thing in other 
words.’96 True concern for biblical interpretation in theology is not demonstrated by the 
discarding of the Bible’s actual terms by immediately translating them into some other 
idiom – that procedure will always involve material loss – but, rather, in a sustained 
consideration of them.97 A departure from the method of sustained interpretation which 
focusses upon biblical language to a method of illustration which immediately translates 
and discards it was for Barth a ‘desertion of revelation’ which stands under the 
‘interdict’ of the second commandment, i.e., which commits idolatry.98 
An implication of Barth’s belief that the doctrine of God had to be derived from 
Scripture in the way described above if idolatry were to be avoided was his conviction, 
most fully expressed within his doctrine of God in the CD II/1, that the corporeal 
anthropomorphisms and anthropoieticisms used by the Bible describe to God (i.e., those 
which suggest that God is or has a body), must not be ‘spiritualised,’ i.e., ‘arbitrarily 
translated into something spiritual.’99 This assertion distanced Barth from most classical 
theologians, including nearly all scholastic and Protestant orthodox ones.100 Even before 
                                                          
96 For more on Barth’s distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘illustration’ see the CD I/1, 345. 
See also p. 344 and Jüngel’s discussion (GB, 24-25) of this distinction in Barth. 
 
97 It is the particula veri of ‘postliberal’ accounts of Barth that, in general, they accurately depict 
this conviction of Barth’s – that theology must involve a sustained reckoning with the language of the 
Bible, rather than an immediate ‘translation’ of it. See, e.g., George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1984), 135; ‘Barth and Textuality,’ Theology Today 43, 3 
(1986): 365. 
 
98 Barth, CD I/1, 345. 
 
99 Barth, CD II/1, 266. Some of the information and arguments presented in the present work 
concerning the issue of biblical anthropomorphisms were previously put forth in the following 
unpublished conference paper by the present author: ‘On Speaking of God’s Body: Through Barth and 
Aquinas,’ presented at the Society for the Study of Theology Postgraduate Conference, Oxford, 6 January 
2014. 
 
100 Barth, CD II/1, 221-223; 264-267. 
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the time of Christian theology, Greek thinkers like Xenophanes had worried over the 
use of corporeal images of God,101 and the higher forms of Greek philosophy, including 
the Platonism so heavily appropriated by the early Christian tradition, criticised the 
obvious corporeal anthropomorphisms ascribed to the Greek pantheon by, among 
others, Homer and Hesiod.102 The early Christian tradition – and Christian theology 
thereafter, with few exceptions – took up this aversion to anthropomorphic descriptions 
of God and the concomitant commitment to the doctrine of divine incorporeality.103 The 
obvious problem with this position was that the Bible speaks of God with the use of 
corporeal anthropomorphisms and anthropoieticisms. Traditionally, the solution to this 
problem was the spiritualisation of these concepts and, within dogmatics, their 
discarding.   
 Barth rejected this approach to biblical, corporeal anthropomorphisms as a 
rejection of revelation, and thus as idolatrous. For him all human concepts and terms 
were equally inapplicable to God, and, indeed, were equally anthropomorphic, so that 
‘the divine being must be allowed to transcend both spirit and nature, yet also to overlap 
and comprehend both, as attested in His revelation according to the testimony of Holy 
Scripture.’104 There was thus no justification in revelation itself or in the Bible for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
101 See Grace Jantzen, God’s World, God’s Body (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984), 
1; Geoffrey W. Bromiley, ‘Anthropomorphism,’ in The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, 
Volume 1, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 136-138. See also Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, ‘The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as a Dogmatic Problem of Early 
Christian Theology,’ in Basic Questions in Theology, volume II, trans. George H. Kehm (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1971). 
 
102 This according to Eberhard Jüngel, ‘Anthropomorphism,’ in Theological Essays I, trans. John 
Webster (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 73. 
 
103 An outstanding example the classical position may be found in Aquinas, ST, I.3.1, the thesis 
of which is: ‘It is absolutely true that God is not a body.’ 
 
104 Barth, CD II/1, 266. 
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principle of spiritualising corporeal anthropomorphisms. Obedience to revelation 
demanded, then, the utilisation of the concepts and terms that God had selected to 
testify to Godself, i.e., first and foremost, those (both spiritual and corporeal ones) 
found in the Bible. The application of the principle of spiritualisation was disobedient to 
revelation (i.e., speculative) because its practitioner looked away from Scripture (to ‘the 
philosophy of pagan antiquity,’105 according to Barth), to find the foreign (i.e., non-
revealed) notion that spiritual concepts are intrinsically better suited to speak of God 
than are corporeal ones, which he or she then imported into the doctrine of God.106  
With that foreign principle in place and on its basis the ‘spiritualiser’ translated a large 
amount of language used by the Bible to describe God into language amenable to a 
foreign conceptual system and then discarded it instead of holding fast to and 
interpreting it. Since the importing of this foreign principle of spiritualisation into the 
doctrine of God was, however, a looking away from Jesus Christ and Scripture, and thus 
an act of speculation, it is unsurprising, that Barth believed that its employment helped 
one to speak, not of God, but, rather, of an idol like ‘the highest ideal in Plato’s 
teaching, or the πρῶτον κινοῦν of Aristotle.’107 While the spiritualisation of corporeal 
biblical anthropomorphisms within the doctrine of God was initially no doubt thought to 
be necessary in order to prevent idolatry, Barth believed that it had the opposite effect. 
 Barth’s position with regard to metaphysics, particularly within the doctrine of 
God, must also be understood within the context of his attempt to testify faithfully to 
revelation through the utilisation of biblical concepts and terms within it, and to thereby 
                                                          
105 Barth, CD II/1, 266. 
 
106 Barth, CD II/1, 266.  
  
107 Barth, CD II/1, 265. See also p. 222. 
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avoid idolatry. Barth’s understanding of metaphysics and their place (or lack thereof) 
within the doctrine of God was more complex than is insinuated by those who claim 
that he was, without qualification, an anti- or post-metaphysical theologian.108 It was 
also (in its mature form) more complex than the stances of liberal theologians like 
Ritschl, whose rejection of metaphysics within the doctrine of God took the form of a 
retreat into descriptions of religious subjectivity. Thus, Barth’s position, contra 
Pannenberg, cannot be properly understood as a mere ‘radicalisation of the Ritschlian 
rejection of metaphysics.’109 
 Barth understood ‘metaphysics’ to be any systematic attempt on the part of the 
human being to understand and expound reality, which has as its source that which is 
                                                          
108 See Bruce McCormack (‘Beyond Nonfoundational and Postmodern Readings of Barth: 
Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology,’ in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl 
Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 155, n. 150; ‘Seek God Where He May be Found: A Response to 
Edwin Chr. Van Driel,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 60, 1 (2007), 76; ‘The Actuality of God: Karl Barth 
in Conversation with Open Theism,’ in Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant 
Perspectives, ed. Bruce McCormack (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 211; ‘Election and Trinity: Theses in 
Response to George Hunsinger,’ in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. 
Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 122, 126). While his claims to this effect are potentially 
misleading, however, he is not materially in error, because he seems to use the term ‘metaphysics’ to 
denote what, as will be seen, Barth understood to be one particular form of metaphysics: that which is not 
primarily concerned with revelation and Scripture; Barth, of course, did reject this form of metaphysics 
within the doctrine of God as idolatrous. McCormack hints that he understands ‘metaphysics’ in this 
sense when he says (‘The Actuality of God, 211) that, ‘Traditional metaphysics held that it is not possible 
to speak of God without first speaking of something else. All talk of God begins as talk about something 
else – as talk about the cosmos, perhaps, or as talk about what it means to be a ‘person’ on the human 
plane. And the hope was that through a series of negations (removing from divine being the imperfections 
proper to creaturely being) and a series of analogies (making God to be like us in that he ‘has’ certain 
qualities or attributes that we also have but has them perfectly), one would eventually arrive at talk about 
God that was really talk about God and not just an endless chain of self-referential statements.’ See also 
Louis Dupré (‘Belief and Metaphysics,’ in Belief and Metaphysics, ed. Peter M. Candler, Jr. and Conor 
Cunningham (London: SCM Press, 2007), 8), for an example of the view that Barth is anti-metaphysical. 
Robert Jenson (‘Religious Pluralism, Christology, and Barth,’ in Dialogue: A Journal of Theology 20 
(1981): 34; ‘Karl Barth,’ in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in the 
Twentieth Century, volume 1, ed. David F. Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 38-41), Gordon 
(‘Speculate after Barth?,’ 8), Hauerwas (WGU, 189), and Timothy Stanley (Protestant Metaphysics after 
Karl Barth and Martin Heidegger (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 158-159) rightly perceive and convey 
the complexity of Barth’s thought on the topic of metaphysics. 
 
109 Pannenberg, ‘Philosophical Concept,’ 121. 
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not revelation.110 When metaphysics spoke of God as an element in its system it was, by 
definition, speculative and idolatrous. This did not lead to Barth’s rejection of 
metaphysics within theology, because he knew well that all theology, and every 
doctrine of God, both utilises, and is itself a venture in, metaphysics. It is a major, if 
largely implicit, claim of Barth’s essay ‘Fate and Idea in Theology’ that the use of 
metaphysics cannot be avoided within theology, and Barth made this conviction clear in 
various other statements throughout his career, such as this one: 
 The interpreter [of Scripture] cannot help this. Even in what he says as an 
 observer and exponent, he will everywhere betray the fact that, consciously or 
 unconsciously, in cultured or primitive fashion, consistently or inconsistently, he
 has approached the text from the standpoint of a particular epistemology, logic
 or ethics, of definite ideas and ideals concerning the relations of God, the world 
 and man...Everyone has some sort of philosophy, i.e., a personal view of the 
 fundamental nature and relationship of things.111 
 
And in a place where the term ‘Philosophie’ is at least roughly equivalent to Barth’s 
‘metaphysics,’ he wrote that: ‘jede Theologie bewuβt oder unbewuβt auch Philosophie 
wäre.’112 It was, for the mature Barth, a matter of self-deception when liberalism, and 
especially Ritschl, held that their theologies, and their doctrines of God, were non-
metaphysical. Ritschl in particular, according to Barth, erred when he suggested that by 
renouncing Hellenistic metaphysics within the doctrine of God, he avoided the 
problems of metaphysics altogether. This was Barth’s meaning when he spoke of: 
                                                          
110 While Barth does not seem to have anywhere offered a formal definition of his own of 
metaphysics, it is only by presuming that he understood it in this very broad manner that one can account 
for Barth’s divergent comments about it, which will be discussed below. See also, one of Barth’s most 
important and direct discussions of the role of metaphysics in theology at CD I/1, 280.  
 
111 Barth, CD I/2, 728. See also, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 28-29. 
 
112 Karl Barth, Die Theologie Zwinglis: Vorlesung Göttingen, Wintersemester 1922/1923 (GA 
II.40), ed. Matthias Freudenberg (Zurich: TVZ, 2004), 492. It can be surmised that in speaking of 
‘philosophy’ Barth meant something near to what he elsewhere called metaphysics because immediately 
after this statements he went on to describe the ‘philosophy’ of Zwingli as ‘eine Verbindung von 
Neuplatonismus und Aristotelismus.’ (492) See also CD I/1, 165. 
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 ...the school of A. Ritschl, which was supposed to be so averse to every type of 
 speculation and metaphysics. It is all very well to renounce the Platonism of the
 Greek fathers, but if that means that we throw ourselves all the more 
 unconditionally into the arms of the positivists and the agnostics of the 19th
 century, we have no right to look for the mote in the eye of those ancient fathers, 
 as though on their side is a sheer hellenisation of the Gospel, and on ours a sheer 
 honest exegetical sense for facts.113 
 
Barth believed that Ritschl’s doctrine of God, no less than that of the early church 
fathers, emerged from within and as a part of a set of human, and therefore speculative, 
attempts to systematically understand the nature of reality (metaphysics) – such was 
simply unavoidable.  
 The universal intrinsic idolatry of metaphysical doctrines of God in particular 
was not a major theme of Barth’s mature thinking. Yet the logic of his thought indicates 
that he believed that every description of God, in so far as it was metaphysical, was by 
definition idolatrous. In so far as a doctrine of God is metaphysical it does not have 
revelation, but a substitute, as the source of its description of the reality of God; and in 
so far as the latter is the case it is speculative, and idolatrous. Its idol is, at the level of 
theological method, metaphysics itself; at the material level, its idol is whatever concept 
is held by the particular metaphysical system to be communicative of God: whether 
‘Being,’ the ‘Unmoved Mover,’ ‘revelation,’ or some other. In that Barth agreed with 
Ritschl that metaphysical doctrines of God were idolatrous and his understanding of 
what constituted metaphysics was far more inclusive than that of Ritschl, his critique of 
metaphysics within the doctrine of God was more radical than that of Ritschl.  
 Although all doctrines of God were for Barth metaphysical and therefore 
intrinsically idolatrous, they were not all so in the same way. Some doctrines of God 
were metaphysical in a specific way, namely, in a way which obediently corresponded 
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to revelation in the way proper to and possible for created intelligence. A doctrine of 
God was metaphysical in this way when it, ongoingly, utilised human attempts to 
understand and describe God as an element in a systematic understanding of reality in 
service of the attempt to testify to revelation and interpret Holy Scripture, i.e., when it 
was a venture in truly theological, christological, metaphysics.114 In the CD II/1 Barth 
wrote that, ‘There could be no objection to the logic, metaphysics and mathematics of 
these [ancient and Protestant orthodox] lines of thought if they had been used only to 
perform the service of explanation – a service which it is quite possible and even up to a 
point necessary to render in this way.’115 Doctrines of God which were ventures in 
theological metaphysics were still ventures in idolatrous metaphysics, because they had 
their source not, strictly speaking, in actual revelation, but, rather, in actual revelation in 
the way proper to and possible for created intelligence, i.e., in a human concept or 
recollection of ‘revelation.’ But because of their obedient correspondence to revelation 
in the way proper to and possible for created intelligence, they could hope (like 
obediently ‘speculative’ doctrines of God more generally) for God’s self-giving to be 
their object.  
 Since within the doctrine of God metaphysics had to be used in service of the 
interpretation or explanation of revelation and Scripture if the doctrine of God were to 
be developed in creaturely correspondence to revelation and thereby ultimately avoid 
idolatry by God’s grace, metaphysical systems and concepts propounded a priori could 
not simply be accepted by theology in toto and without revision, one or more 
metaphysical concepts being identified with God. Using them in this way could not 
represent a true attempt to correspond to revelation, but could only mean the idolatrous 
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affording to metaphysics or one of its concepts the role that properly belonged to the 
Christian concept of revelation. Instead, if metaphysics were to truly serve revelation 
and Scripture, previously propounded metaphysical systems and their concepts, terms 
and modes of thinking had to be imported into theology and the doctrine of God 
eclectically, on the basis of how well they helped to explicate revelation and Scripture, 
and in such a manner that they were malleable.  That previously propounded 
‘metaphysics’ and their concepts had to be used in service of revelation, and thus be 
understood as malleable, if a theology or doctrine of God were to be developed in 
creaturely correspondence to revelation is undoubtedly what Barth had in mind when he 
wrote in the CD II/1 that, within the doctrine of God: ‘...we shall have to divest of their 
original character the perhaps inevitable elements of a generally ‘metaphysical’ 
language structure, giving them a clear theological sense and by placing them in the 
theological context,’116 and, in the CD I/1, that within the doctrine of God ‘the 
legitimacy [of the theological use of metaphysical concepts] must be decided by the 
context in which the concepts occur.’117  
 Barth’s own doctrine of God was itself an exercise in theological metaphysics 
which utilised concepts from previously propounded systems of metaphysics in service 
of revelation and the interpretation of Scripture. Not only was his theology self-
evidently an attempt to describe reality, both created and uncreated, systematically; he 
also did not hesitate to utilise classically metaphysical concepts like ‘being’ to describe 
God in this effort, being careful, of course, to make known that for him ‘the concept of 
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being is not to be understood in the sense of a general doctrine of being,’118 but that it 
must be understood, rather, as a concept of being revised that it might serve the 
interpretation of revelation and Scripture. Jenson rightly notes, with some surprise, that 
Barth’s doctrine of God utilised in some places, the ‘language of standard substance-
metaphysics.’119 
 Of course, there was also the possibility that a doctrine of God could be 
metaphysical in a different fashion: it could be a venture in non-theological 
metaphysics. In such a case, correspondence to revelation and the interpretation of 
Scripture was not its chief concern. It was not, therefore, the concept of revelation 
shaped by actual revelation and Holy Scripture which was its source. Instead one or 
more foreign metaphysical systems or concepts usurped the role of revelation and 
Scripture as the primary source of theology and the doctrine of God, as in the case, for 
example, of at least certain types of onto-theology.120  This could only be evaluated by 
Barth as idolatrous, ‘the attempt to unite Yahweh with Baal.’121 
Barth spoke of metaphysics and its relationship to theology negatively more 
frequently than he did positively. But on a number occasions when he did so – and 
perhaps on most – he used a qualifying word, in order to make it clear that he was 
speaking of a certain kind of metaphysics, namely a non-theological metaphysics: that 
which seeks to speak of God as an element within a systematic human attempt to 
understand reality which is unconcerned with revelation and Scripture, or in which 
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119 Robert Jenson, ‘Karl Barth on the Being of God,’ in Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: An 
Unofficial Catholic-Protestant Dialogue, edited by Bruce L. McCormack and Thomas Joseph White 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 44. 
 
120 Barth, CD II/2, 531. 
 
121 Barth, CD II/1, 84. 
 
123 
 
 
 
some other reality assumes the role of master over or alongside of revelation and 
Scripture. Such is ‘self-motivated and self-grounded metaphysics,’122 ‘pure 
metaphysics,’123 ‘a metaphysics that has nothing whatever to do with proclamation,’124 
‘untheological metaphysical speculation,’125 ‘an abstract metaphysics of God,’126 
‘illegitimate metaphysics,’127 ‘a metaphysics of being,’128 or an ‘alien mythological 
metaphysics.’129  
 Barth’s critique of metaphysics was, on the one hand, more wide-ranging than 
that of Ritschl. He knew on the basis of revelation, which contradicted metaphysics that, 
as Ritschl had said, all metaphysics were idolatrous. He went beyond Ritschl to include 
within ‘metaphysics’ much more than just those of the Hellenistic variety. Yet Barth 
was, at the same time, ultimately much more positive than Ritschl concerning a certain, 
genuinely theological, use of metaphysics within theology and the doctrine of God. It 
was Barth who rightly saw that metaphysics are unavoidable within theology, and that if 
one is to speak of God at all, one must speak – in obedience to revelation and Scripture 
– metaphysically and idolatrously, and therefore in dependence upon grace.  
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125 Barth, CD I/1, 416. 
 
126 Barth, CD I/1, 325. 
 
127 Barth, CD I/1, 422. 
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3.3.3 The doctrine of God must be consistently Trinitarian if it is to avoid idolatry 
In order for a doctrine of God to correspond to revelation and avoid idolatry, Barth 
believed that it had to be consistently Trinitarian. There must, in other words, be no talk 
within it of God in abstraction from the prior understanding that God is the Trinity of 
Father, Son, and Spirit. As suggested in the preceding chapter, the doctrine of the 
Trinity was not for Barth, strictly speaking, part of the content of revelation. Its 
formulation was, rather, a product of reflection upon and interpretation of revelation. 
But it was for him a formulation which necessarily will be immediately made and 
consistently held in view if one truly begins and continues the development of the 
doctrine of God via the interpretation of revelation, such that Barth could understand the 
doctrine of the Trinity as ‘indirectly, though not directly, identical with the statement 
about revelation.’130 If, however, the doctrine of God is undertaken, even if only 
momentarily, without having in view the Trinitarian nature of God, then it is not based 
upon revelation but (again, even if only temporarily) upon something else, and it is 
therefore idolatrous. Barth believed that Sabellius and Schleiermacher, with their 
ultimately non-Trinitarian doctrines of God, committed idolatry along these lines, 
taking an ‘unreal God seriously as God.’131 But so, too, if only temporarily, did much of 
scholasticism and Protestant orthodoxy, because they began their doctrines of God with 
the consideration of God in God’s unity in abstraction from consideration of God’s tri-
unity: 
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We have already mentioned the common practice in this doctrine of placing the 
doctrine of the Trinity after development of a concept of the nature and 
attributes of God in general. This arrangement led to the temptation of speaking 
of God apart from His revelation and therefore apart from His being as the One 
who loves, on the basis of a free appraisal of what can be called divine. The 
result was an involuntary movement away from the school of Scripture into that 
of heathen antiquity.132 
 
 This consideration of God in abstraction from God’s tri-unity was not based upon 
revelation, and was therefore the consideration of the being and attributes not of God 
but of an idol, even though the information that this God was also triune was later 
added. Barth himself set forth his doctrine of the Trinity well before he came to the 
doctrine of God proper (i.e., the doctrine of God’s nature and attributes133) in both the 
CD and the GD,134 and urged throughout the doctrine of God proper (in both works) 
that it not be forgotten that the God under discussion was the Triune God.135 It was 
because God’s unity or simplicity was for Barth never to be discussed in abstraction 
from God’s triunity136 that Christianity could not be placed, alongside other religions, 
under the general heading of ‘monotheism,’137 and that those other non-Trinitarian 
monotheistic religions had, for Barth, to be judged as idolatrous from the perspective of 
Christian revelation.138 Non-Trinitarian  monotheism could be, for Barth, only ‘the 
                                                          
132 Barth, CD II/1, 288. 
 
              133 The terminology ‘doctrine of God proper’ is used here to denote Barth’s doctrine of the nature 
and attributes of God even though te Velde (Paths Beyond Tracing Out, 364) is undoubtedly right that 
this has the potential to be misleading, because Barth would have affirmed that the doctrine of the Trinity 
was just as much a part of the doctrine of God proper as the doctrine of God’s nature and attributes. 
 
        134 In the GD, the doctrine of the Trinity is set forth in §5, while the doctrine of God proper is not 
addressed until §§16-17. In the CD, the doctrine of the Trinity is set forth in the CD I/1, §§9-12, while the 
doctrine of God proper is not addressed until the CD II/1, §§28-31.  
 
        135 Barth, GD, 368, 370; CD II/1, 261, 265, 268, 288, 303, 323-324, 350. 
 
        136 Barth, CD II/1, 329-330. 
 
        137 Barth, CD II/1, 448-489. 
 
             138 Barth, CD II/1, 448. 
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religious glorification of the number ‘one,’ the absolutising of the idea of 
uniqueness...’139 
 
3.3.4 The doctrine of God must be ‘realistic’ if it is to avoid idolatry 
Barth, further, believed that the doctrine of God had to be realistic when it came to the 
status of the divine attributes if idolatry were to be avoided. One aspect of ‘realism,’ as 
a traditional position within the doctrine of God, is the affirmation that the divine 
attributes in some sense objectively inhere in the divine nature. It has as its counter-
position nominalism, understood narrowly: the view that divine attributes are merely 
names predicated of God without there existing a corresponding reality in the divine 
essence. If the nominalist position runs the risk of denying genuine knowledge of God, 
the realist position runs the risk of denying divine simplicity, i.e., the traditionally 
accepted claim that divine essence is without parts, composition, or distinctions (i.e., 
multiplicity). The solution for many realists who desired to maintain the doctrine of 
divine simplicity, e.g., Thomas, was to argue that the divine attributes do truly 
correspond to the reality of the divine essence, but each to the whole of the divine 
essence (and thus that each divine attribute is ultimately, in God, identical to all the 
others).140 Thus, in the end, realists like Thomas ultimately affirmed simplicity, but not 
multiplicity, in the divine essence.141 
 Barth also held a realistic doctrine of God, i.e., one in which the perfections of 
God are understood to truly inhere in God’s being, as seen in his general discussion of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
            139 Barth, CD II/1, 448. See also CD II/1, 329. 
 
140 Aquinas, ST, I, 13, 4. 
 
141 Aquinas, ST, I, 3,7; I, 28, 3. 
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the divine attributes in §29 of the CD. The affirmation of this kind of realism was, for 
Barth, an implication of the affirmation of the realism of revelation more broadly, i.e., 
of the idea that God is truly, in God’s immanent being, as God is known to be in God’s 
revelation: 
…it is impossible to have knowledge of a divine perfection without having 
knowledge of God Himself – knowledge of the triune God who loves in 
freedom. For as the triune God, both in regard to His revelation and to His being 
in itself, He exists in these perfections, and these perfections again exist in Him 
and only in Him as the One who, both in His revelation and in eternity, is the 
same.142 
 
If God is perceived in God’s revelation to exist in a multiplicity of attributes, then such 
a multiplicity of attributes must be affirmed as inhering within the immanent being of 
God.143 Realism in the broad sense, the realism of revelation, required the affirmation of 
realism in this narrower sense, and (by Barth’s logic) both were required if idolatry was 
to be avoided. The alternative, the assertion that the perfections in which God is known 
do not actually inhere in God’s essence, would mean that God is not in himself as God 
is known to be in revelation, which would, in turn, entail the denial of revelation as the 
source of one’s doctrine of God and, necessarily, its replacement with that which was 
not revelation. Nominalistic doctrines of God (whether medieval or modern) were, for 
Barth, idolatrous in precisely this way: ‘The whole wrongheadedness of the 
nominalistic treatment of the doctrine of attributes becomes apparent in [the] attempt of 
Schleiermacher and Schweizer. What is found is just what is sought, but only what is 
                                                          
142 Barth, CD II/1, 323-324. 
 
143 Though Price (Letters of the Divine Word, 57-58) rightly notes that Barth inconsistently and, 
at times, unsatisfactorily, described the way in which the attributes of God known in revelation were to be 
understood as descriptive of God’s immanent being. 
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sought, viz., the gigantic reflections or projections of the human religious 
consciousness.’144  
 Barth, by the time of the CD II/1,145 also criticised as idolatrous what he called 
the ‘semi-nominalistic’ doctrines of God of scholastic and Protestant orthodox ‘realism’ 
– for Barth did not believe that these older forms of realism were realistic enough.146 
This was because, as described above, they upheld the traditional doctrine of divine 
simplicity by finally denying genuine multiplicity within the divine essence, affirming 
instead that it was ultimately proper only to speak of the simplicity of the divine 
essence.147 Barth wrote that, ‘We must reject out of hand the semi-nominalistic 
reservation that in the last resort we can speak of the proprietates Dei only improprie, 
that the most characteristic inner being of God is a simplicitas which is to be understood 
undialectically.’148 Accepting semi-nominalism meant, for Barth, a rejection of 
revelational realism and the denial and idolatrous replacement of revelation as the 
source and norm of the doctrine of God, since revelation communicated that a genuine 
multiplicity of perfections inhered in the divine essence.149 It entailed, objectively, the 
description of ‘a God who is extremely lofty in His pure simplicity but also quite empty 
                                                          
144 Barth, CD II/1, 339. See also Barth, GD, 378-379; CD II/1, 329 and 3.1.1 of the present work. 
 
145 In the CD II/1, Barth expresses opposition to the ‘semi-nominalism’ of the older orthodoxy, 
while in the doctrine of God in the GD he does not express this kind of opposition to the older doctrines 
of God. See, for example, Barth’s apparent agreement with the approach of Quenstedt in the GD, 380, 
and compare with his accusation that Quenstedt’s approach was semi-nominalistic and idolatrous in the 
CD II/1, 327-329. It is likely (though it is a bit difficult to determine, because as will be seen both 
presentations are a bit confused and perhaps even self-contradictory) that the change between the GD and 
the CD II/1 was merely a change in Barth’s evaluation of ‘the older theology,’ rather than a change in his 
own approach to questions of God’s unity and multiplicity. 
 
146 Barth, CD II/1, 333-334. 
 
147 Barth, CD II/1, 333. 
 
148 Barth, CD II/1, 333. 
 
149 Barth, CD II/1, 322. 
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and unreal.’150 In particular, Barth held that, at the point at which semi-nominalists 
denied multiplicity in God for the sake of affirming divine simplicity, revelation was 
replaced by Hellenistic metaphysics, reflection upon ‘the platonic-aristotelian idea of 
being.’151 Correspondingly, their doctrines of God ‘falsely defined the being of God,’152 
and had not God but a god as the object of their description.  
 Largely for historical reasons, nominalism and semi-nominalism (and its 
associated denial of divine multiplicity) were Barth’s main opponents in the CD §29, 
but it is clear that, if he criticised them as idolatrous, he would have had to say much the 
same about abstract realism.153 Abstract realism here is non-theological realism, a 
position founded not upon the desire to testify to and uphold the broader realism of 
revelation, but rather upon an independent desire to uphold an alien principle of realism 
or divine multiplicity.154 Barth believed that a principle within theology could be 
detected as alien, i.e., as not derived from revelation, when it violated others statements 
which had to be made in faithful reflection upon revelation (see 3.3.6 below). Barth 
believed, further, that simplicity did in fact have to be predicated of God in faithfulness 
to revelation.155  Thus one example of an abstract realism would be one that entailed a 
contradiction of the simplicity of God (just as the axiom that God is simple could only 
be a foreign, abstract principle if it was held to in such a way that it contradicted what 
                                                          
150 Barth, CD II/1, 333. 
 
151 Barth, CD II/1, 334. 
 
152 Barth, CD II/1, 335. 
 
153 ‘Abstract realism’ is not Barth’s term, but rather a term used by Asbill (The Freedom of God, 
71) to describe a reality which Barth himself clearly and explicitly rejected (see Barth, CD II/1, 13, 325-
326). 
 
154 Barth, GD, 379; CD II/1, 330-335; Asbill, The Freedom of God, 71; Price, Letters of the 
Divine Word, 36. 
 
155 Barth, CD II/1, 333. See also pp. 327, 442-446. 
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had to be said about God’s multiplicity).156 Once again, abstract realism – including any 
realism which contradicted the divine simplicity and unity – would mean the attempt to 
speak of God apart from reflection upon Jesus Christ, and thus the idolatrous, 
speculative substitution of Jesus Christ with a foreign principle.  
Barth himself attempted to avoid not only nominalism and semi-nominalism 
(which denied multiplicity in God because of a commitment to an abstract principle of 
simplicity), but also the denial of the genuine simplicity of God which stemmed from an 
abstract realism by holding, at least in his formal statements, that the particular way in 
which God is simple is not incompatible with multiplicity, and that the particular way in 
which there are a multiplicity of attributes in God is not incompatible with the divine 
simplicity: ‘We can only accept and interpret God’s simplicitas and multiplicitas in such 
a way as to imply that they are not mutually exclusive but inclusive, or rather that they 
are both included in God Himself.’157 Whether Barth was actually able to truly and 
coherently affirm both multiplicity and simplicity in God in the CD II/1 materially is 
certainly debatable.158 The most important point, for present purposes, however, is that 
whatever Barth’s own actual practice, he believed in theory that in revelation there was 
seen to be a tension between divine simplicity and the multiplicity of the divine 
attributes which could not be resolved in favour of one side at the expense of the other. 
                                                          
156 Barth, CD II/1, 331. 
 
157 Barth, CD II/1, 333; see also p. 331. 
 
158 Te Velde (Paths Beyond Tracing Out, 373) is likely correct in saying that, though Barth 
clearly thought otherwise, the way in which he qualifies his assertions of God’s multiplicity causes his 
treatment of the subject to be very much within the stream of thought of Protestant orthodoxy and its 
‘semi-nominalism.’ In the end, for Barth, God is each of God’s perfections, and each of his perfections 
are therefore identical to all of the others. (GD, 380; CD II/1, 333) Barth explicitly denied that only 
simplicity can be properly predicated of God, and multiplicity only improperly. (CD II/1, 333) He 
wanted, rather, to hold the simplicity and multiplicity in God together in dialectical tension. In actual 
practice, however, he tended in both the GD and the CD II/1 to resolve that tension in favour of the divine 
simplicity. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, in spite of Barth’s obvious efforts to differentiate his 
thinking from that of ‘semi-nominalism,’ he was unable to do so. 
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Instead, theological realism (which was itself demanded by revelation) demanded the 
upholding both sides of that tension. The alternative could only have its source in a 
looking away from revelation, and could thus only be an act of disobedience to 
revelation and of idolatry. 
 
3.3.5 The doctrine of God must allow revelation to alter the meaning of its terms if it is 
to avoid idolatry 
If the doctrine of God was to correspond to revelation and avoid idolatry, Barth believed 
it necessary not only to allow revelation and Scripture to select the terms and concepts 
to be used within the doctrine of God (and their arrangement), but also to allow 
revelation to determine (i.e., alter) the meaning of the terms which were employed.159  
All those terms which could be used within the doctrine of God possessed ‘regular’ 
meanings, i.e., meanings which they possessed when used in the description of created 
reality. The utilisation of terms understood in their regular sense to describe God could 
only be an act of idolatry, because their utilisation in this way could not be act of 
faithful reflection upon, or, therefore, correspondence to, revelation. On the contrary, it 
could only be act of disobedience to revelation (i.e., subjective idolatry), which could 
only mean that the god described by them was not God, but an idol.  
 Of course, Barth did not deny that even when the theologian allows revelation to 
alter the meaning of the terms used within the doctrine of God, those terms remain 
unable to describe God in their own power. Even then, they could not conform to 
revelation in the absolute sense, and, thus, intrinsically, they described that which was 
                                                          
159 Barth’s idea that all concepts must be given their content by reference to Jesus Christ is 
labelled ‘particularism’ by Hunsinger. (How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 32-35) The argument here is that particularism within the doctrine of 
God was for Barth, among other things, a way of avoiding idolatry. 
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not God. Nevertheless, when their meanings were altered properly by revelation, they 
corresponded to revelation in the way possible within sinful human thinking and 
speaking. One could thus hope that by God’s grace, they would actually describe God 
objectively. 
 Barth’s conviction that terms must, within the doctrine of God, be determined as 
to their meaning by revelation if one is to avoid idolatry was implicit throughout his 
doctrines of God in both the GD and the CD. An outstanding example of its outworking 
may be seen in consideration of Barth’s discussion of the meaning of the term ‘love’ as 
it applies to God in the CD II/1, §28. Barth explained therein that when the term ‘love’ 
is utilised as part of the attempt to describe God’s nature, one must not assume that one 
knows what that term means from any source other than revelation itself: ‘If as our first 
step we take up the concept of love, it is not because we think that somehow we already 
know generally what love is as the content of an action which is genuinely good, and 
that on the basis of this knowledge we can equate God with this content.’160  It must 
rather be ‘mediated and clarified from God's being and therefore from God's act what 
the love is which can and must be legitimately identified with God.’161 That the 
alternative – the use of terms with their ‘regular’ or ‘general’ meaning within the 
doctrine of God – constituted idolatry in Barth’s thinking can be seen with particular 
clarity through an analysis of Barth’s related discussion of ‘grace in general’162; and his 
discussion of ‘abstractly understood transcendence’ reveals this same fact, as he alludes 
that its predication of God means idolatrous projection à la Feuerbach:  
                                                          
160 Barth, CD II/1, 276. Cf. Barth, CD II/1, 352. 
 
161 Barth, CD II/1, 276. 
 
162 Barth, CD II/1, 357.  
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 ...if we view the being of God in abstractly understood transcendence...then we 
 have substituted for the biblical idea of God an idea which is easily recognizable
 as the highest idea conceivable to man. For what is the idea of the infinite, the 
 unconditioned or the absolute but the idea of our own limits, which suggest to us 
 both our transcendent goal and origin, but which in themselves can be 
 understood only as our limits and therefore as the negation, the non-being of all 
 that we are? If we interpret this our non-being as pointing to true being, if we 
 make our limits the object of  apotheosis, we are in no sense testifying to 
 God...We are expressing the deep appreciation and esteem we feel for this our 
 goal and origin, and for our own ideal image, carefully purged of all 
 imperfection...163 
 
3.3.6 The doctrine of God must not allow any of its terms or concepts to be thought in 
abstraction from the others if it is to avoid idolatry 
By the time of the CD II/1, Barth believed that, in order to safeguard one’s doctrine of 
God against idolatry, one had to make predications of God (and understand each of 
God’s predicates) in such a way that each harmonised with all the others which had to 
be made in the act of faithful reflection upon revelation – or at least such that they did 
not contradict them. Within the GD, Barth showed a greater willingness to allow 
predications of God to stand in what appeared to be contradiction to each other without 
attempting harmonisation. For example, of the two determinants of God’s nature, 
personality and aseity, Barth wrote there that ‘we ourselves cannot combine aseity and 
personality,’164 and spoke of the need to maintain ‘paradox’ within the doctrine of 
God.165  By the time of the CD II/1, however, Barth insisted upon the need to 
understand all predications of God such that they harmonised with all of the others, and 
such that their meaning was, in this sense, controlled by the others. If one were to make 
                                                          
163 Barth, CD II/1, 303-304. Barth is suggesting that the employment of such a concept within 
the doctrine of God makes one vulnerable to Feuerbach (though he does not mention the latter by name 
here). 
 
164 Barth, GD, 371-372. 
 
165 Barth, GD, 373-374. 
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a predication of God which conflicted with other predications of God which had to be 
made in the act of faithful reflection upon revelation, that first predication would 
necessarily not be an act of faithful reflection upon revelation, and the making of it 
would thus be an act of subjective (and, therefore, also objective) idolatry. A hidden 
premise in this line of thinking is that the ectypal knowledge of God created in the 
human mind by revelation and faithful reflection upon it is rational, at least in the sense 
that it is not self-contradictory. 
Barth’s concern to understand predications of God such that they harmonise 
with all others, and to thereby avoid idolatry, is visible in the way in which he paired 
certain predicates of God with other, very different, and sometimes apparently opposite, 
ones, and sought to define each with reference to the other. For example, in Barth’s 
discussion of the divine love and the divine freedom, he wrote that, ‘Only ‘in [God’s] 
freedom [is God’s loving] the divine loving. But we must also say, conversely, that only 
in this divine loving is the freedom described by us divine freedom.’166 The alternative – 
understanding divine freedom in abstraction from and in a way that contradicts the 
divine love, or vice versa – was, for Barth, idolatry: ‘If we abstract the love of God and 
therefore the purpose of God, however circumspect we may be, we describe only a 
world-principle.’167 Or again, if one asserts the simplicity of God in such a way that it 
contradicts the divine tri-unity, or even simply in such a way that it is not understood in 
light of the divine tri-unity (and vice versa), then one commits idolatry; when this was 
done in the past, ‘the idea of the divine simplicity was necessarily exalted to the all-
                                                          
166 Barth, CD II/1, 321. 
 
167 Barth, CD II/1, 321. 
 
135 
 
 
 
controlling principle, the idol...’168 To avoid idolatry, ‘[one] can only accept and 
interpret God’s simplicitas and multiplicitas in such a way as to imply that they are not 
mutually exclusive but inclusive, or rather that they are both included in God 
Himself.’169  
 
3.3.7 The theologian must be conscious of the relativity of his or her doctrine of God if 
he or she is to avoid idolatry 
Even after abiding by these foregoing directives, if the theologian is to avoid idolatry 
within his or her doctrine of God, he or she must, according to Barth, be conscious of 
the intrinsic falsity and relativity of his or her own formulations therein and, therefore, 
of his or her need for God’s grace. Revelation itself judges all human attempts to 
describe God as intrinsically idolatrous; thus, if the theologian is to formulate the 
doctrine of God in obedient correspondence to revelation, he or she must do so while 
confessing that his or her attempts are intrinsically idolatrous, relative, and dependent 
upon grace. Barth suggested this in his 1926 lectures on Feuerbach: ‘There is a test of 
whether or not we stand on this base [that of revelation], of whether we are able to 
admit to Feuerbach that he was right…’170; in his 1927 essay, ‘Fate and Idea in 
Theology’: ‘To determine whether a particular theology has as its object merely a 
deified concept or the living God, the first criterion might be whether this theology is 
conscious of its own relativity’171; and again in the CD II/1: 
                                                          
168 Barth, CD II/1, 329. See also the various pairings of the divine perfections in the CD II/1, 
§§30-31.  
 
169 Barth, CD II/1, 333; see also p. 331. 
 
170 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 236-237. 
 
171 Barth, ‘Fate and Idea in Theology,’ 58-59. 
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 When we are obedient, according to our capacity and even our incapacity, we 
 have the promise that God Himself will acknowledge our obedience in spite of 
 our capacity or even incapacity, and this means that He will confer upon our 
 viewing, conceiving and speaking His own veracity. The obedience to the grace
 of God in which man acknowledges that he is entirely wrong, thus 
 acknowledging that God alone is entirely right, is the obedience which has this 
 promise.172 
 
And yet again in that same volume:  
 The humility which is not only demanded by induced by the veracity of [God’s] 
 revelation can certainly allow us to repeat our way, but it will accompany any 
 such repetition with the warning and summons that, whether in repetition or in a
 new form of our work [of attempting to view, conceive and speak of God], we 
 must reach out and explore for its object, i.e., for the grace of His revelation, 
 from which alone it can ever become and be true.173 
 
For the doctrine of God to obey revelation and thereby avoid being only idolatrous is for 
it to admit that it is intrinsically idolatrous.  
 Throughout his doctrines of God in both the GD and the CD Barth emphasised 
the relativity of his own proposals and the need for God’s grace if they were to truly 
describe God. The doctrine of God is not given in finished form, according to Barth, 
once and for all, whether in Scripture or anywhere else; rather, one’s choice and 
grouping of concepts to be predicated of God as God’s perfections, ‘can always have 
the basic character only of a trial and proposal.’174 And, once such a proposal is made, 
no matter what relative advantages it may have over other such proposals, it is always 
the case that, ‘the veracity of our knowledge of God is the veracity of his revelation.’175 
The making of these admissions and ones like them within the doctrine of God was not 
merely an expression of humility, but rather also an attempt on Barth’s part to 
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173 Barth, CD II/1, 211-212. 
 
174 Barth, CD II/1, 352. 
 
175 Barth, CD II/1, 209. 
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correspond to revelation, and to thereby avoid idolatry – in this case, the idolisation of 
his doctrine of God itself.  
 
3.3.8 Conclusion to directives for avoiding idolatry within the doctrine of God 
The ways mentioned above in which Barth believed the doctrine of God must be 
formulated if idolatry were to be avoided is by no means comprehensive. The logic of 
Barth’s thinking is such that any failure to correspond to revelation (and to obey the 
Bible as its authoritative testimony) within the doctrine of God is an act of idolatry. The 
specific ways in which the doctrine of God may veer off course into idolatry, and the 
routes which the doctrine of God must avoid if it is to avoid idolatry, are therefore 
infinite. The directives discussed above that Barth believed the doctrine of God must 
adhere to if idolatry is to be avoided are ones the adherence to which were particularly 
important for the development of Barth’s own theology, and the violation of which he 
explicitly linked to idolatry. 
 
3.4 Idolatry and the Debate over Election 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of debate on the question of how best to 
interpret Barth’s mature doctrine of election, the most complete expression of which is 
found in the CD II/2, § 32-33. In particular, the debate has focussed upon the question 
of whether or not Barth’s doctrine of election implies that God determined Godself to 
be triune in or as a result of God’s act of self-election to be for human beings in Jesus 
Christ. Those who have answered in the negative have been called traditionalists, and 
those who have answered in the affirmative, revisionists.176 Nothing like a 
                                                          
176 See George Hunsinger, Reading Barth with Charity: A Hermeneutical Proposal (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2015), xi. The debate has been undertaken through an assortment of essays and books. 
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comprehensive interpretation of Barth on this and related questions can be attempted 
here. They are difficult questions to which no easy answer may be given, not least 
because significant textual evidence can be marshalled to support both positions. 
Nevertheless, this debate intersects with the discussion of idolatry within Barth, in that 
the question of what constituted ‘speculation’ in Barth is of great importance to it. It is 
from this angle only that these questions will be examined here. 
 Barth’s chief negative concern in his mature doctrine of election, as presented in 
the CD II/2, was to avoid speculation, and, therefore idolatry.177  His quarrel with the 
main position which he sought to set his doctrine of election over and against, that of 
classical reformed theologians beginning with Calvin, for example, was essentially that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Traditionalists understand God’s Trinitarian being to be logically prior to God’s election in Barth, while 
revisionists understand God’s act of election to be logically prior to, and determinative of, God’s 
Trinitarian being. Representatives of the ‘traditionalist’ position (with some of their relevant works cited) 
include George Hunsinger (‘Election and the Trinity: Twenty-five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth,’ 
in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, edited by Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 91-114; Reading Barth with Charity), Molnar (‘Can the Electing God be God without 
Us? Some Implications of Bruce McCormack’s Understanding of Barth’s Doctrine of Election for the 
Doctrine of the Trinity,’ in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, edited by Michael T. 
Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011); Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity 
(London: T&T Clark, 2002); Faith, Freedom and the Spirit), Edwin Chr. van Driel (‘Karl Barth on the 
Eternal Existence of Jesus Christ,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 60, 1 (2007): 45-61), Christopher R.J. 
Holmes (‘The Theological Function of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes and the Divine Glory, with 
Special Reference to Karl Barth and his Reading of the Protestant Orthodox,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology 61, 2 (2008): 217-218), Thompson, (‘On the Trinity,’ 25), Asbill (The Freedom of God). 
Representatives of the ‘revisionist’ position include Bruce McCormack (‘Grace and Being: The Role of 
God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Theological Ontology,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92-110; ‘Processions and 
Missions: A Point of Convergence between Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth,’ in Thomas Aquinas and 
Karl Barth: An Unofficial Catholic-Protestant Dialogue, ed. Bruce L. McCormack and Thomas Joseph 
White (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013); ‘Seek God’; ‘The Actuality of God’), Jones (THC, 66), Matthias 
Gockel (Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A Systematic-Theological Comparison 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)) and Paul Nimmo (Being in Action: The Theological Shape of 
Barth’s Ethical Vision (London: T&T Clark, 2007)). 
 
177 As the early pages (e.g., 3-24) of the CD II/2 indicate. It was because he believed that, e.g., 
the traditional doctrine of the decretum absolutum was speculative, i.e., not derived solely from reflection 
upon Jesus Christ, that he rejected it. Although this was Barth’s chief negative concern, McCormack 
(‘Grace and Being,’ 95-96) and Stanley (PM, 215-216) are right in claiming that Barth’s aim was not 
merely to avoid speculation; indeed, Barth’s ultimate aim is never a negative one. And though 
McCormack is right on this point, Barth’s texts do not substantiate his assertion (‘Grace and Being,’ 97-
98) that ontological issues were at the heart of his critique of the doctrine of election of Calvin and the 
classical, reformed tradition more broadly. His chief negative, polemical concern was speculation, and, as 
a consequence, idolatry, not the failure to make election determinative for divine ontology. 
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it ought to have been ‘less speculative and more in accordance with the biblical 
testimony.’178 Thus, as Hunsinger notes, the question as to what (would have) counted 
for Barth as speculation is important to understanding his intentions in his doctrine of 
election.179 And, indeed, this has been a dividing line in the interpretative debate. 
McCormack, for example, believes that the traditionalist assertion that Barth held that 
God would have been triune even apart from the economy amounts to speculation.180 
Hunsinger himself argues that it is the ‘revisionist’ position of McCormack and others 
that Barth would have seen as speculative, because it implies the existence of a ‘pre-
trinitarian’ god, i.e., a god who is other than God is in God’s revelation.181 
McCormack’s interpretation of Barth is safe-guarded from this specific line of critique, 
because there was never, according to him, a pre-trinitarian god since the priority of 
election over Trinity is purely logical, and not at all temporal.182 
 Which position, then – the traditionalist or the revisionist – would have 
constituted ‘speculation’ for Barth? There is no explicit, absolutely conclusive, piece of 
textual evidence. There is perhaps an argument to be made that both would have. 
Neither the counter-factual statement of the traditionalists (that God would have been 
triune even apart from the economy) nor the assertions of the revisionists concerning the 
logical ordering of election and Trinity can be directly derived from reflection upon 
                                                          
178 Barth, CD II/2, 18. See also pp. 59-60, 69. 
 
179 Hunsinger, Reading Barth with Charity, 33. 
 
180 McCormack, ‘Seek God,’ 76; ‘Grace and Being,’ 101-102; Hunsinger, Reading Barth with 
Charity, 35. 
 
181 Hunsinger, Reading Barth with Charity, 36. Molnar (‘Without us?,’ 81) makes a similar 
judgment. 
 
              182 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being,’ 101; ‘Processions and Missions,’ 211.  
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Jesus Christ. It is possible, therefore, that Barth would have considered both positions 
speculative, and, therefore, either consciously or unconsciously chosen to take neither.  
 It is more likely, however, that Barth would have understood the revisionist 
position to be speculative and not the traditionalist one – though not for the precise 
reasons Hunsinger suggests.183 While neither position is directly demanded by 
revelation, reflection upon revelation must be rational, and it seems to be the case for 
Barth, that, e.g., as Molnar convincingly argues, the fact that God is free is known 
directly in revelation,184 and that faithful testimony to that freedom rationally demands 
the upholding of a more traditional assertion of God’s aseity, and therefore the counter-
factual assertion that God would have been the same God without creation.185 God 
‘loves us and the world as He who would still be the One who loves without us and 
without the world; as He, therefore, who needs no other to form the prior ground of His 
existence as the One who loves and as God.’186 It is not difficult to see how an assertion 
of the traditional doctrine of aseity (in both its positive and negative aspects) could be a 
faithful (second-order) reflection upon revelation for Barth – and thus non-
speculative.187 On the other hand, there simply does not seem to be a clear reason why 
                                                          
183 Not, that is, because it is like Protestant liberalism in that it posits the actual existence of a 
‘God beyond God’ (Reading Barth with Charity, 36) or is modalistic (Reading Barth with Charity, 37). 
 
184 In addition to ‘freedom’ being one of two determinants of God’s being in the CD II/1, Barth 
emphasises God’s freedom in the first paragraph (32) of the CD II/2; see, e.g., pp. 5, 9-11, 19, 21-30. 
 
185 Paul Molnar, ‘The Trinity, Election, and God’s Ontological Freedom: A Response to Kevin 
W. Hector,’ in Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011); ‘Without us?’. Similarly, Justin Stratis (‘Speculating about Divinity? God’s Immanent 
Life and Actualistic Ontology,’ International Journal of Systematic Theology 12, 1 (2010): 29-32) argues 
that faithful reflection upon the love of God known in revelation requires the claim that God’s intra-
Trinitarian love precedes election, and thus that counter-factual statements can be the product not of 
abstract speculation, but of true reflection upon revelation. 
 
186 Barth, CD II/1, 280. 
 
187 Of course, McCormack would disagree that predicating ‘freedom’ of God means necessarily 
the denial of his own proposals, in favour of a traditional assertion of God’s aseity. His particular way of 
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revelation demands (directly or indirectly) the revisionist claim that election precedes 
Trinity,188  and, thus, why Barth would not have considered it speculative.189 
Approaching the debate only from this angle, the traditionalist interpretation of Barth is 
to be preferred over against the revisionist one. 
 
3.5 Evaluation and Critique 
In some cases, Barth’s material formulations within the doctrine of God did not adhere 
to his own directives for the avoidance of idolatry, and thus, by his own standard, 
participated in it. 
 A consideration of the issue of the ‘spiritualisation’ of the corporeal concepts 
which the Bible uses to describe God provides an example. It has already been 
recounted that, because of Barth’s commitment to Scripture as the source and norm of 
the doctrine of God, he stood in his formal statements against the majority of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
understanding what ‘freedom’ means when it is applied to God, such that it does not contradict his 
proposals, whether proper or not in itself, is an inadequate representation of Barth. In particular, 
McCormack’s divine freedom seems to be freedom for, and hardly at all freedom from, creation. 
(‘Processions and Missions,’ 123-124) Hector, too, downplays to a great degree the fact that Barth wanted 
to maintain that God is free from creation. (Kevin Hector, ‘God’s Triunity and Self-Determination: A 
Conversation with Karl Barth, Bruce McCormack, and Paul Molnar,’ in Trinity and Election in 
Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 41) For Barth, 
God’s freedom is both freedom from and freedom for creation (CD II/1, 301-303; see also Molnar, 
‘Trinity, Election,’ 62).  
 
188 It is not the case, for example, that one must claim that the act of election has logical 
precedence over God’s being triune in order to faithfully uphold the claim that God is who God in God’s 
revelation. Hector aptly summarises McCormack’s thinking as follows (‘God’s Triunity,’ 32): 
Because Christ reveals God, and because we see in Christ that God is God-with-us, we must 
conclude that, from all eternity, God determined to be God-with-us. ‘The electing God’, 
McCormack argues, ‘is not an unknown “x”. He is a God whose very being – already in eternity 
– is determined, defined, by what he reveals himself to be in Christ.’ [McCormack, ‘Grace and 
Being’, p. 97.] If God reveals Godself, then we cannot speculate about a ‘God behind God’, a 
deus absconditus; we must trust that God is eternally who God reveals Godself to be. 
It is, however, not true that to deny that God’s acts in Jesus Christ in the economy determine the being of 
God in eternity is to introduce a deus absconditus. All that is needed to avoid such is the assertion that 
God does not reveal himself in Jesus Christ either partially or to be other than God is in eternity. 
 
189 The textual evidence seems, on the whole, to support this line of thinking (even in spite of 
ambiguity), especially since McCormack’s thesis that Barth’s thinking on the topic of theological 
ontology in general, and the ontological implications of election in particular, underwent a great deal of 
development between the CD II/1 and the CD II/2 is problematic both textually and historically. 
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theological tradition and rejected as idolatrous the procedure of spiritualising biblical 
corporeal concepts within that doctrine. Unfortunately, these formal convictions made 
very little impact on his own material explication of the doctrine of God. For Barth to 
have avoided speculation and idolatry, by his own standards, he would have had to have 
spent at least some time analysing God’s corporeal predicates and utilising them in 
description of God. In actual fact, outside of his formal assertions that they ought not be 
arbitrarily spiritualised or neglected, he almost completely neglected them himself.  
 The theologian will need to pay more attention to the corporeal concepts the 
Bible uses to describe God within his or her own doctrine of God than Barth himself did 
if he or she is to avoid the charges of speculation and idolatry. Since the Bible is replete 
with the use of corporeal concepts in its description of God, the theologian must also 
utilise them within the doctrine of God if he or she is to be able to claim that his or her 
doctrine is not speculative, but, rather ultimately derived from revelation and Scripture 
alone, and not from a foreign spiritualism – i.e., an a priori idea, foreign to Scripture, 
that spiritual concepts are to be preferred for the description of God over material, 
corporeal concepts. This foreign spiritualism is idolatrous because, at the level of 
theological method, it is speculative; it takes the place of revelation, at a key point, as 
the source and norm of theology. Barth rightly denied, on the formal level, that theology 
should utilise a foreign principle of spiritualisation within the doctrine of God, but his 
material neglect of biblical corporeal anthropomorphisms within his own doctrine of 
God signals an implicit acceptance of such a principle. 
 Had Barth followed his own directive for the avoidance of idolatry, namely, that 
the doctrine of God must be derived from revelation and Scripture, and not, therefore, 
neglected corporeal anthropomorphisms, his doctrine of God would look much different 
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than it in fact does. Most obviously, it would have included the sustained analysis and 
interpretation of biblical, corporeal predicates of God, and the denial of the traditional 
doctrine of the incorporeality of God. Since the traditional doctrine of God’s 
incorporeality is tightly intertwined with other doctrines within the doctrine of God, it 
would likely have affected Barth’s treatment of those other doctrines as well. Above all, 
the traditional doctrine of divine incorporeality is interwoven with the traditional 
doctrine of divine simplicity, i.e., the assertion of the lack of composition, parts, or 
distinctions within God. The rejection of the traditional doctrine of divine 
incorporeality, in favour of the affirmation of God’s corporeality, would have 
problematised the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity. Depending upon how, 
precisely, the corporeality of God was understood, it could have meant the necessity of 
leaving behind or substantially revising that doctrine. Even if it did not, it would have 
had to have been specified how God’s corporeality was to be understood such that the 
traditional doctrine of divine simplicity was not contradicted by it. In actual fact, 
however, Barth largely accepted the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity without 
addressing the potential problems that the divine corporeality raises for it.190 
 Furthermore, Barth’s criticisms of certain moves within the doctrine of God as 
idolatrous should not be accepted. Examples include his criticism of the affirmation of 
the divine apatheia and of the denial of eternal functional subordination within the 
Trinity as instances of idolatry. These criticisms were evoked by a change in Barth’s 
doctrines of revelation and Christology as described above. Barth’s inclusion of the 
human nature of Jesus within the content of revelation by the time of the CD IV/1 
                                                          
190 Barth, CD II/1, 447. 
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represented an advance over his earlier, pneumatocentric (in McCormack’s sense191) 
theology in that it gave a more satisfying account of the uniqueness of the earthly life of 
Jesus of Nazareth. Yet, surely, if the Creator-creature distinction is to be preserved, it 
must be affirmed that the way that Jesus reveals God according this human nature 
differs infinitely from the way in which Jesus reveals God according to his divine 
nature: according to the former, indirectly and analogously; according to the latter, 
directly. 
 The problem with Barth’s assertion of eternal subordination within the 
immanent Trinity and of divine suffering, and his charge of idolatry against those who 
deny the same, is that they seem to be based logically upon a closing of the gap between 
the ways in which Christ’s two natures reveal God’s being. Barth’s thinking seems to be 
that since Jesus, in his earthly, human life, is seen to be subordinate to the Father, and 
since Jesus’ earthly, human life is also revelatory, it is a speculative, and therefore 
idolatrous, denial of revelation to deny subordination within the immanent Trinity. But 
this assumes that the observable, human nature of Jesus reveals God in such a way that 
it can and must, in all its aspects, be read quite directly back into the immanent Trinity.  
This assumption is highly problematic. There are aspects of Jesus’ life which 
pertain directly only to his human nature, and which cannot be read back into the eternal 
Trinity. If the perception of subordination to the Father in the human life of Jesus 
necessitates the assertion of an eternal subordination of the Son to Father, then why 
would not the fact that Jesus of Nazareth ate fish (Luke 2.42-43) necessitate the 
assertion that from all eternity there has been fish-eating within the Trinity? Or, again, if 
                                                          
191 McCormack argues that Barth’s theology, up until the time of the CD II/2, was not truly 
christocentric, though it was christological, but rather pneumatocentric. What he means by this is that 
while the logic of the incarnation undergirded, for Barth, all revelation, Barth problematically focussed 
more upon the event of revelation which occurs in an ongoing fashion than the historical events of the life 
of Jesus.  (McCormack, KBCRDT, 328) 
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it is idolatrous to deny eternal subordination and suffering to the eternal Godhead 
because in Jesus’ earthly life there is seen to be subordination to the Father and 
suffering, then why would it not be idolatrous to affirm that God does not grow tired (as 
the Bible does; Is. 40.28) – given the fact that Jesus grew tired (John 4.6)? One cannot 
and should not consistently apply the principle that each event within the life of Jesus 
reveals so directly something within the life of the immanent Trinity. There are thus no 
a priori grounds for arguing that a refusal to read a particular event within the historical 
life of Jesus back into the immanent Trinity is an idolatrous denial of revelation. Barth’s 
apparent argument for castigating the denial of subordination and suffering within the 
Trinity as idolatrous thus cannot stand. It is not speculative to claim that certain aspects 
of or events within the human life of Jesus cannot be in any direct way read back into 
the life of the Trinity (like suffering or subordination), unless one begins with the highly 
questionable presupposition that the human nature of Jesus reveals the immanent life of 
God quite directly.192 
 The most basic concerns which drove Barth’s affirmation of divine 
subordination and suffering and the levelling of his idolatry critique against those who 
denied them – the concerns to uphold the realism of revelation and the concern to affirm 
that Jesus’ human nature is also revelatory – are in themselves legitimate. But they 
should be affirmed in a way that does not necessitate the direct reading of the events of 
the earthly life of Jesus into the immanent Trinity; in other words, it should be held that 
the events of Jesus’ earthly life reveal God’s immanent being by perfect human 
                                                          
192 Berkouwer (TTG, 302-305) argues to the effect that Barth’s reading of events of the life of 
Jesus of Nazareth back into the life of the Trinity is itself speculative (in Barth’s sense) – the exact 
opposite of Barth’s position. The truth is that which one is speculative in Barth’s sense – the reading of 
the events of the life of Jesus of Nazareth back into the immanent life of God, or the abstention from that 
same procedure – depends wholly on the underlying issue of whether, and in what sense, one understands 
the human nature of Jesus to be revelatory. 
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correspondence to it, and, therefore, indirectly and/or analogically. For example, even 
given Barth’s most basic convictions concerning the realism of revelation and the 
revelatory nature of Jesus’ observable, human history, it is not necessary to affirm that 
because Jesus suffered there must also be suffering in God. It may, rather, be affirmed 
that the suffering of Jesus reveals the immanent being of God both indirectly and 
analogically by saying something like the following: the suffering of Jesus according to 
his human nature is the pre-eminent example of human love, which corresponds 
(analogically) to the love of God. There would thus be a relationship of positive 
correspondence between Jesus’ historical, human life and the suffering that took place 
within it and the immanent being of God, such that former is understood to reveal the 
latter. There would thus be no idolatrous denial of revelation. But the indirectness of 
this relationship and the manner of this revealing would mean it is unnecessary to affirm 
suffering in God, and inappropriate to, a priori, call the denial of suffering in God 
idolatrous. 
 A further critique must be levelled against Barth’s understanding of idolatry 
within the doctrine of God. As described above, Barth believed that every doctrine of 
God was, strictly speaking, completely idolatrous intrinsically. Since the theologian 
could not possess revelation such that it could be utilised as the source of his or her 
doctrine of God, it had another source (even if that source was, as it should be according 
to Barth, a human concept of revelation) and was, therefore, speculative, and, therefore, 
had, intrinsically, an idol as the object of its description.  
 The over-arching framework within which Barth understood the question of the 
doctrine of God was once again that of soteriology. It was the reality of human 
depravity – sin and its absolutely devastating noetic effects – which necessitated the 
147 
 
 
 
assertion that no human being could by his or her concepts and terms possess revelation, 
and that all doctrines of God were therefore completely idolatrous intrinsically. If and 
when, at a certain time, a doctrine of God was made by God to testify to Godself, it was 
due only to God’s gracious gift of Godself to be the object of that which by nature was, 
and remained, intrinsically incapable of having God as its object. It was, that is, an 
occasion of the divine justification of that doctrine – such that being permitted to 
effectively testify to God did not alter its intrinsic failure to do so, nor, therefore, its 
intrinsic idolatry. ‘The veracity of the revelation of God, which justifies the sinner in 
His Word by His Spirit, makes his knowledge [and doctrine] of God true without him, 
against him...’193  The theologian must ever depend upon subsequent acts of divine 
justification of his or her doctrine of God if it is not to be merely idolatrous. 
 If, as elsewhere, Barth is strong on depravity and the need for divine grace, 
revelation and justification within the doctrine of God, his account of sanctification is 
also again here woefully weak. Revelation and grace are never given to the sinner or the 
sinner’s doctrine of God, but are, rather, always to be given. The sanctification of the 
doctrine of God, within Barth’s thinking, could not mean that the doctrine of God came 
to possess revelation as its source and object; it could only mean its reconstitution in a 
way which corresponds to revelation in the way proper to and possible for the created 
intellect. But ‘in the way proper to and possible for the created intellect’ means in a way 
that leaves it being still, strictly speaking, intrinsically idolatrous. It can only mean: in 
creaturely ‘obedience to the grace of God’ in which the theologian remains still ‘entirely 
wrong’ (and in which the theologian acknowledges that fact).194   
                                                          
193 Barth, CD II/1, 213. 
 
194 Barth, CD II/1, 213. 
 
148 
 
 
 
If the doctrine of God can be justified by God’s grace and revelation, then it can 
also be sanctified by God’s grace and revelation; and, again, contra Barth, sanctification 
means something more than error, sin and idolatry merely being ‘put under the order of 
revelation.’195 It means namely, an essential alteration within the doctrine of God, such 
that it becomes no longer intrinsically sinful and idolatrous – or, at least, no longer 
absolutely intrinsically sinful and idolatrous. It means, in other words, the impartation 
or infusion of grace and righteousness to the doctrine of God such that it becomes at 
least to some degree an intrinsically true description of God, one truly possessing 
revelation as its source and object. 
 The affirmation of the sanctification (in the sense of the infusion of 
righteousness), by God’s grace, of doctrines of God would not constitute, as Barth 
seems to have feared, a denial of the absolutely devastating effects of the fall or of the 
human being’s absolute need for grace, i.e., of the fact that, in each moment the doctrine 
of God can be true (and something more than mere idolatry) only due to grace.196 It 
would remain true that human intelligence is, and doctrines of God are, intrinsically, 
apart from grace, wholly fallen, sinful and idolatrous; that human concepts and terms 
are, apart from grace, totally corrupted by sin, and that they therefore, apart from grace, 
cannot describe God, but only an idol. It would merely mean that grace can be received, 
and is not always only to be received; that grace can truly reverse the effects of the fall; 
that one’s concepts can be, in an ongoing way, no longer apart from grace, but rather, 
transformed by it in a perduring fashion such that they can, intrinsically, truly describe 
                                                          
195 Barth, CD I/2, 360. 
 
196 This fear of Barth’s is made visible when, for example, he critiques Quenstedt’s fairly 
traditional doctrine of the analogia entis by saying that he ‘did not remember the doctrine of 
justification,’ and that he did not remember that the attribution of the analogia attributionis had ‘perhaps 
something to do with the grace of God.’ (Barth, CD II/1, 239) 
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God. A gift which has been received is not for that reason any less a pure gift than a gift 
which can always only be received afresh; nor is it, for that reason, any less 
indispensable. A strong affirmation of the sanctification of doctrines of God would, 
rather, constitute a proper affirmation of the efficacy of God’s grace and self-revelation 
– i.e., of the fact that God is able to, and in fact does by God’s own gracious self-giving, 
not only justify and impute righteousness, but also sanctify and impart righteousness, to 
sinners and their thoughts and statements concerning God, such that they become truly 
thoughts and statements about God and not an idol. 
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Chapter 4: Idolatry and Religion 
 
This chapter considers the relationship of Barth’s idolatry-critique to religion across 
three periods in his career. Its primary concern is the attempt to offer an interpretation 
and evaluation of Barth’s idolatry-critique as active in his most mature and definitive 
statement on the topic of religion, §17 of his Church Dogmatics I/2 (1938). Other works 
of Barth’s will, however, be referred to, and through discussion of them it will be shown 
how Barth arrived at the mature form of his critique of the essence and improper 
theological use of religion as idolatry there. It will be seen that very important and 
practical consequences necessarily emerge from Barth’s critique of idolatry within his 
discussion of the topic of religion not only for constructive theology, but also for the 
Christian life, and, in particular, for the engagement of the Christian with adherents of 
other religions. 
 
4.1 ‘Religion’ in Liberal Protestantism 
Before the relationship of religion and idolatry in Barth may be analysed, however, an 
important preliminary question must be answered: what did Barth mean by ‘religion’? 
Most commentators have rightly perceived that Barth’s concept of ‘religion’ was 
characteristically modern; from his days as a student under Herrmann until the end of 
his career, he consistently understood religion (at least broadly) according to the 
conception of liberal Protestant theologians like Schleiermacher, Ritschl and Herrmann, 
as he understood it.1 This is made clear in Barth’s writings on religion, and Barth 
                                                          
1 Among those who have rightly perceived this are Allan W. Loy (‘The Theological 
Interpretation of the Relation of Christianity to Other Religions, with Particular Reference to Karl Barth’ 
(PhD diss., Yale University, 1963), 95), Johannes Aagaard (‘Revelation and Religion: The Influence of 
Dialectical Theology on the Understanding of the Relationship between Christianity and Other 
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explicitly stated in 1964 that: ‘…wenn ich von Religion rede, dann denke ich doch vor 
allem an Schleiermacher und an seine Folgen.’2 Thus, any attempt to understand Barth’s 
thinking on the topic of religion, and the way in which religion related in his thinking to 
idolatry, must begin with an attempt at understanding the way in which he believed 
‘religion’ was defined, evaluated, and employed within Protestant liberalism. Such an 
understanding will be pursued below through a consideration of Barth’s interpretation 
of ‘religion’ in six representative liberal Protestant theologians: Schleiermacher, 
Feuerbach,3 Ritschl, Ernst Troeltsch, Adolf von Harnack and Herrmann. Brief allusions 
will be made to Barth’s reactions to the various elements of their understanding and use 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Religions,’ Studia Theologica 14, 1 (1960): 158), Garrett Green (‘Introduction: Karl Barth as a Theorist 
of Religion,’ in On Religion: the Revelation of God as the Sublimation of Religion, by Karl Barth (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2006), 7), Hans-Joachim Kraus (Theologische Religionskritik (Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag, 1982), 23), J.A. Di Noia (‘Religion and the Religions,’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 45), 
Eberhard Busch (The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, ed. Darrell L. Guder and Judith J Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 142) and Wolf 
Krötke (‘A New Impetus to the Theology of Religions from Karl Barth’s Thought,’ Cultural Encounters 
7, 2 (2011): 29; English translation of: Wolf Krötke, ‘Impulse für eine Theologie der Religionen in 
Denken Karl Barths,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 104, 3 (2007): 320-335). In apparent 
disagreement, Greggs writes that, ‘Barth is not [in §17] using religion as a concept by means of which to 
distance his theology from that of Schleiermacher, as had previously been the case.’ (Tom Greggs, 
Theology against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth (New York: T&T Clark, 
2011), 24) He is certainly right to say that in §17 Barth had more in view than a simple polemic against 
the theology of Schleiermacher. But Barth’s discussion of the theological situation vis-à-vis the concept 
of religion, especially in his historical excursus in §17.1, pp. 37-46, makes it clear that he believed that 
the problem of religionism was what had necessitated his own critique of religion, and that Protestant 
liberalism provided the example of religionism par excellence. It was above all Schleiermacher and the 
liberal tradition to which he gave birth to which the post-1915 Barth sought to oppose his theology 
generally (Karl Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher,’ in The Theology of 
Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 265-266). Since this tradition, beginning with 
Schleiermacher himself, had employed a concept of religion, as it defined it, in a central and 
determinative place in its theology, Barth also felt compelled to contest its use of this concept in his own 
theology.  There is no reason to think, furthermore, that Barth’s assumption of the liberal conception of 
religion was merely a strategic move; rather, he seems to have never left it behind.  
 
2 Karl Barth, ‘Interview von H.A. Fischer-Barnicol, Südwestfunk (5.5.1964),’ in Gespräche 
1964-1968 (GA IV.28), ed. Eberhard Busch (Zurich: TVZ, 1996), 145. 
 
3 It is in some ways strange and, indeed, improper, to include Feuerbach in a list of liberal 
Protestant theologians, but Barth himself regarded Feuerbach as a true (and in some ways the truest) 
representative of this tradition, and, indeed, at least in some sense, as himself a theologian: ‘…the 
position of Feuerbach the anti-theologian was more theological than that of many theologians.’ (Barth, 
‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 217) 
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of religion; these allusions will be substantiated and elaborated upon later in the present 
chapter. All such allusions are meant to be descriptive of Barth’s thinking at the time of 
§17. It is beyond the scope of the present work to consider whether Barth’s 
interpretation of these thinkers’ concepts and uses of religion was accurate in its details. 
Since the purpose of this survey is to be an aid in understanding Barth’s concept of 
religion, attention will be focussed upon Barth’s interpretative works, and not upon the 
question of to what extent Barth’s interpretations accord with the primary literature. 
 
4.1.1 Barth on religion in Schleiermacher 
In Barth’s analysis, Schleiermacher, who was the father of German liberal Protestant 
theology,4 understood religion to be the exercise of a human capacity which was located 
within the realm of feeling [Gefühl]. As such, religion was for him a thoroughly (and, 
indeed, essentially) human possibility: ‘with religion [in Schleiermacher], it is a 
question of the realization of an original, universal and necessary disposition of 
mankind as such.’5 While Barth would not contest this description of religion, and, 
indeed, assumed it, he would disagree with Schleiermacher’s belief that in religion one 
truly had to do with God, and, thus, that religion was a human good, ‘the highest value 
in life.’6 It was also problematic, for Barth, that Schleiermacher, as he understood him, 
held religion to be the source of the knowledge of God, and the object, source and norm 
of theology. Schleiermacher’s was a ‘theology and philosophy of religion.’7 According 
                                                          
4 Barth, ‘Concluding Postscript,’ 274; ‘Schleiermacher,’ trans. Brian Cozens, in Protestant 
Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1972), 426. 
 
5 Barth, ‘Schleiermacher,’ in PT, 442; See also TOS, 245; ‘Kant,’ trans. Brian Cozens, in 
Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1972), 306. 
 
6 Barth, ‘Schleiermacher,’ in PT, 442. 
 
7 Barth, ‘Schleiermacher,’ in PT, 427. Emphasis added. 
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to Barth: ‘What concerns him is not the substance, but the form, not the inner dialectic 
of Christian truth but the phenomenon of religion.’8 For Barth, of course, the roles of 
source, norm and object of theology belonged properly only to God in God’s revelation; 
Schleiermacher’s affording of them to human religion was thus idolatrous.  
For Schleiermacher, according to Barth, it was as instantiations of religion in 
general that particular religions and their respective (real or purported) revelations had 
to be both interpreted and evaluated by theology – and this included the Christian 
religion and its revelation, Jesus Christ. Barth held that Schleiermacher used a general, 
philosophical idea of religion to, ‘not only provide him[self] with a frame within which 
he established the nature of the Christian religion...but also with a yardstick by which its 
value [could] be measured.’9 Barth no doubt agreed that Christianity could also be 
considered and measured as an instantiation of religion in general; but he disagreed that 
revelation could be so considered and measured. For him, within theology, revelation 
had to be the ultimate interpreter and measure of all things, including of particular 
religions and religion in general. To afford that role to a general concept of religion was, 
for him, once again, an act of idolatry.10 Interpreters have sought to express Barth’s 
most fundamental critique of Schleiermacher (and, by extension, of the Protestant 
                                                          
8 Barth, TOS, 245. See also Karl Barth, ‘Schleiermacher,’ in Theology and Church: Shorter 
Writings 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), 160, 162; 
‘Schleiermacher,’ in PT, 427, 454. 
 
9 Barth, ‘Schleiermacher,’ in PT, 449. Schleiermacher was, for Barth, one of those who assumed 
that, ‘that which we think we know about the essence and appearance of religion has to serve as the 
criterion and explanatory principle for God’s revelation.’ (On Religion: The Revelation of God as the 
Sublimation of Religion, trans. Garrett Green (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 37) See also Greggs, TAR, 
21. 
 
10 It was Barth’s intention to indicate that it was religion as Schleiermacher defined it which held 
this role of source and object in Schleiermacher’s theology when he spoke of Schleiermacher’s (and his 
followers’) ‘consciously and consistently executed anthropological starting point,’ (‘Concluding 
Postscript,’ 270) and stated that, indeed, Schleiermacher, ‘brilliantly, like no one before or after 
him…thought and spoke ‘from an anthropological standpoint.’’ (‘Concluding Postscript,’ 279) 
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liberalism that followed him) in a variety of ways.11 It was, in fact, this: the mature 
Barth held that Schleiermacher’s theology was not christocentric, but religionistic; in 
other words, that in Schleiermacher’s theology, religion usurped the role that Jesus 
Christ alone ought to have held; in still other words, that Schleiermacher’s theology 
made an idol of religion.12 
 
4.1.2 Barth on religion in Feuerbach 
According to Barth, religion was, for Feuerbach, the same kind of reality that it was for 
Schleiermacher: a human undertaking, a particular act of human psychological self-
exertion, the exercise of a particular human capacity. Feuerbach agreed with 
Schleiermacher and others of his line that the task of the theologian was to ‘make 
religion, revelation and the relationship with God a necessary predicate of man, or at 
any rate to demonstrate that man had a potentiality or a capacity for these things.’13 
Having accepted this understanding of the theologian’s task, Feuerbach, according to 
                                                          
11 See, for example, James E. Davison, ‘Can God Speak a Word to Man? Barth’s Critique of 
Schleiermacher’s Theology,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 37, 2 (1984): 189-211, doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0036930600016781; Greggs, TAR, 20; John E. Thiel, ‘Barth’s Early 
Interpretation of Schleiermacher,’ in Barth and Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. Duke 
and Robert F. Streetman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988); Ronald F. Thiemann, ‘On Speaking of God 
– the Divisive Issue for Schleiermacher and Barth: A Response to Frei and Sykes,’ in Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. Duke and Robert F. Streetman (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1988); Hans Frei, ‘Barth and Schleiermacher: Divergence and Convergence,’ in Barth and 
Schleiermacher: Beyond the Impasse?, ed. James O. Duke and Robert F. Streetman (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1988), 68-69; Daniel B. Clendenin, ‘A Conscious Perplexity: Barth’s Interpretation of 
Schleiermacher,’ in Westminster Theological Journal 52, 2 (1990): 281-301. 
 
12 Later in Barth’s career, as seen in his ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher,’ 
he showed himself to be open to the possibility (however remote) of interpreting Schleiermacher in a way 
which would undercut many of his earlier critiques of him. (pp. 275-279) This, however, should not be 
taken as a revocation of Barth’s earlier critique of religionistic theology, or even as an assertion that 
Schleiermacher could indeed be spared from being implicated in such a critique. (esp. p. 279) 
 
13 Karl Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ trans. Brian Cozens, in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century (London: SCM Press, 1972), 537. 
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Barth, ‘wanted to be a theologian himself.’14  Even if Feuerbach diverged from 
Schleiermacher in that his particular way of claiming that religion had this character 
was by claiming that it was merely psychological projection, devoid of any truly 
objective pole,15 Barth still believed that he was faithful to Schleiermacher’s basic way 
of thinking – and, indeed, that he brought it to its inevitable conclusion: ‘Was 
[Feuerbach] in fact completely wrong? Had not the theologians themselves tended to 
work in this same direction before him?’16  
Barth perceived, further, that Feuerbach held human religiosity to be the source 
of the knowledge of ‘God,’ the proper object, source and norm of theology, and 
therefore the general category which ought to serve as the interpretative and evaluative 
principle for all particular religions and their purported revelations. With an objective 
God or revelation denied, it was only the religious human being which could fill these 
roles.17 
Again, Barth accepted Feuerbach’s basic definition of the essence of religion 
and even his claim – against Schleiermacher – that there was no truly objective pole in 
religion.18 Religion’s apparently objective pole, its God, was merely a ‘god,’ the 
conglomeration of the projections and wishes of the human subject – a conceptual idol. 
Feuerbach believed that religion was a good when the lie of an objective god was left 
                                                          
14 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in PT, 537. 
 
15 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in T&C, 223 (quoting Feuerbach, Volksausgabe (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner), 
10: ‘Feuerbach epitomized his doctrine at the beginning of the third Heidelberg lecture. ‘Theology is 
anthropology, that is to say in the object of religion, what we call Theos in Greek and Gott in German, 
nothing is specified except the essence of man.’’ 
 
16 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in PT,  537. 
 
17 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in PT, 536-537. 
 
18 The god of religion was an idol, and was thus only quasi-objective, in the sense described in 
2.1.1.3 of the present work. 
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behind.19 For Barth, however, Feuerbach’s critique of religion was not radical enough, 
since idolatry could truly be overcome not by human self-exertion even of the negative 
kind, but only by revelation. In the end, though Feuerbach offered a valuable critique of 
and warning to Schleiermacher and his tradition by drawing out their thinking to its 
inevitable (atheistic) conclusion, from the perspective of revelation his supposedly 
purified religion remained idolatrous, as did his assertion that religious human being 
ought to be the object, source and norm of theology. 
 
4.1.3 Barth on religion in Ritschl 
According to Barth, the ‘religion’ of Ritschl was, like that of Schleiermacher and 
Feuerbach, an anthropological reality; for him in particular, a human ‘outlook on life 
and its morality,’20 which was itself an attempt to answer the universal question as to 
how human beings could establish spiritual ‘dominion over the world...against the 
limitations imposed upon [them] by the world.’21 This outlook took the form of ‘value-
judgments’ made by religious community,22 which were, in turn, the source of the 
knowledge of God and the source and norm of theology.23 The material centre of 
Ritschl’s theology was likewise religion as the means of attainment to this human ‘ideal 
of life’ which was assumed independently of revelation.24 Barth would have known well 
                                                          
19 Barth, ‘Feuerbach,’ in PT, 535. 
 
20 Karl Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ trans. Brian Cozens, in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: SCM Press, 1972), 658. 
 
21 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 660. 
 
22 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 661. It was in part the focus on the religious community which differentiated 
Ritschl from Schleiermacher. 
 
23 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 656, 661. 
 
24 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 656; Karl Barth, Ethics, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1981), 79. 
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that Ritschl himself had stated that, ‘The form of systematic theology is bound up, first 
of all, with the correct and complete idea of the Christian religion.’25  
For Ritschl, too, according to Barth, religion was a general reality, as 
instantiations of which all particular religions were to be understood and measured. 
Since all religions were, for Ritschl, ways of answering the dilemma of how human 
beings can exercise spiritual dominion over the world in face of the restrictions placed 
upon human beings by the natural world, the highest religion would be the religion 
which best provided a solution to that dilemma.26 It was on the grounds that it was the 
Christian religion that did so that Ritschl afforded to the Christian religion a place of 
relative superiority over all others: 
What distinguishes Christianity from every other religion [for Ritschl] is that it 
answers the question all religions ask...That is the meaning of an apologetics of 
Christianity: to demonstrate this significance of Christianity for the realization 
of the ideal of human life – to demonstrate that the Christian idea of God is the 
first to offer the necessary connexion of ideas between our outlook upon life, 
which is dependent upon the perception of nature with all its limitations, and our 
necessary moral self-judgment, and that therefore to this extent it fills a gap 
which philosophy leaves open, and must of necessity leave open.27 
 
Barth did not deny, but rather assumed, broadly speaking, Ritschl’s anthropocentric 
definition of religion. Nor did he deny that religion was a general category of the kind 
that Ritschl described, as an instantiation of which all particular religions could be 
measured. Of necessity, however, he also assumed that Ritschl’s ‘religion’ was 
idolatrous. The God of religion was, for Ritschl, according to Barth, defined with 
reference to the human ‘ideal of life,’ and therefore speculatively. Barth believed, 
further, that affording to religion roles in theology (both methodologically and 
                                                          
25 Ritschl, TCDJR, vol. 3, 8. 
 
26 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 660. 
 
27 Barth, ‘Ritschl,’ 660. 
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materially) which properly belonged only to Jesus Christ – as Ritschl did – was 
idolatrous.  
 
4.1.4 Barth on religion in Troeltsch 
For Troeltsch (1865-1923), according to Barth, religion was – as it was for 
Schleiermacher, Feuerbach, and Ritschl – a human capacity, or the exercise of that 
capacity. Troeltsch in particular referred to this capacity as the ‘religious a priori’: ‘in 
contrast to the Enlightenment theology, the 19th-century theologians focused their 
attention on one particular point in relation to all various world views of their time: 
man’s supposedly innate and essential capacity to ‘sense and taste the infinite’ as 
Schleiermacher said, or the ‘religious a priori’ as later affirmed by Troeltsch.’28 While 
Troeltsch was somewhat reticent to describe the nature of religion any further, it is clear 
that he held it to be at its core the inward experience of the divine; in the words of 
Ogletree, the ‘most concentrated locus of the feeling for the absolute in human 
experience’;29 and in the words of Troeltsch himself, ‘Die Grundvoraussetzung der 
Religion [ist] daß endliche Wesen seine Befaßtheit in dem Zussamenhang einer 
unendlichen Macht hingebend oder schauernd erfahre.’30 Thus, Troeltsch’s general 
evaluation of religion was also positive. 
Once again, Barth did not contest Troeltsch’s most basic definition of religion; 
he would merely have denied that the ‘absolute,’ the unendlichen Macht, with which the 
                                                          
28 Karl Barth, ‘Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century,’ in The Humanity of God, trans. 
John Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960), 21. See also 
Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst Troeltsch and Karl 
Barth (Nashville: Abingdon, 1965), 40. 
 
29 Ogletree, CFH, 40. 
 
30 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Die Selbständigkeit der Religion,’ Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 6, 1 
(1896): 82. 
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human communes on the basis of the exercise of the religious a priori could be 
identified with God, since Barth held that the true God could not be encountered on the 
basis of any kind of a priori or point of contact within the human being. Troeltsch’s 
religion, too, was thus idolatry. And Troeltsch, too, according to Barth, afforded 
religion roles within theology (e.g., that of source and object) which belonged properly 
only to God’s revelation. ‘Then E. Troeltsch taught us that the main task of the 
theologian is to exercise himself in ‘entering hypothetically’ into the phenomena of 
general religious history, so that by a comparative assessment of the various worlds of 
religion he may then see that Christianity is relatively the best religion.’31 Again, in 
Troeltsch, according to Barth, ‘Theology turned into philosophy of the history of 
religion in general, and of the Christian religion in particular.’32  It was, in particular, 
the historical manifestation of religion, religion as an historical phenomenon, that was 
taken to be theology’s object, and thus could Troeltsch’s theological method could be 
described as a ‘history of religions’ approach.33 Only revelation, for Barth, ought to be 
theology’s object, and it, therefore, had to be, as such, determinative for theological 
method. Not only did Troeltsch’s ‘religion’ have to be judged as idolatrous, for Barth, 
so too did his use of the concept of religion within theology, and his selection of a 
theological method which either revealed or determined that he held religion as an 
historical phenomenon to be theology’s object. 
 
                                                          
31 Barth, CD I/2, 290. 
 
32 Barth, ‘ET,’ 13. See also pp. 23, 28. 
 
33 Barth, ‘ET,’ 14, 22. 
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4.1.5 Barth on religion in Harnack34 
The ‘religion’ of Harnack (1851-1930) was, for Barth, once again, ‘nothing other than 
the realization of a human possibility,’35 the attempt to reckon with and live out the 
‘simple Gospel,’ ‘the message of God the Father, the infinite worth of the human soul 
and the love of the brethren.’36 Barth knew well that Harnack was right that faith can 
always be understood as religion in this sense or one similar to it,37 but he also believed 
that the state of the homo religiosus as such was one of a ‘natural-titanic 
presumptuousness,’38 in which the human being idolatrously substituted his or her own 
conception of God for God’s revelation.  
 Harnack’s theological method was borne out of a deep concern, furthermore, 
that theology be scientific,39 which meant, for him, among other things, heavy reliance 
upon the historico-critical method within theology. This meant for Barth, however, as in 
the case of Troeltsch, the abandonment of revelation as both the object of theology 
                                                          
34 The most complete and direct of Barth’s engagements with Adolf von Harnack may be found 
in the correspondence between these two men which was published in Die Christliche Welt in 1923. An 
English translation of this correspondence, from which the quotations presented here are drawn, may be 
found in H. Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology: An Analysis of the Barth – Harnack 
Correspondence of 1923 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 29-53. This correspondence is 
composed of five documents, two written by Barth and three by Harnack. The first (29-31) is a list of 
fifteen questions, formulated by Harnack, and addressed to the ‘despisers of scientific theology.’ The 
second document (31-35) is Barth’s reply to each of these fifteen questions, the third (35-39) an open 
letter from Harnack to Barth, the fourth (40-52) Barth’s response to that open letter, and the fifth (52-53) 
a ‘postscript’ to the discussion written by Harnack. This correspondence will here be cited as ‘Barth-
Harnack’ when the reference is to one of the documents which Barth wrote to Harnack, and as ‘Harnack-
Barth’ when the reference is to one of the documents written by Harnack. 
 
35 ‘Barth-Harnack,’ 44-45. 
 
36 Karl Barth, ‘Herder,’ trans. Brian Cozens, in Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: SCM Press, 1972), 502. 
 
37 ‘Barth-Harnack,’ 48. 
 
38 ‘Barth-Harnack,’ 49. 
 
39 ‘Harnack-Barth,’ 31. Rumscheidt (Revelation and Theology, 23) notes that, ‘For Harnack, 
science was a sphere of methodical, unprejudiced, stately and well-thought-through approach to the 
cognition of an object or truth.’ 
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(since it was not uncoverable by means of the historico-critical method)40 and as the 
determinant of theological method, and its idolatrous replacement with religion.41 Barth 
surely knew that in Harnack’s What is Christianity? he had, once again in accord with 
the Protestant liberalism which came before him, stated programmatically that it was, 
‘with the Christian religion alone that we have to do.’42 In his substitution of religion 
for revelation, Barth understood Harnack to be a true heir of the liberal tradition which 
began with Schleiermacher: ‘Harnack was obviously speaking for neo-Protestantism, 
whose proper object of faith is not God in His revelation, but man himself believing in 
the divine.’43 And Barth could not have failed to note, further, that Harnack, again 
following his liberal forefathers, considered ‘religion’ to be the generative principle of 
all particular religions, and the standard by which they had to be measured.44 
  
4.1.6 Barth on religion in Herrmann 
Barth noted that, for Herrmann, religion was ‘the ability – based in itself and 
experienced only as a miraculous event – to see the working of God in the events of 
                                                          
40 ‘Barth-Harnack,’ 31-32, 43-46; see also CD I/2, 367. 
 
41 Karl-Josef Kuschel rightly argues (Born before All Time? The Dispute over Christ’s Origin, 
trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1992), 65-66) that one of the main differences between Barth’s 
understanding of theology and that of Harnack is their divergence on the question of whether theology 
must be undertaken according to a more general, and purportedly presuppositionless, scientific method 
(Harnack) or whether it means simply that theology must faithfully afford precedence to its object, and 
formulate its methods according to it (Barth). Barth clearly believed that Harnack, by taking the former 
route, allowed something other than revelation to determine its method – and this could only mean 
idolatry. 
 
42 Adolf von Harnack, What is Christianity?, trans. Thomas Bailer Saunders (London: Ernst 
Benn, 1958), 17. Emphasis added. 
 
43 Barth, CD I/2, 367. 
 
44 Harnack, WIC, 17. 
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life,’45 in light of ‘the experience of pure dependence in free surrender.’46 Indeed, what 
Herrmann called ‘religion’ would be identical to ‘revelation’ according to certain 
definitions of the latter (though certainly not according to that of the mature Barth).47 
And his conception of religion could have only been seen by Barth as an outwardly 
closer approximation to what he would understand as ‘true religion’ in the Church 
Dogmatics §17 than any of the other conceptions found amongst liberal Protestants, for 
Herrmann’s religion did ostensibly depend for its possibility and actuality on a gracious 
act of God; it was ‘based in itself and experienced only as a miraculous event.’48 It did 
not, therefore, have its possibility in human beings as such; it was not, e.g., based in an 
inherently human capacity as in Schleiermacher or in a human a priori as in Troeltsch.49 
Since Herrmann meant by the term ‘religion’ to refer to a reality closely bound up with 
true encounter with God, which was the answer to the human ethical dilemma, it is 
unsurprising that, unlike Barth, ‘[Herrmann] nearly always spoke of religion in positive 
terms.’50 
 Barth could allow that at least some of what Herrmann called ‘religion’ was 
evoked by an actual encounter with God, i.e., revelation. But according to Barth religion 
                                                          
45 Karl Barth, ‘The Principles of Dogmatics According to Wilhelm Herrmann,’ in Theology and 
Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), 243. 
 
46 Ibid., 239. Quoting Herrmann’s ‘Christliche-protestant Dogmatik,’ in Hinneberg’s Die Kultur 
der Gegenwart: Ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele I: IV, 2, ed. Paul Hinnenberg (Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 
1909), 624. 
 
47 Robert Morgan, ‘Troeltsch and Christian Theology,’ in Writings on Theology and Religion, by 
Ernst Troeltsch (London: Duckworth, 1977), 227. 
 
48 Barth, ‘PD,’ 243. 
 
49 Barth, ‘PD,’ 244. 
 
50 Gary Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology Without Weapons 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 180. 
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in Herrmann’s sense became a human ‘ability,’51 a certain modification of 
‘consciousness,’52 a ‘particular, vital possession of individual men’;53 though its origin 
was not in human beings, its ongoing reality was. For Barth, any reality possessed by 
human beings, including religion, and including even that religion evoked by revelation, 
not only not could not be identical to revelation, it could actually only oppose 
revelation. The ‘god’ of the religion that was a human ability and possession could only 
ever be an idol, since the true God could not be the object of human cognition and 
perception in any static sense.54 Herrmann, further, afforded to his idea of ‘religion’ the 
role of source of the knowledge of God, and of the source and object of theology – as 
seen in his description of dogmatic formulations as Glaubensgedanken.55 Barth wrote 
that, ‘According to Herrmann [dogmatics] is the search for clarity concerning the origin 
and validity of our own religion.’56 The affording of the roles of source and norm in 
theology to religion could only, once more, represent for Barth the affording to religion 
a role properly belonging only to revelation – the idolisation of religion.  
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Barth, ‘PD,’ 243. 
 
52 Barth, ‘PD,’ 243. 
 
53 Barth, ‘PD,’ 241. 
 
54 The fact that Herrmann’s ‘religion’ (according to Barth) was the answer to a universally 
perceptible ethical dilemma (Barth, ‘PD,’ 261; Albert A. Jagnow, ‘Karl Barth and Wilhelm Herrmann: 
Pupil and Teacher,’ The Journal of Religion 16, 3 (1936): 302; Daniel Lee Deegan, ‘Wilhelm Herrmann: 
A Reassessment,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 19 (1966): 193) and the end of the universally valid ‘way 
to religion’ (Barth, ‘PD,’256) are also reasons why Barth had to judge it negatively. 
 
55 Barth, ‘PD,’ 240; GD, 25. 
 
56 Barth, GD, 8. 
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4.1.7 Summary of Barth on religion in German Protestant Theological Liberalism 
Notwithstanding important differences, a number of commonalities existed across many 
or all liberal Protestant thinkers (in Barth’s interpretation) when it came to the 
definition, evaluation, and theological usage of ‘religion.’57 In the first place, religion 
was understood as an anthropological reality – an ongoing modification or possession of 
human feeling, values, outlook on life, experience, etc. – in which the human being in 
some way knows or communes with God. The reality of religion (strictly defined) was 
the core, generative principle, and standard of particular world religions. With the 
exception of the fact that he came to deny that it is the true God who is communed with 
on the basis of religion, Barth affirmed this general understanding of religion held in 
various specific ways by liberal theologians, throughout his career without (at least from 
the time of Romans) binding himself to the more specific understanding of any one of 
the latter. Second, religion was viewed in Protestant liberalism as truly having to do 
with God (with a partial exception in in the case of Feuerbach) and thus as a human 
good. As will be seen, Barth, because he came to believe in his mature period that 
religion was idolatrous, denied that it was good. Third, in liberal theology religion was 
afforded roles which the mature Barth believed ought to be afforded only to revelation: 
the roles of source of the knowledge of God, source, norm and object of theology, etc. 
In this way, liberal Protestant theology was ‘religionistic,’ i.e., it made an idol of 
                                                          
57 Though Barth was clearly aware of differences between these thinkers on the topic of 
‘religion,’ it may nevertheless be true that he was guilty of totalising the liberal view and use of religion 
in such a manner that he failed do justice to each of the individual thinkers described above. This is a 
criticism is, for example, suggested by McCormack’s statement that: ‘Barth’s critique was, in a good 
many of its main lines, not valid for Schleiermacher. But it was valid for Troeltsch. Barth’s problem was 
that he never succeeded in distinguishing Schleiermacher from Troeltsch.’ (Bruce McCormack, ‘What 
Has Basel to Do with Berlin? Continuities in the Theologies of Barth and Schleiermacher,’ in Orthodox 
and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 80) Whether or not this 
critique of McCormack’s is valid, the important point for present purposes is that Barth believed that there 
were enough underlying similarities between liberal understandings and uses of religion that he could 
rightly think and speak of a generically liberal understanding and use of it. 
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religion. Even if Barth did not explicitly critique the ‘religionism’ of liberal theology as 
idolatry, it is clear that he understood it to be what he elsewhere did explicitly call 
idolatry: ‘That [modern liberal Protestant theology] really lost revelation is shown by 
the very fact that it was possible for it to exchange revelation, and thereby its own 
birthright, for the concept of religion.’58 In sum, Protestant liberalism, according to the 
mature Barth, in general rightly defined religion, but wrongly evaluated it, and wrongly, 
i.e., idolatrously, afforded to religion roles which properly belonged only to revelation.  
 
4.2 Religion and Idolatry in Barth 
To the above synchronic description of Barth’s mature interpretation of the liberal 
understanding, evaluation and utilisation of ‘religion,’ and the interspersed comments 
concerning Barth’s own reaction to and appropriation of the same, must now be added a 
more complete, analytical and diachronic account of the relationship between religion 
and idolatry in Barth. In this way it will be seen more clearly what the relationship 
between idolatry and religion was in Barth’s mature thought, and how and why he 
arrived at that mature position. First, what was perhaps implicit above must now be 
made explicit: the question of how idolatry related to religion in Barth’s thinking must 
be asked in two ways: (1) How did Barth think of idolatry relating to the theological use 
of the concept of religion? (2) How did Barth think of idolatry relating to the essence of 
religion? Three stages in the way in which Barth answered these questions over the 
course of his career may be discerned. Undergirding Barth’s thinking at each of these 
stages, and the transitions between them, was his ever-stable formal definition of 
                                                          
 58 Barth, On Religion, 49. Emphasis added. 
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idolatry as the replacement or substitution of God in God’s revelation with that which is 
created. 
 
4.2.1 Barth’s liberal period 
The first stage which may be discerned is Barth’s liberal period, i.e., that period from 
approximately 1908 when he became a student of Herrmann until 1915 when he broke 
from liberalism. During this period Barth’s understanding of religion was 
characteristically liberal, and largely Herrmannian. For Barth, as for Herrmann, religion 
was the experience of God as the answer to the individual’s moral struggle. Thus Barth 
in 1909: 
Individuell bedingt ist das Erwachen der Religion, wie wir sie verstehen. Wo ein 
Mensch zur Erkenntnis gekommen ist, daß es ihm faktisch unmöglich ist, das als 
gut erkannte Sittengebot bei sich durchzusetzen, da kann er es erleben, daß ihm 
in der Überlieferung der christlichen Kirche oder in ihrem gegenwärtigen Leben 
eine Macht begegnet, der er sich in Gehorsam und Vertrauen gänzlich 
unterwerfen muß.59 
 
Religion was, for him, a general reality of communion with God which had particular 
manifestations in the various world religions. Also in 1909, Barth wrote that, ‘Die altisr. 
Religion eine unter vielen, nicht einmal der erste Israels. Überall wo Menschen Rel. 
haben, ist Gott beteiligt…’60 Since all world religions were manifestations of this basic 
reality, the Christian religion could have only a relative advantage over other world 
religions: ‘Der Christ erkennt in den andern Religionen unvollständige Stufen der 
höchsten Wahrheit.’61  
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60 Barth, Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921, 3.  
 
61 Barth, Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921, 62. 
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When, during this period, it came to question (1), the question of the relationship 
between idolatry and the theological use of ‘religion,’ Barth’s position ran thus: any 
theology which does not afford ‘religion’ the role of source, norm and object is 
idolatrous. Even at this time, Barth believed that only revelation ought to hold these 
roles. How then could religion holding them not only not be idolatrous, but also be the 
only scenario which was not idolatrous? Simply because Barth, at this time, in line with 
his liberal teachers, associated very closely, and even in a certain sense, identified, 
religion with revelation.62  This has already been suggested above, and Barth made this 
identification even more explicit when he wrote in 1909 that, ‘…was wir von menschl. 
Seite Religion nennen [,] ist von Seiten Gottes Offenbarung.’63 
With the near identification of religion and revelation made, it became the case 
that to afford the roles of source, norm and object in theology to religion was to afford it 
to revelation. Alternatively, to refuse to afford the roles of source, norm and object in 
theology to religion was to afford them to something other than revelation, and, thus to 
commit idolatry. This line of thinking is most easily perceptible in Barth’s previously 
cited 1911 essay ‘La Réapparition de la Métaphysique dans la Théologie,’ the 
argumentative thrust of which is that the substitution of metaphysics for ‘la religion 
[and its God], qui est l'objet de la théologie’64 is an illicit act, which can be 
characterised as idolatry. ‘Lui [‘Le Dieu de la conclusion métaphysique,’ (p. 349)] 
                                                          
62 See McCormack, KBCRDT, 67, n. 70 and Frei, ‘The Doctrine of Revelation in the Thought of 
Karl Barth,’ 27, 33, 140, 361. While this identification was in line with much of Protestant liberalism, it 
should also be noted briefly here that liberalism could also sometimes use the term ‘revelation’ 
differently, i.e., such that it was not synonymous with religion, but rather such that it referred to the 
specific creaturely media of revelation, i.e., of the creation of the internal reality of religion. See, e.g., 
Schleiermacher, TCF, 50. Such ‘revelation’ was of secondary importance to inward reality of religion 
(and revelation), and to be understood in terms of it. This point will become important below. 
 
63 Barth, Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921, 15. Emphasis original. 
 
64 Barth, ‘La Réapparition,’ 336. 
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attribuer une importance religieuse, c’est ériger un idole («einen Götzen aufricthen und 
anbeten»)…’65  
When, during this same period, it came to question (2), the question of the 
relationship between idolatry and the essence of religion, Barth held – again, keeping in 
line with Herrmannian liberalism – that the essence of religion was altogether good, and 
that it was not idolatrous. The belief that religion was truly communion with God 
necessitated this. Religion could not be the replacement of revelation, since religion, in 
an important sense, was revelation. Idolatry would have necessarily meant irreligion. In 
Barth’s 1910/11 ‘Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte der christlichen Religion,’ for 
example, he closely linked religion and revelation, and irreligion and speculation (the 
latter, as the previous chapter has shown, was for him a form of idolatry): ‘Irenäus hat 
in richtiger Weise die Einheit Gottes u. d[er] Offenbarung gegenüber der unrel. 
Spekulation der Gnost[iker vertreten]. Er spekuliert aber selbst unreligiös...’66 
 
4.2.2 Barth’s Romans II period 
The second stage which may be discerned in Barth’s thinking on these issues is best 
represented by his discussion of religion in his 1922 Romans II, and in the seventh 
chapter in particular, which is devoted to the discussion of that topic. ‘Freedom’ is the 
title of the chapter, but its three sections are entitled ‘The Frontier of Religion,’67 ‘The 
Meaning of Religion,’68 and ‘The Reality of Religion,’69 respectively. As the title of the 
                                                          
65 Barth, ‘La Réapparition,’ 350. 
 
66 Barth, ‘Lebensbilder,’ 100. 
 
67 Barth, Romans II, 229-240. 
 
68 Barth, Romans II, 240-257. 
 
69 Barth, Romans II, 257-270. 
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chapter suggests, even the negative judgments which Barth levelled against religion 
under these sub-headings were part of his attempt to elucidate the freedom of God vis-à-
vis all of that which is created.  
Chapter 7 treats of the seventh chapter of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, using the 
term ‘religion’ in place of Paul’s ‘law.’ It may here be briefly noted that, as may be 
expected given that by ‘religion’ Barth meant to describe what Paul meant to describe 
by the term ‘law,’ Barth’s concept of religion in Romans II seems to have included not 
only a certain modification of consciousness or of human experience, but also a certain 
set of empirical human actions: ‘...we hear, we believe, we obey, we confess, we 
express ourselves with some passion, in speech or in print.’70  This did not represent a 
rejection of the liberal understanding of religion, however – Schleiermacher was still 
clearly in view, for example, in the negative statements which Barth made about 
religion71 – but simply an expansion of the strict form of its definition of it. As has been 
noted, Schleiermacher’s tradition realised that, though religion was primarily a matter of 
subjectivity, it also had objective manifestations.  And, to be sure, religion was for 
Barth in Romans II, as it had been in liberalism, the actualisation of an innately, and 
indeed essentially, human possibility and reality, and the highest one at that. ‘We have 
to show that religion is a human possibility, and, consequently, a limited possibility...’72 
‘As men living in the world, and being what we are, we cannot hope to escape the 
possibility of religion.’73  
                                                          
70 Barth, Romans II, 230. It was also, as Matthew Myer Boulton rightly states, conceived of as a 
certain ‘moral and legal ordering’ of such actions. (God Against Religion: Rethinking Christian Theology 
Through Worship (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 26). 
 
71 Barth, Romans II, 258, 260. 
 
72 Barth, Romans II, 229-230. 
 
73 Barth, Romans II, 230. 
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Barth apparently believed that the ‘religion’ of liberalism was at least roughly 
the same reality as that which Paul sought to describe with the term ‘law,’ and his 
decision to gloss Paul’s ‘law’ in Romans 7 as ‘religion’ was materially determinative 
for what he said about the latter. It should not be thought either that Barth’s choice to 
equate religion and Paul’s ‘law’ was arbitrary, or that, having made that equation, his 
discussion of ‘religion’ was unconcerned with what Paul said about the law, as if he was 
willing to jettison Paul’s actual meaning for the sake of the exposition of his own 
theology. According to Barth’s own statements, he was not engaged in ‘free 
theologizing,’ nor did he set out in Romans ‘to compose a free fantasia on the theme of 
religion.’74 Barth was engaged in Romans II in the writing of biblical commentary. It 
must be assumed, therefore, that he believed that ‘religion,’ understood in a 
characteristically liberal manner, was at least roughly equivalent to what Paul meant by 
‘law’ and life under it in Romans 7, however this equation of Barth’s is to be evaluated. 
It should also be assumed, for this reason that Barth’s material statements concerning 
religion were driven by what Paul had to say about the law.  
 When it came, during this time period, to question (1), that of the relationship 
between idolatry and the theological use of religion, Barth’s held the exact opposite 
position of that which he held during his liberal period. Whereas then the refusal of the 
roles of source of the knowledge of God, and source, object and norm in theology75 to 
religion was idolatry (since religion and revelation were nearly identified), by the time 
of Romans II the affording of these roles to religion was, for him, an act of idolatry. 
This change came about because, as has been recounted previously within the present 
                                                          
74 Barth, Romans II, ix. 
 
75 ‘Theology’ here refers not simply to a formal academic discipline, but to all attempts to think 
and speak of God and creation in relation to God. 
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work,76 Barth’s break from liberalism involved the disentangling of revelation from all 
that is human, including religion and religious experience (and, indeed, the opposing of 
one to the other). By the time of Romans II, religion was no longer revelation or grace, 
but, rather, the law. Once religion and revelation could no longer be in any sense 
identified, to afford to religion a role which properly belonged to revelation (e.g., that of 
source and object in theology) was to replace revelation with that which was not 
revelation, i.e., it was to commit idolatry: in this case, the idolatry of legalism. This kind 
of idolatry is what occurs when ‘men cling to religion with a bourgeois tenacity, 
supposing it to be that final thing of soul and sense which is deathless and 
unshattered.’77 Barth believed that liberal theology was guilty of this precisely this kind 
of idolatry, when it held that religion itself was the means of being ‘in tune with the 
infinite,’78 the ‘apprehension of the absolute,’ a ‘feeling and taste for eternity.’79 
 When it came, during this time period, to question (2), Barth’s thinking was 
much more complex than is often realised. So, too, was his overall evaluation of 
religion, which is nowhere near as negative as is often assumed. Those who, like von 
Balthasar, see Romans II as being ‘deeply anti-religious’80 misunderstand it. Because 
                                                          
76 See 2.1.2.1 of the present work. 
 
77 Barth, Romans II, 238. 
 
78 Barth, Romans II, 253. 
 
79 Barth, Romans II, 260. 
 
80 Von Balthasar, TKB, 53. Greggs, in his important treatment of religion in Barth also seems to 
see Barth’s evaluation of religion in Romans II as predominantly negative. He realises that it is ‘never 
fully negative’ (TAR, 18), but implies that it is primarily negative; and this, as will be seen, is not the 
case. Further, while Greggs perceives the positive element in Barth’s discussion of religion, he interprets 
Barth’s claims that religion is death, an enemy of human beings, etc. as an attempt on Barth’s part to 
guard against an overly-positive assessment. (TAR, 19) In fact, just the opposite is the case. Religion, in 
Romans 7, is a positive reality precisely when and because it is death, an enemy, etc. It is, as will be seen, 
an enemy to human beings as they stand apart from God, in their sin and idolatry; in other words, it is 
precisely the enemy that human beings need in order to be shaken from their self-assurance and self-
contentment, and therefore to be placed in a position in which they can only wait upon God. Religion is 
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Barth truly set out to interpret Paul, he could have no more been anti-religious than he 
could have been, as an interpreter of Paul, an anti-nomian. Indeed, for Barth, religion, 
like the law for Paul, was, ‘holy, just and good.’81 Religion, like the law, possessed for 
Barth the power to disclose sin and idolatry as such to human beings and, therefore, to 
prepare the human being for God’s grace. Many commentators such as Vallée, Busch, 
Krauss and van der Kooi have perceived a striking note of positivity in Barth’s 
evaluation of religion, and this is the reason why.82 Yet, on the other hand, Barth did 
ostensibly render many negative judgments against religion, and did, criticise it for its 
association with idolatry. Indeed, in certain places, he spoke very disparagingly about it, 
agreeing with Marx, for example, that religion was a kind of opiate.83 How can Barth’s 
negative statements about religion, and his charge of idolatry against it, be reconciled 
with what van der Kooi rightly describes as Barth’s, at times ‘liebvoll, sympathisch’84 
tone as he speaks about religion?  
                                                                                                                                                                          
negative only when it does not act as an enemy to human beings apart from God, but rather reassures 
them in their actually godless pursuits, goals, and ideals. Further examples of those who overestimate the 
negativity of Barth’s evaluation of religion in Romans include Benkt-Erik Benktson (Christus und die 
Religion: Der Religionsbegriff bei Barth, Bonhoeffer und Tillich (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1967), 59) 
and Sung Ryul Kim (Gott in und über den Religionen: Auseinandersetzung mit der «pluralistischen 
Religionstheologie» und das Problem des Synkretismus (Zurich: TVZ, 2010), 30-31). 
 
81 Barth, Romans II, 254. 
 
82 Gérard Vallée, ‘Foi et Religion dans le Commentaire de l’Epître aux Romains de Karl Barth,’ 
Science et Esprit 32, 3 (1980): 338; Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth & the Pietists: The Young Karl Barth’s 
Critique of Pietism and Its Response, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch (Downers Grove: Intervarsity, 2004), 85; 
Kraus, TR, 8; Cornelis van der Kooi, ‘Religion als Unglaube. Bemerkung zu einer Kampfparole,’ in Karl 
Barth im europäischen Zeitgeschehen (1935-1950): Widerstand – Bewärung – Orientierung, ed. Michael 
Beintker, Christian Link and Michael Trowitzsch (Zurich: TVZ, 2010), 449. See also Choan-Seng Song 
(‘The Relation of Divine Revelation and Man’s Religion in the Theologies of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich’ 
(ThD diss., Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York, 1965), 10-28), who rightly understands 
that Barth sought, in Romans II, only to critique a certain, deviant kind of religion. 
 
83 Barth, Romans II, 238. 
 
84 Van der Kooi, ‘Religion als Unglaube,’ 449. 
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 They can be reconciled by the realisation that Barth, in Romans II, distinguished 
between two possibilities for the practice or use of religion. There was as little 
possibility of Barth speaking negatively of religion per se as there was of him speaking 
negatively of the law per se; but just as the law can be viewed and utilised both properly 
and improperly, so can religion be practised both properly and improperly, i.e., in 
conformity or non-conformity with its genuine nature and purpose.  
The concrete practice of religion, whether proper or improper, was always 
idolatrous because the religious person always remains, even in his or her religion, a 
sinner and an idolater, separated from God by the ‘infinite qualitative distinction.’85 
Since the concrete religious human being, like all human beings, can never come to 
possess revelation, his or her conception of God can only be an idolatrous one, one not 
founded upon revelation: he or she can only conceive of God as ‘one factor in a 
contrast,’86 and thus only as a ‘god of this world.’87 The god that the religious person 
can grasp is not God, but an idol, the ‘No-God.’88 The religious person, therefore, never 
possessed a positive relationship with God by virtue of his or her religion, but, rather, 
always remained in his or her religion as he or she was apart from it: a sinner and an 
idolater. 
 When religion was understood and practised properly, however, the religious 
person could receive this very self-negating and self-condemning fact – that of one’s 
own sin, idolatry, and godlessness – as a disclosure of religion. Properly practised, 
                                                          
85 That idolatry was for Barth a universally human act has been argued in 2.1.1.2 of the present 
work. 
 
86 Barth, Romans II, 231. 
 
87 Barth, Romans II, 231. 
 
88 Barth, Romans II, 231. 
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religion, for the Barth of Romans II is ‘the point at which sin becomes an observable 
fact of experience...’89  Those who understand and practise religion along these lines, 
‘penetrate the valley of the shadow of death.’90 They are compelled by religion itself to 
recognise that ‘God is not to be found in religion,’91 and because religion is the highest 
human possibility, all human action can be seen under that same sign.92 They recognise 
themselves ‘to be conditioned invisibly by – sin.’93 In this type of religion, one 
encounters and perceives the limit to and judgment of all human possibilities, and 
religion is thus ‘fraught with disturbance...non-aesthetic...non-rhetorical...non-pious.’94 
The essence of religion so practised is self-negation, humility, recognition of one’s own 
sin and idolatry, and dependence upon grace. Thus, it is unsurprising that concerning 
this form of religion, Barth was almost unequivocally positive in Romans II. Indeed, he 
exhorted his contemporaries to take up the practice of religion: ‘Let us be convincedly 
nothing but religious men....’95 Conceptually, the reason that Barth could affirm this 
positive possibility for religion is that – as has been argued previously in this work – at 
the time of Romans II, although Barth did not believe that experience, feeling, etc., 
could disclose any positive knowledge of God, and self and world in relation to God, he 
did believe that existential experience could provide negative knowledge of those 
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90 Barth, Romans II, 255. 
 
91 Barth, Romans II, 242. 
 
92 Barth, Romans II, 231. 
 
93 Barth, Romans II, 244. 
 
94 Barth, Romans II, 258. 
 
95 Barth, Romans II, 254. 
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realities. Religion was, for him, properly practised, the highest form of negatively 
revelatory existential experience.96  
There was for Barth, however, in Romans II, a second, degenerate possibility for 
the practice of religion, in which one fails to perceive the true meaning of religion, i.e., 
religion’s disclosing of the human predicament of sin, idolatry and separation from 
God, and believes that, by virtue of one’s religion, one knows and stands in positive 
relationship to God. The essence of religion, so practised, was not self-negation, 
humility, and recognition of one’s own sin and idolatry and therefore need for grace but, 
rather, pride, self-satisfaction, blindness to one’s own sin and idolatry, and confidence 
in the reality of one’s ‘god.’ It was in discussing religion in this form that Barth agreed 
with Marx that religion acts ‘upon [people] like a drug which has been extremely 
skillfully administered. Instead of counteracting human illusions, it does no more than 
introduce an alternative condition of pleasurable emotion.’97 Clearly, by the time of 
Romans II, Barth believed that neo-Protestant religion was religion in this form; it had 
understood and practised religion as if it were not a completely self-negating, sin- and 
idolatry-revealing, reality, but, rather, as if it were ‘that human capacity by which ‘all 
human occurrences are thought of as divine actions,’98 or as ‘the solemn music which 
accompanies all human experience’ (Schleiermacher).’99 In this ‘religion’ one was 
                                                          
96 The influence of existentialism, particularly of the Kierkegaardian variety, on Romans II, has 
been widely recognised. See McCormack, KBCRDT, chapter 2. While McCormack sees Kierkegaard’s 
influence as less determinative than others have, even he must acknowledge that, ‘it is beyond question 
that Kierkegaardian language and concepts play a significant role in Romans II’ (237). Barth himself was 
quite open about Kierkegaard’s influence: ‘...if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what 
Kierkegaard called ‘the infinite qualitative distinction’ between time and eternity, and to my regarding 
this as possessing negative as well as positive significance…’ (Romans, 10) 
 
97 Barth, Romans II, 236. 
 
98 Barth, Romans II, 257-258. 
 
99 Barth, Romans II, 258. 
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convinced that one’s ‘god’ was truly God, and was, therefore, not merely an idolater – 
as all people, and all religionists, are – but an unconscious, self-satisfied, idolater.  
In Barth’s most negative comments about religion in Romans II, the fault that he 
seeks to point out is not to be found with religion per se but rather with this particular, 
degenerate, form of its practice and use. The person who practises religion along these 
lines is like the person who strives to obey the law and, being satisfied with his or her 
own obedience, never recognises that he or she falls short of its standard, and, therefore, 
never allows him or herself to be brought under conviction or to a realisation of the 
need for grace. In such a case, the problem is not with the law but rather with the person 
who fails to understand the law and perceive its judgment.  
In Romans II, Barth demonstrated little interest in criticising religion per se as 
being essentially idolatrous. Rather, given that all human beings were idolaters, and 
religion, like the law, revealed sin and idolatry as such, he desired to hold forth the first 
possibility for the practice of religion – the one in which one perceives one’s own 
idolatry and sin as a disclosure of religion – and to argue for the avoidance of the 
second form of religion which leaves its practitioners undisturbed and self-satisfied in 
their idolatry. This explains the divergent remarks that Barth made in Romans II on the 
topic of religion. All religion involved idolatry. But the religion he disparaged was 
religion in the second form, and the religion about which he spoke lovingly and 
sympathetically, and enjoined upon others, was religion in the first form. ‘Religion is 
neither a thing to be enjoyed nor a thing to be celebrated: it must be borne as a yoke 
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which cannot be removed.’100 ‘Religion is not at all to be ‘in tune with the infinite’ or to 
be ‘at peace with oneself’...religion is an abyss: it is terror.’101 Again: 
Should we remove ourselves consciously or unconsciously from the dangerous 
ambiguity of religion, either we must take refuge in some other less exalted 
human possibility...or we must side-step into some ancient or modern variety of 
religion; and, if we are not fully aware of the ambiguity of all religion, to do so 
will mean inevitably that the alternative variety which we have selected will be a 
bad one.102 
 
The two forms of approach to and experience of religion under discussion were both 
human possibilities, such that Barth could exhort his contemporaries to choose one 
instead of the other. The essence of religion properly understood and practised was this: 
it was the location of the experience of sin and idolatry which reveals sin and idolatry as 
such. 
 
4.2.3 Barth’s Church Dogmatics period – as represented by the CD §17103 
The final stage to be mentioned in Barth’s thinking on the issues of religion and idolatry 
is that of his Church Dogmatics period, as represented by his treatment of religion in the 
CD I/2, §17.104 Within §17 Barth, in what Green calls his ‘formal theological definition 
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101 Barth, Romans II, 253. 
 
102 Barth, Romans II, 254. 
 
103 Quotations and citations of §17 are from Garrett Green’s recent translation of that paragraph 
(On Religion). Green’s translation is to be preferred to the original English translation for a number of 
reasons, perhaps most importantly because of its sensitivity to the two-fold meaning of the German 
Aufhebung, a term which plays a central role in Barth’s argument. Green translates Aufhebung as 
‘sublimation’ in an attempt to capture the positive aspect of the German term, which was obscured in the 
original translation of Aufhebung as ‘abolition.’  For a summary of the ways in which Green’s translation 
differs from, and is an improvement over, the original translation, see Green, ‘Translator’s Preface,’ pages 
vii-xi in On Religion, by Karl Barth (London: T&T Clark, 2006).  
 
104 Barth took up the issue of religion between Romans II and the CD §17 in a sustained way in 
§18 of his 1927 Chr.D., which was entitled ‘Die Gnade und die Religion.’ In this paragraph, Barth’s 
discussion of religion was, in general, very similar to that found with the CD §17, and it was, in 
particular, similar to the latter in the way in which it linked religion and idolatry. Barth wrote therein, for 
example, that: 
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of religion,’105 wrote that religion is, ‘the realm of attempts by man to justify and 
sanctify himself before a wilfully and arbitrarily devised image of God.’106 While this 
(highly evaluative107) definition of religion was intentionally broad and inclusive, and 
allowed Barth to consider a number of different realities which might be termed 
‘religion,’ his primary target remained religion as described by liberal Protestantism; 
not because he held that liberal Protestantism errantly defined religion, but rather, 
precisely because he accepted their definition of it.108 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Im Ereignis der Religion als solchem ist der Mensch der Schöpfer Gottes, ist Gott in 
bedenklichster Weise des Menschen Gott, Prädikat seines, des Menschen Wesens und 
Lebens...in der Religion als solcher macht sich der Mensch selbst seinen Gott, verehrt und 
verherrlicht er also auf einem kleinen Unweg letzlich sich selber. Beruht Religion auf der 
letzten, tiefsten Möglichkeit der menschlichen Seele, so ist sie als dieses Ereignis, in sich 
betrachtet, gewiß auch der letzt und tiefste Akt des Widerspruchs gegen Gott, in dem der 
Mensch existiert, die offen ausbrechende Empörung, die Sünde gegen das erste Gebot, neben der 
alle anderen nur abgeleitete Bedeutung haben können. (415-416) 
Barth’s discussion of religion in §17 is, however, more detailed and comprehensive, and so it is to it that 
attention is directed here. 
 
105 Garrett Green, ‘Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth’s Theory of Religion,’ 
The Journal of Religion 75, 4 (1995): 476-477. 
 
106 Barth, On Religion, 33. 
 
107 Indeed, Strenski has critiqued this definition of religion as being not a definition at all, but 
rather an evaluation. (Ivan Strenski, ‘On ‘Religion’ and its Despisers,’ in What is Religion?: Origins, 
Definitions, & Explanations, ed. Thomas A. Idinopulos and Brian C. Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 114) 
While Strenksi perhaps has a point, what he seems to desire is value-neutral and completely 
philosophically- or empirically-derived definition of religion. This is precisely what Barth believes that he 
cannot offer if he is to define and discuss religion theologically, from the perspective of revelation. 
According to Barth, ‘...what we learn from God’s revelation about the essence of religion does not allow 
us to make any but the most incidental use of an immanent definition of the essence of religion derived 
from elsewhere.’ (Barth, On Religion, 53) 
 
108 It is clear, for example, that in §17, religion is a universally human reality, and that the 
various particular world religions are objective instantiations of religion in general, and can be considered 
and measured as such. The Christian religion, according to Barth, ‘stands in a series along with other 
human faces…seen from this angle it is surely remarkable but not unique. (On Religion, 34) Greggs 
rightly acknowledges this: ‘Barth seems to concede to Schleiermacher the universal nature of religion, 
and Christianity’s belonging to that genus.’ (Greggs, TAR, 26) Further, Barth implicitly affirmed the 
viewpoint of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule among others, by stating in §17 that religion is a ‘human, 
historically and psychologically comprehensible phenomenon, into whose nature, structure and value one 
may enquire as in the case of other human phenomena…’ (On Religion, 34) Others who rightly note that 
the liberal Protestant concept of religion was in view in §17 include Loy (‘Relation of Christianity,’ 95), 
Aagaard (‘Revelation and Religion,’ 158: ‘religion is constantly understood in a liberal manner’), and 
Kraus (TR, 23: ‘Die Rechtfertigungslehre ist es, die in eine tödliche Kollision mit dem 
neuprotestantlichen Verständnis von der »christlicher Religion« gerät. In dieser Kollision wird 
Religionskritik erweckt.’) 
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When, during this period, it came to question (1), Barth’s position remained the 
same as it had been at the time of Romans II; if anything, it was presented more 
explicitly. Revelation and religion could in no sense be identified and, thus, the 
affording of roles to religion which properly belong to revelation alone, e.g., the roles of 
source, object and norm in theology, constituted the idolatrous replacement of 
revelation with religion. This kind of ‘religionism,’ according to Barth in §17, had a 
history within the theological tradition stretching back to at least Walaeus and the 1624 
Leiden Synopsis,109 and was carried on in more recent times within liberal 
Protestantism.110  It is perhaps clearer in §17 than anywhere else that Barth believed that 
Protestant liberalism was guilty of this kind of idolisation of religion within theology, 
and that it was because of the kind of ‘religionism’ that it represented that the topic of 
religion had to be treated within theology.111 
Barth’s solution to the problem of idolatry resident within ‘religionism,’ long in 
place in practice, but clearly articulated in §17 as such, was the methodological 
affording of the roles of source, norm and object in theology to revelation, and thus, by 
implication, the displacement of ‘religion’ from those roles. Liberal theologians had 
spoken of and evaluated everything, including particular religions and their particular 
‘revelations’ (among which they believed Jesus Christ ought to be ranged), from the 
perspective of religion. The way beyond this idolatry was, for Barth, for theology to 
speak of human religion (and, indeed, all else) from the perspective of revelation, i.e., 
                                                          
109 Barth, On Religion, 38-39. 
 
110 Barth, On Religion, 46.  
 
111 Barth, On Religion, 37-46. 
 
180 
 
 
 
Jesus Christ, and Holy Scripture112 understood in its testimony to him: ‘It is basically a 
matter of re-establishing the order of the concepts revelation and religion in such a way 
that the relationship between them becomes comprehensible again as identical with that 
event between God and man in which God is God...’113  
It is important to note that Barth spoke of re-establishing the order of the 
concepts of revelation and religion as the way beyond religionistic idolatry. As has been 
suggested previously in this work (especially in chapter 3), the logic of Barth’s thought 
was such that theologian could not possess revelation itself as he or she would need to 
do were he or she to be able to, in the strict sense, afford it the roles which it ought to 
hold within theology. Thus, in the strict sense, something other than revelation always 
held the roles that revelation should hold within human theology, and human theology 
was always, therefore, intrinsically idolatrous. The best that the theologian could do was 
to select his or her concepts, including those which would hold the roles of source, 
object and norm, in correspondence to revelation – in the way proper to and possible for 
the creature – and therefore have reason to hope that, by God’s grace, revelation would 
be given as theology’s object.  
Barth could not have said that the theologian must overcome religionism by 
displacing the concept of religion with revelation as the holder of the roles of the source, 
object and norm in theology in the strict sense. He could only urge the replacement of 
                                                          
112 Barth, On Religion, 51, 33. It is thus potentially misleading even to say with Green that Barth 
‘secures [his argument] biblically’ (Green, ‘Introduction,’ 17) in his exegetical excurses in §17. Barth 
does not use Scripture simply to secure what he had already wanted to say about religion, but rather seeks 
to derive everything that he says about religion from Scripture. 
 
113 Barth, On Religion, 52. Emphasis original. Similarly, Barth wrote in 1938 (How I Changed 
my Mind, ed. John Godsey (Edinburgh: Saint Andrews Press, 1969), 37, emphasis original): ‘Shall I say 
something about the change in my thinking about religion in the last ten years? Then let me say first of all 
that my thinking in any event remains at one point the same as ever. It is unchanged in this, that not so-
called ‘religion’ is its object, its source, and its criterion, but rather, as far as it can be my intention, the 
Word of God.’ 
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the concept of religion with a human concept of revelation, shaped by actual revelation. 
But since the human concept of revelation is infinitely different than revelation itself, 
just as is the concept of religion, those who heed Barth’s admonitions find themselves 
no less complicit in the act of idolatry than the religionistic theologians. They, too, 
afford to that which is created a role which belongs properly only to revelation. The 
reason that Barth argued against religionism, and for a theology which utilises a concept 
of revelation in the places in which religionism utilises the concept of religion, was not 
that the former was intrinsically idolatrous and the latter was not. It was, rather, that, 
both of them being intrinsically idolatrous, the latter, unlike the former, corresponded to 
revelation itself, and, therefore, there was reason to expect that God in God’s grace 
would give revelation to be its object, and that its idolatry would be overcome. When it 
is stated that Barth believed that theology must speak of religion (and, indeed, all else) 
from the perspective of revelation rather than vice versa if idolatry is to be avoided, it 
must be understood in this way: religion (and all else) must be spoken of from the 
perspective of revelation in the way in which it is possible for the creature to speak from 
the perspective of revelation: in creaturely correspondence to it, which in turn means 
from the perspective of a human concept of revelation shaped by actual revelation, such 
that one might have reason to hope in God for the overcoming of idolatry. 
The fact that Barth sought to speak of religion only from the perspective of 
revelation in this sense, i.e., to offer a properly theological account of religion, in the 
CD §17, was determinative for his discussion of it, both formally and materially. 
Formally, it was because Barth sought to speak of religion from the perspective of 
revelation that his approach to it was not firstly phenomenological or philosophical. 
Barth even denied that his definition of religion was substantially influenced by 
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empirical data; he wrote that: ‘What we learn from God’s revelation about the essence 
of religion does not allow us to make any but the most incidental use of an immanent 
definition of the essence of religion derived from elsewhere.’114 While the possibility of 
deriving any definition of religion (including the one Barth offers in §17) directly from 
revelation without reference to phenomena may seem doubtful, the major point remains: 
Barth was not interested, in his discussion of religion, in entering into a 
phenomenological study of the varieties of religious consciousness, belief and practice; 
his understanding of religion was determined a priori by what he believed he heard in 
revelation.115 
 Barth’s material judgments concerning the essence of religion in §17 must also 
be understood as attempts to speak of religion from the perspective of revelation: to bear 
witness to revelation in the way possible for human beings, and to interpret Holy 
Scripture. As will be seen Barth, in §17, levelled some very strong judgments against 
religion. He did not understand these as merely human judgments, but rather as human 
attempts to bear witness to the divine judgment heard in revelation.116 According to 
him, what is said in theology about religion ‘can have nothing to do with a negative [or, 
indeed, a positive] value judgment. It contains no judgment based on religious studies or 
philosophy of religion...’117 Rather, ‘we must allow [revelation’s verdict on religion] to 
                                                          
114 Barth, On Religion, 53. 
 
115 D.T. Niles recounts that he once asked Barth how he knew that Hinduism was ‘unbelief’ (a 
term with which Barth labelled all religion in §17, as will be seen) given that Barth had never met a 
Hindu.  Barth’s simple response was, ‘A priori.’ (Daniel Thambyrajah Niles, ‘Karl Barth: A Personal 
Memory,’ South East Asia Journal of Theology 11 (1969): 10-11. Cited in Pan-chui Lai, ‘Barth’s 
Theology of Religion and the Asian Context of Religious Pluralism,’ Asia Journal of Theology 15, 2 
(2001): 247). 
 
116 Barth, On Religion, 55, 56, 72. 
 
117 Barth, On Religion, 55. 
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stand and be valid as divine judgment...’118 ‘It is by God’s revelation in Jesus Christ and 
it alone by which this characterization of religion...can really be carried out.’119 
Clearly, Barth’s theology provides no license for the levelling of independent, 
human judgments against religion (whether from the perspective of mysticism or 
atheism, or some other), and has very little in common with them. Such critiques can 
never be finally effective in any case, for all human judgments originate from points 
within ‘the magic circle of religion.’120 In other words, all human beings – including the 
atheist and the mystic – are, for Barth, religious,121 and so all human attacks upon 
religion come themselves from the perspective of religion in some form. Thus, human 
criticisms of religion, or even attempts to eradicate it, can never be successful because 
they always, ultimately, whether implicitly or explicitly, presuppose and recommend 
religion in another form. Truly penetrating and effective critique of religion can only 
come from ‘outside the magic circle of religion,’122 that is, not from human beings, but 
from revelation. It is revelation alone which ‘signifies a real and dangerous assault upon 
[religion]...in comparison to which the books of mysticism and atheism can only be 
described as utterly harmless.’123  
At the same time, Barth clearly did not believe that the fact of the exclusive 
efficacy of revelation’s critique of religion ought to silence the theologian on the topic; 
on the contrary, since theology had to testify to revelation, it demanded that the 
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119 Barth, On Religion, 72. 
 
120 Barth, On Religion, 83. 
 
121 Barth, On Religion, 83. 
 
122 Barth, On Religion, 83. 
 
123 Barth, On Religion, 72. 
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theologian (and, indeed, the Christian) testify to it, repeat it, explain it, and expound 
it.124 While the judgment upon religion must be allowed to ‘stand and be valid as divine 
judgment’ on all religion, it must also ‘be made visible from time to time in the shape of 
specific devaluations and negations’125 – as Barth himself made it in §17. Thus di Noia 
is perhaps misleading when he writes that, in Barth, ‘the judgment [on religion] is 
emphatically not one that is pronounced upon the world of non-Christian religions by 
Christianity and its representatives.’126 This statement is accurate in that this judgment’s 
origin does not lie with Christianity and its representatives, and that any judgment upon 
religion cannot only be directed against non-Christian religions, for (as will be seen) the 
Christian religion is in solidarity with the rest, such that whatever is said about the rest 
must apply to it also. But having heard revelation’s judgment upon religion, and having 
first applied it to the Christian religion, Barth believed that Christians could and must 
re-pronounce it also over the world of non-Christian religions.  More recently, 
Ensminger has made a similar claim to that of di Noia, to the effect that for Barth the 
critique of religion is a ‘divine judgment through revelation without a corresponding 
human judgment.’127 Barth’s own statements that religion is ‘unbelief,’ ‘idolatry,’ and 
‘works-righteousness’ are not independent human judgments, but what are they if not 
human judgments upon religion which seek to correspond to the divine judgment upon 
it? 
                                                          
124 Barth, On Religion, 55.  
 
125 Barth, On Religion, 58.  
 
126 Di Noia, ‘Religion and the Religions,’ 250. 
 
127 Sven Ensminger, Karl Barth’s Theology as a Resource for a Christian Theology of Religions 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 69. Emphasis original. See also, similarly, Busch, The Great Passion, 141 
and Kornelis H. Miskotte, When the Gods are Silent, trans. John W. Doberstein (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1967), 66-67. 
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While ultimately aiming to speak of the possibility and reality of ‘true religion’ 
in the CD §17, Barth’s evaluation of religion’s intrinsic essence (which was meant to be 
a repetition of that of revelation) was unequivocally negative; much more negative than 
it had been in Romans II. For while in Romans II Barth believed that religion was the 
experience of sin, idolatry and godlessness which revealed (like the law) sin, idolatry 
and godlessness as such, by the time of the CD §17 he had abandoned this idea. This 
shift was due to deeper changes in his understanding of revelation and its exclusivity 
which caused him to deny that even negative knowledge of God could be gained apart 
from revelation, and which have been described elsewhere in the present work.128 No 
longer being able to understand religion as having the salutary effect of revealing sin 
and idolatry as such, he came to see the judgment of revelation upon the intrinsic 
essence of religion of even the most self-negating kind as being that it is merely a form 
of sin and idolatry. Barth’s answer to question (2), at this time was simply that religion 
is at its essence idolatry. Many commentators have failed to perceive the true nature of 
the shift in Barth’s evaluation of the essence of religion from positive (in Romans II) to 
sharply negative (in the CD §17) in general, and from seeing it as revelatory of idolatry 
and in that way salutary (in Romans II) to itself merely idolatry and therefore a 
necessary evil (in the CD §17), in particular.129 
                                                          
128 See 2.2.3.3. In §17 in particular, see Barth, On Religion, 60 for a description of Barth’s 
understanding of revelation as revealing its own exclusivity as the source of the knowledge of God. It is 
clear that by this time Barth understood revelation to be the sole source of both positive and negative 
knowledge of God – on the basis, he would no doubt argue, of revelation itself. Thus, (religious) 
existential experience could no longer provide even negative knowledge of God. 
 
129 Some have, for example, failed to perceive any shift between the evaluation of religion in 
Romans II and that in the CD §17, or have seen any shift as being superficial. Within this group are 
Friedrich Heiler, McCormack, Green, Braaten, and Kim. Heiler writes that, ‘Ein leidenschaftliches 
Anathem gegen Religion wurde von der Barthschen Theologie ausgesprochen,’ and cites Romans II as 
evidence. (Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1961), 5) 
This is, however, to read Barth’s mature position back into Romans II. McCormack overstates the 
negativity of Barth’s evaluation of religion in Romans II, which is logical given the fact that he wrongly 
denies that Barth believed, at this time, that (properly religious) existential experience could offer true, 
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 Revelation, for Barth, encountered human beings within the field of religion, 
and particularly the Christian religion. It is in that encounter, in which there occurs a 
‘sublimation’130 of religion by revelation, that revelation’s judgment upon religion may 
be perceived. The German term for sublimation (Aufhebung) as is now widely 
recognised, is poorly translated in the original English translation of the CD as 
‘abolition,’ such that the title of the CD §17 is made to read, ‘The Revelation of God as 
                                                                                                                                                                          
negative knowledge of God and self and world in relation to God. (KBCRDT, 282-283; 260-261) Green, 
on the other hand, points precisely to the change in Barth’s thinking which undergirded the transition in 
his thinking on religion and its relationship to idolatry between the time of Romans II and the time of the 
the CD §17:  the shift from an existentialist anthropology, and a belief in the human existential experience 
of religion as capable of granting knowledge to the human being of his or her predicament before God, to 
a more thorough christocentrism, which would not allow that even this knowledge could be gained from 
any other place than in revelation. (Green, ‘Introduction,’ 9) He downplays the effect of this shift, 
however, when he states that ‘Nothing that [Barth] says about religion [in Romans 7] is incompatible with 
his later views,’ (Green, ‘Introduction,’ 9) and he repeats this judgment elsewhere: ‘It would be difficult 
to find an assertion in [Romans 7] that Barth would repudiate later.’ (Green, ‘Challenging the Canon,’ 
476) In actuality, Barth’s rejection of the possibility of (religious) existential experience affording 
negative knowledge of God and self in relation to God had an enormous effect upon his evaluation of the 
essence of religion, and there are a number of statements which Barth made in Romans 7 about religion 
that he would have to later repudiate, even if only implicitly, as a result of it. For example: ‘Religion 
compels us to the perception that God is not to be found in religion.’ (Romans II, 246) Carl Braaten also 
downplays the change in Barth’s evaluation of religion between the time of Romans II and that of the CD 
§17. He notes that, ‘A distinction between Barth’s earlier and later periods in speaking of the world 
religions can be observed,’ but then equivocates: ‘I am not prepared to argue that he changed his mind of 
contradicted himself, nor can I claim he repeated himself.’ (No Other Gospel! Christianity among the 
World’s Religions (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 53-54) In actual fact, as argued, there was a very 
significant change in Barth’s thinking between these two works. Kim, too, sees Barth’s view of religion 
as very negative in Romans II (see footnote 79 above) but downplays the negativity of it in §17. (Über 
Religion, 52-55) Some have understood the shift in Barth’s evaluation of the essence of religion from 
Romans II to the CD §17 the wrong way round, seeing it as a transition from a completely negative to a 
less negative evaluation of religion’s essence. An exemplar of this view is Zachhuber (‘Religion vs. 
Revelation,’ 312). It is van der Kooi who seems to most clearly understand the shift between Romans II 
and the CD §17 on this matter: he writes that while ‘Im zweiten Römerbrief ist der Ton noch beinahe 
liebevoll, sympathisch,’ ‘Wenn ich es richtig sehe, hat sich 1938 etwas verschoben. Die Religion ist jetzt 
zu einer Gefährdung der Humanität geworden.’ (‘Religion als Unglaube,’ 449) Others who seem to 
properly understand this shift between Romans 7 and §17 include Osgood Darby Cannon III (‘The 
Concept of Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth’ (PhD Dissertation, Drew University, 1975), esp. pp. 
110, 132) and Paul Knitter (‘Christomonism in Karl Barth’s Evaluation of the Non-Christian Religions,’ 
Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 13 (1971): 99-121, 106). Knitter 
sees Nürnberger’s (‘Glaube und Religion bei Karl Barth: Analyse und Kritik der Verhältnisbestimmung 
zwischen dem Christlichen Glauben und den Anderen Religionen in §17 der ‘Kirchlichen Dogmatik’ Karl 
Barths’ (Doktors der Theologie Dissertation, Philipps-Universität Marburg/Lahn, 1967) argument as 
correctly seeing the shift between Romans 7 and §17 as owing itself to a shift from philosophical 
categories to more complete Christocentrism, but he critiques Nürnberger by stating that the latter failed 
to perceive the material difference that this made in Barth’s evaluation of religion. Knitter himself rightly 
sees that this shift led to a more negative evaluation of religion in §17 compared to that found in Romans. 
 
130 ‘Sublimation’ is the term used by Green to translate the German Aufhebung in his 2006 
translation of §17, entitled On Religion: The Revelation of God as the Sublimation of Religion. 
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the Abolition of Religion.’ This translation wrongly gives the impression that Barth 
believed that the entrance of revelation into the realm of human religion meant only the 
destruction of religion by revelation.131 In actual fact, while the idea of revelation’s 
Aufhebung/sublimation of religion does contain this negative aspect, it also contains a 
positive aspect though the latter has been frequently neglected.132 As Green notes, while 
the term Aufhebung and its cognates indeed include the ideas of ‘abolish,’ ‘annul,’ or 
‘suspend,’ they also include the meanings ‘to lift up,’ ‘to preserve,’ or ‘to save.’133 
Perhaps the best that can be done in English in order to communicate what Barth meant 
by referring to revelation’s two-sided sublimation/Aufhebung of religion is to speak of 
revelation’s mortification and vivification of religion.134  
When revelation mortifies religion, according to Barth, it exposes it as being, at 
its very essence, idolatrous. Barth treated of this mortifying moment of revelation’s 
encounter with religion under the heading ‘Religion as Faithlessness [Unglaube].’135 
Indeed, it is Barth’s preferred manner of speaking to describe the mortifying of religion 
as being its exposure as essentially Unglaube. Yet this section could just as well have 
been entitled ‘Religion as Idolatry,’ because, as has been previously argued, unbelief 
and idolatry were, for Barth, two ways of describing the same reality, since unbelief in 
                                                          
131 As Chistian Link (‘Der Religionsbegriff Karl Barths: Einleitung in KD I/2, §17,’ Zeitschrift 
für dialektische Theologie 19, 1 (2003): 10) rightly says: ‘Barth zielt in §17 keineswegs auf ein 
Abschaffung [abolition] oder auch nur Tabuisierung der Religion. Das thematische Stichwort der 
‘Aufhebung’ meint etwas durchaus anderes.’ See also Wolf Krötke, Der Mensch und die Religion nach 
Karl Barth (Zurich: TVZ, 1981), 13. 
 
132 In, for example, Hendrik Kraemer, Religion and the Christian Faith (London: Lutterworth, 
1956), esp. pp. 185-196. 
 
133 Garrett Green, ‘Religion,’ in The Westminster Handbook to Karl Barth, ed. Richard Burnett 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2013), 180.  
 
134 It is important, however, that one not read too much into these terms at this stage but, rather, 
let their meanings be filled out in the exposition below. 
 
135 Barth, On Religion, 53-84. 
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revelation never takes the form of pure negation, but always takes the form, rather, of 
the substitution of that which is created for revelation: ‘...in religion man resists and 
closes himself off to revelation by creating a substitute for it,’136 ‘putting a human 
contraption in place of the divine handiwork.’137  
Barth argued that as revelation encounters religion it contradicts it ‘just as 
religion had previously contradicted revelation...’138 If faith [Glaube] is the human 
action which corresponds to revelation, the fact that revelation contradicts human action 
within the realm of religion reveals that the latter, at least in the absolute sense, does not 
correspond to revelation, and is, therefore, Unglaube. Viewed differently, as revelation 
displaces that which religion had, in its Unglaube in revelation substituted for 
revelation, it reveals them to have been substitutes, and, therefore, religion to be 
idolatrous. Barth considered God’s revelation under two aspects: the cognitive, in which 
God offers Godself to human beings to be known,139 and the reconciliatory, in which 
God reconciles human beings to Godself.140 The Unglaube that is religion is the 
complete human failure to properly correspond to either aspect.141 And, once more, this 
                                                          
136 Barth, On Religion, 59. Emphasis added. 
 
137 Barth, On Religion, 57. 
 
138 Barth, On Religion, 59. 
 
139 Barth, On Religion, 57ff. 
 
140 Barth, On Religion, 64ff. Hartmut Ruddies correctly writes that, for Barth: ‘Offenbarung ist 
nicht nur in einem technischen Sinn die Voraussetzung von Gotteserkenntnis, sondern sie ist immer auch 
in einer substantiellen Weise Offenbarung des göttlichen Für-uns-Seins, Offenbarung der Versöhnung 
Gottes mit dem Menschen.’ (‘Christologie und Versöhnungslehre bei Karl Barth,’ Zeitschrift für 
dialektische Theologie 18, 2 (2002): 175)  
 
141 Avery Dulles (Revelation Theology: A History (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 95), 
for one, understates matters when he writes that, for Barth, ‘…religion, even in a Christian context, is to 
some extent a perversion of revelation.’  
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Unglaube takes the form of the replacement of revelation in each of these aspects with 
that which is created, such that the essence of religion is, for Barth, two-fold idolatry. 
Firstly, the Unglaube of religion that corresponds (or fails to correspond) to the 
cognitive aspect of revelation involves the refusal of the knowledge of God offered in 
Jesus Christ in the form of the establishing of a ‘wilfully and arbitrarily devised image 
of God’142 in the place of Jesus Christ. Barth notes that, ‘Here ‘willfully and arbitrarily’ 
just means for the moment ‘out of [one’s] own means, [one’s] own insight, will-power 
and energy.’’143 The particular ‘image’ of God that religion substitutes for the 
knowledge of God given in Jesus Christ may have merely conceptual existence, or also 
extra-conceptual existence; it is ‘that reality, seen or thought, in which man assumes and 
asserts something Real, Ultimate, Decisive beyond or even within his own existence, by 
which he in turn takes himself to be posited or at least determined or conditioned.’144 It 
is as revelation encounters religion, and Jesus Christ is known to be the only image of 
God, that images of God universally erected in the practice of religion are seen to be 
false images of God, merely created substitutes for the revelation of God, and, thus, 
idols.145 Throughout §17, Barth explicitly refers to this form of the Unglaube which is 
religion’s essence, the substituting of created images of God for God’s revelation, as 
idolatry [Götzendienst]. 
                                                          
142 Barth, On Religion, 33. 
 
143 Barth, On Religion, 58. The connection between the religious concept of God and the 
speculative concept of God, and, therefore, also the concept of God of natural theology, is a close one. 
Jenson rightly states that, ‘By ‘natural theology’ Barth means the reflecting about God which occurs in 
the course of our religious quest.’ (God After God, 70. Emphasis added.) See also Christoph Kock, 
Natürliche Theologie: Ein evangelischer Streitbegriff (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2001), 
50. 
 
144 Barth, On Religion, 58. 
 
145 Barth, On Religion, 59. 
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Secondly, the Unglaube of religion that corresponds (or fails to correspond) to 
the reconciliatory aspect of God’s revelation involves the replacement of that 
reconciliation with one’s own moral striving, undertaken in service of the idol which 
one has fashioned. ‘Religion is the realm of attempts by man to justify and sanctify 
himself before a wilfully and arbitrarily devised image of God.’146 These efforts, 
according to Barth, most often take the form of, sacrifice, prayer, asceticism [and] 
morality.’147 This replacement of the reconciliation with God offered in Jesus Christ is 
an ethical or practical form of idolatry, and Barth’s analysis of it bears resemblance to 
Luther’s critique of works-righteousness (which he cited at some length).148 Barth did 
not specifically designate this phenomenon as idolatry in §17, and, at times, 
distinguished between it and the first aspect of religion’s Unglaube by referring to the 
latter as idolatry and the former as ‘works-righteousness.’149 But there is no doubt that 
works-righteousness is also idolatry according to Barth’s own definition,150 and this in 
two ways. First, it ascribes to one’s own works a role that properly belongs only to 
Jesus Christ: that of justifier and sanctifier. Second, the works themselves, in being acts 
of service to ‘wilfuly and arbitrarily devised images’ as if they were God, ascribe to 
those images the role of God. It is again as revelation encounters human beings in the 
realm of religion, and God in God’s revelation is seen to be the sole justifier and 
sanctifier (and the only one worthy of divine service) that the negative implications of 
                                                          
146 Barth, On Religion, 33. Emphasis added. 
 
147 Barth, On Religion, 66. 
 
148 Boulton, GAR, 164. 
 
149 See, for example, Barth, On Religion, 75. 
 
150 It is clear, also, etymologically, that this practical, lived ascription of that which belongs to 
God alone to some other aspect of created reality, and not simply the conceptual or physical formation of 
images, is in view in the NT biblical term εἰδωλολατρία. 
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this are also brought into view: that one’s own efforts of works-righteousness were only 
creaturely substitutions for the true justifier and sanctifier, and that they were thus idols, 
and that the ‘god’ worshiped in one’s efforts of works-righteousness was only a created 
substitute for the true God (and thus an idol).151 
Barth did not specify the exact nature of the relationship between cognitive 
idolatry and the practical idolatry of works-righteousness. He confessed his ignorance 
as to which came first and generated the other, and also suggested that the question was 
relatively unimportant: ‘Might sacrifice, prayer, asceticism, and morality and religion be 
more primitive than God and the gods? Who is to say? In face of these two possibilities 
we surely find ourselves in a circle that can be looked at and understood one way or the 
other with the same result.’152 But even if chronological priority cannot be definitively 
assigned to either of these two forms of idolatry, it is clear that, for Barth, they stand in 
the closest of relationships to one another. They always exist together, and together 
constitute the essence of religion. The devising of an idolatrous image of God, if that 
image is truly regarded as God, implies service or worship of that image in some form; 
and because such images are unable to dispense grace to their devotees, dependent as 
they are upon those devotees for their own existence, the service and worship of them 
can only be a form of works-righteousness. Viewed from the other angle, works-
righteousness requires its practitioners to posit an idolatrous image of God before whom 
they seek to justify and sanctify themselves, and to whom their efforts and strivings are 
directed, since any God who requires and accepts human attempts at self-justification 
can only be an idol. Since religion was, at its essence, idolatry in this two-fold way, and 
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since all human beings participated, for Barth, in religion, all human beings were also, 
for him, religious idolaters – again, in this two-fold way: ‘Precisely this capacity to be 
in the world and to be human is, as man’s own capacity, identical with the capacity to 
devise and fashion gods and to justify and sanctify himself.’153 
The Christian religion and its practitioners, far from being exempted from 
revelation’s critical, mortifying judgment upon all religions and religionists, are indicted 
by it first of all: ‘...it is incumbent upon us precisely as Christians to allow this judgment 
to apply first and most acutely to ourselves.’154 The judgment of revelation, and 
therefore of the theologian, upon religion is ‘aimed not only at various others with their 
religion, but rather first of all at ourselves as members of the Christian religion.’155 This 
is because it is the Christian religion in which revelation is received, and which is, 
therefore, most directly contradicted and revealed to be idolatrous by it. Since 
Christianity is, essentially and intrinsically, a religion like all others, the revelation that 
the Christian religion is essentially idolatry is indirectly, by extension, a revelation that 
the same is true for all religions. Since this is the pattern of revelation’s idolatry-critique 
of religion, it must also be the pattern of the idolatry-critique of religion of the 
theologian who seeks to bear witness to revelation: he or she must criticise the Christian 
religion as idolatry first and foremost, but must also, secondarily, level the same critique 
against all religion and religions. Christians are to understand the judgment of revelation 
on religion as applicable to other religions ‘only to the extent that we recognize 
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ourselves in them – i.e., to the extent that we recognize that the truth of this judgment of 
revelation applies to us and encounters us.’156 
This being the case, two opposing interpretations of Barth on religion are both 
shown to be inaccurate. In the first place, there are some interpreters of Barth, such as 
Richardson and Parrinder, who claim that he did not think of Christianity as a religion at 
all, and that his critique of religion was not meant to affect Christianity, but was, rather, 
meant to be levelled only against other world religions.157 Barth explicitly denied the 
idea that Christianity was not a religion:  
These reflections could not, therefore, be understood as a polemic against the 
non-Christian religions that might have served as preparation for the proposition 
that the Christian religion is the true religion, so that our only further task would 
be to show that the Christian religion, in contrast to the non-Christian ones, is 
not guilty of idolatry and works-righteousness, hence is not faithlessness but 
faith, and hence the true religion–or to show (which comes to the same thing in 
the end) that the Christian religion is not a religion at all... 158 
 
Far from Barth seeking to protect Christianity from the critique that theology had to 
level against all religion in obedience to revelation, Barth held that Christianity was, 
properly, its primary object.  
On the other hand, there are others who wrongly suggest that Barth’s critique of 
religion as idolatry was not meant to be levelled against particular world religions at all, 
but, rather, only against human religiosity as understood by liberalism. Forms of this 
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157 See Alan Richardson, Religion in Contemporary Debate (London: SCM Press, 1966), 18; 
Geoffrey Parrinder, Comparative Religion (London: Sheldon Press, 1976), 48. See also Hans Strauss, 
‘Krisis der Religion oder Kritik der Religionen?!?,’ in ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ: Karl Barth zum Achtzigsten 
Geburtstag (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1966), especially p. 306. 
 
158 Barth, On Religion, 86. Barth, later in life, would write, in apparent contradiction, ‘Das 
Christentum ist keine Religion.’ (‘Christentum,’ 182. Emphasis original.) Yet even this does not 
necessarily indicate a reversal of Barth’s position; rather, in this context, it seems that he was seeking to 
differentiate Christianity from other world religions in the same way that he did in §17: without denying 
that, considered according to its intrinsic features, it remained ultimately in solidarity with them. 
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misinterpretation of Barth have been propagated by Loy, Lai, Harrison, Aagaard and, to 
a lesser extent, Chestnutt.159 As suggested above, Barth sought to criticise religion as 
described by liberal Protestantism. But he believed, still in keeping with liberalism 
itself, that the liberal (and especially Feuerbachian) conception of religion as the 
actualisation of a human capacity rightly identified the generative principle and core of 
all particular, empirical world religions, such that the latter also could, and, indeed, had 
to be, subjected to the critique of idolatry. That this was the case can be surmised from 
the way in which Barth moved easily, and without explanation, from discussing 
‘religion’ to discussing particular world religions such as Christianity160 and Pure Land 
Buddhism.161 
 Revelation mortifies all religiosity and all of its objective manifestations, 
revealing their intrinsic essence to be idolatry in this two-fold way. Yet revelation also 
vivifies the religion in the realm of which it is granted. Barth considered the religion 
                                                          
159 See Loy, ‘Relation of Christianity,’ 269; Lai, ‘Theology of Religion,’ 250; Peter Harrison, 
‘Karl Barth and the Non-Christian Religions,’ Journal of Ecumenical Studies 23, 2 (1986): 215; Aagaard, 
‘Revelation and Religion,’ 158; and Glenn A. Chestnutt, Challenging the Stereotype: The Theology of 
Karl Barth as a Resource for Inter-religious Encounter in a European Context (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), 
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160 Barth, On Religion, 34.  
 
161 Barth, On Religion, 101-106. Knitter is thus right to say that, ‘All that Barth says [in §17] 
about religion in general can apply to every religion.’ (‘Christomonism,’ 106, n. 20) And DiNoia is right 
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developed organizations and recognizable institutions (dogmas, rituals, and so on).’ (‘Religion and the 
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understood to suggest that his earlier criticism of religion was not addressed to particular world religions; 
when questioned concerning his statement that ‘Religion ist Unglaube’ he responded: ‘Aber wenn ich von 
Religion rede, dann denke ich doch vor allem an Schleiermacher und an seine Folgen. Vom Hinduismus 
und Buddhismus weiß ich doch nichts oder nur wenig.’ (‘Interview von H.A. Fischer,’ 145. Emphasis 
added.) If by this Barth intended to suggest that his critique of religion as idolatry did not apply to 
Hinduism and Buddhism (and it is not completely clear that this was his intention), then this is a 
revisionist understanding of §17 that does not fit with the textual evidence of §17 itself. That Barth, in 
conformity with Protestant liberalism, consistently understood ‘religion’ as a genus to which particular 
world religions belonged has been recognised and often, more recently, made the target of critique. See 
for example Geoff Thompson, ‘Christianity and World Religions: The Judgment of Karl Barth,’ Pacifica: 
Australian Theological Studies 7 (1994): 200-203. 
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which is vivified by revelation under the heading ‘True Religion.’ Though this second, 
positive aspect of revelation’s Aufhebung of religion has often been neglected,162 it was, 
in Barth’s thinking, for the sake of the vivification of religion that God in God’s 
revelation mortifies religion, and, thus, it was for Barth with a view to the discussion of 
true, vivified religion that he had to discuss religion’s mortification. The flow of §17’s 
argument is towards the discussion of ‘true religion,’ and the negative assertions which 
Barth makes about religion should be understood as an attempt to specify negatively in 
what sense Christianity might said to be the true religion. Further, §17 as a whole is 
situated within a broader section within the CD, the final paragraph of which is §18, 
‘The Life of the Children of God.’ Within the latter, Barth wrote, ‘Since this section 
[which included §17] as a whole is concerned with revelation in its manward aspect, it 
is obvious that the object of this final discussion can only be man himself as the 
recipient of revelation, i.e., believing and perceiving man.’163 The main goal of both §17 
and the section in which it was situated was the exposition of the reality of true religion 
– religion which truly had to do with God. Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry must 
be understood in that light, and, therefore, as motivated even in its most negative 
moments by a fundamentally positive intention. 
 The possibility of true, vivified, religion is always only a possibility for God, 
actualised by the giving of revelation – unlike in Romans II, in which true and false 
religion were both human possibilities. At all times, all human religion remains, 
intrinsically and essentially, idolatry. When Ensminger states that ‘Barth never sees a 
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world without religion as attainable or even desirable’164 he is correct in suggesting that 
religion, for the Barth of the CD §17, cannot be avoided, but wrong to suggest that, on 
Barth’s terms, there is nothing desirable about the prospect of the abolition (in the sense 
of eradication) of religion: the essence of religion, after all, is unbelief and idolatry. But 
just as revelation justifies some intrinsically idolatrous doctrines of God, causing them 
to be more than merely idolatrous, so, too does God’s gracious self-giving in revelation 
justify a certain form of religion, causing it to truly have God as the object of its thought 
and worship. Barth did not hesitate to specify that the form of religion for which God 
does this is the Christian religion: ‘…the Christian religion is the true religion.’165 The 
Christian religion, for Barth, was not the true religion due to anything belonging to its 
intrinsic essence; not contra liberal Protestantism due to the fact that among the world 
religions it most fully instantiated and expressed religion in general: ‘Not even the 
distinction of the church as the site of true religion, which is indeed given with 
revelation, is to be understood in such a way as to imply that the Christian religion as 
such were the fulfilled essence of human religion, or that the Christian religion was for 
that reason the true religion and fundamentally superior to the other religions.’166 Nor 
was it the true religion even because it was a religion of grace (in the sense that it gives 
a human idea of grace a place of theological priority).167 For Barth, Christianity was the 
true religion due to God’s gracious election of it to be justified and the recipient of 
God’s revelation. Its being the true religion depends wholly upon ‘something that 
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167 For other religions can claim to be religions of grace in this sense. Most striking in this 
regard, Barth notes, are Yodo-Shin and Yodo-Shin-Shu Buddhism. (On Religion, 101ff) 
 
197 
 
 
 
happens to it quite apart from any aptitude or merit.’168 For the very same reason that 
the theologian must criticise Christianity as idolatry first and foremost, he or she must 
also, in Barth’s thinking, affirm that Christianity is the true religion: because it is to the 
Christian religion that revelation is granted. 
 It is important to understand that, for Barth, revelation was never granted to the 
Christian religion in the sense that it became in any way its possession. Rather, it had, at 
each moment, to be granted afresh. ‘That there is a true religion is an event of God’s 
grace in Jesus Christ.’169 Thus, there was no alteration to the intrinsic essence of 
Christian religion, such that it became capable of revelation, and intrinsically, even in 
part, non-idolatrous. The Christian religion was the true religion, in the same way that 
sinners are justified. As the justified sinner is always simul justus et peccator, so too 
was the justified religion always sinful and idolatrous, its righteousness forensic, alien, 
and imputed. Weinrich explains: ‘Wenn in theologischen Sinne etwas gerechtfertigt 
wird, bekommt es gerade nicht Recht, sondern ihm wird Recht zugesprochen...So wie 
der Sünder in seiner Rechtfertigung nicht Recht bekommt, so auch nicht die 
Religion.’170 While the analogy of justified sinner was his most prominent as a way of 
explaining Christianity’s relationship to revelation, Barth also used a number of others, 
all of which communicated roughly the same point: Christianity, according to Barth, is 
the true religion due to the creatio171 and electio172 continua of God, and in analogy to 
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the reality of the assumptio carnis173 and to the way in which the suns shines on a 
specific part of the earth, illuminating but not essentially altering it, while leaving the 
rest of the world in darkness.174 
 
4.3 Critique and Conclusions 
A number of scholars including K. Ward and I. Strenski have criticised Barth’s critique 
of religion as idolatry as expressed in §17 and as discussed above on the grounds that it 
is prideful, triumphalistic and/or imperialistic. Ward writes that Barth’s theology of 
religion is ‘a particularly clear example of human pride and self-interest,’ which, 
‘enables one to dismiss others as of no account and so bask in the superiority of one’s 
own possession of truth.’175 Strenski claims that in Barth’s §17 and in particular his 
discussion of Christianity as the ‘true religion’ he has ‘imperialistic intentions’176 and 
that Barth’s analysis of religion is ‘not only embarrassing, it is offensive to the dignity 
of the spiritual and religious lives of literally billions of fellow human beings.’177  
These criticisms of Barth are, however, without ground, especially in light of the 
fact that Barth criticises all human religion, including the Christian religion, as being 
intrinsically idolatrous. That Christianity is the true religion emphatically does not 
mean, in Barth’s thinking, that truth is its possession: ‘…our Christianity, just to the 
extent that it is our Christianity, a human work undertaken by us and applied to various 
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short and long-term goals…appears on the same level with the human works of other 
religions.’178 In the same reception of revelation which makes Christianity the true 
religion, Christianity learns that it is, intrinsically, on the same level as all other 
religions: like them, it is idolatrous. Thus, that which is the ‘possession’ of the Christian 
religion and its adherents is not truth, and there is, therefore no room, on the part of the 
Christian, for pride or a feeling of superiority vis-à-vis persons of other religions, but, 
rather, only for humility and gratitude for grace. Barth’s critique of religion is 
‘offensive’ because it seeks to repeat the offense of the cross, which involves a 
revelation of the radical sinfulness of all that is human and the folly and idolatry of all 
human attempts to reach God apart from grace. Barth, in fact, places Christianity in 
solidarity with all other religions as much as is possible to do without denying the 
reformed tradition, and, indeed, the biblical witness to the fact that God’s grace is a 
discriminating, electing grace with selects particular recipients – namely, Israel and the 
Church. 
A critique which must be levelled against Barth’s understanding of religion as 
idolatrous comes from a very different, and even opposing, angle. It is highly 
problematic that Barth spoke so strongly of the ongoing justification of true religion (in 
the sense of the imputation of righteousness), but not of its sanctification (in the sense 
of the impartation or infusion of righteousness and revelation), concepts which should 
always be considered together. Barth did speak of some form of the sanctification of 
religion. For him, the sanctification of religion means that it is ‘differentiated and 
singled out, stamped and characterised’179 by the name of Jesus Christ. It is shaped by 
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revelation into creaturely correspondence to Jesus Christ, and this means for him that it 
is made to ‘serve the name Jesus Christ,’180 and to be always concerned to ‘awaken and 
keep alive the remembrance and expectation of’181 Jesus Christ. But none of this meant, 
for Barth, sanctification in the sense of the infusion or impartation of righteousness to 
religion, for this would, in turn, mean the complete or at least partial cessation of 
intrinsic idolatry within religion – something which Barth, who held that religion was 
always idolatry at its very essence, would not allow. The sanctification of religion 
meant, rather, for him, that while religion continued to be, at its essence, idolatry, its 
idolatry was ‘placed under the order of revelation.’182 
 If religion can be justified, then it can also be sanctified. And sanctification 
means more than sin and idolatry being placed under a different ‘order.’ It was Paul’s 
prayer for the Thessalonians, for example, that, ‘the God of peace, sanctify you through 
and through. May your whole spirit, soul and body be kept blameless (ἀμέμπτως) at the 
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.’183 This suggests that sanctification effectuates a 
change in one’s actual life, in that which one does and in that which one leaves undone, 
and that this change involves one’s actions being no longer worthy of blame. Surely this 
speaks of more than the possibility of being a sinner and idolater under a specific 
‘order’; namely, it speaks of the power of God by which one can be delivered from sin 
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and idolatry. And there is at least a significant strand of the NT that presents a stark 
contrast between the essential character of a life prior to receiving God’s grace in Jesus 
Christ and the essential character of that life after having received that grace. Paul 
wrote:  
Or do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do 
not be deceived: Neither the sexually immoral nor idolaters [note that ‘idolaters’ 
are specifically included here, as one descriptor of what some of Paul’s audience 
used to be] nor adulterers nor men who have sex with men nor thieves nor the 
greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will inherit the kingdom of 
God. And that is what some of you were. But you were washed, you were 
sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the 
Spirit of our God.184 
 
Here sanctification is not presented simply as sinners and idolaters in particular being 
‘placed under the order of revelation’185 but as the actual removal and casting off of sin 
and idolatry.  
Righteousness is not only imputed to the one who receives Jesus Christ, but it is 
also imparted to him or her in sanctification, such that one is enabled at least to some 
extent to no longer be an idolater, an adulterer, etc. Once again, sanctification means the 
(at least partial) deliverance from sin and idolatry, such that the sanctified person or 
religion, which was once idolatrous and sinful is no longer so to same degree, or with 
the same level of consistency. The sanctification of religion means that the concepts of 
God and the practices of the religion in the realm of which revelation is given are not 
only imputed with righteousness, they are also imparted with righteousness, such that 
they become, even intrinsically, true concepts and true worship of the true God – and 
thus no longer, or at least no longer to the same extent, idolatrous.  
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The fact that, as has been discussed, Barth’s theology more broadly tended to 
reject the reality of infused righteousness, and the fact that Barth clearly desired to 
maintain that, intrinsically, Christianity was in complete solidarity with all other world 
religions, made it such that he could not accept this understanding of revelation’s affect 
upon true religion. Barth’s emphasis upon the solidarity of the Christian religion with 
other religions need not be completely jettisoned for the sake of the affirmation of the 
infusion of grace in sanctification; Christianity would still depend utterly on grace for 
what truth it did possess; and it would still undoubtedly also be, to some degree, sinful 
and idolatrous.  Yet in failing to affirm the infusion of grace, both in the realm of 
religion and more broadly, Barth failed to fully bear witness to the efficacy of God’s 
grace and revelation, which, as the NT also testifies, does not only impute 
righteousness, but also imparts it.  
 Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry is of great importance for the question of 
the interaction between Christianity and other world religions. Its clearest implication is 
the same whether one upholds Barth’s thought as he presented it, or whether one, 
against Barth, affirms not only the justification of the Christian religion but also its 
sanctification in the most complete and biblical sense. It is an oversimplification when 
Ensminger writes that, Barth in the CD §17 ‘did not have the relationship between 
Christianity and other religions in mind, but reacted against revelation being interpreted 
in the light of religion (singular) and not vice versa.’186 That Barth did the latter is 
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beyond dispute. But it has also already been argued that Barth understood his critique of 
religion as idolatry to apply to particular world religions, and the fact that Barth 
believed that this critique had implications for the interaction between Christianity and 
the world religions is made clear by the fact that, as will be seen below, Barth explicitly 
described what the foremost of those implications were: the necessity and urgency of 
Christian missions and evangelism to the adherents of non-Christian religions. 
 Recent emphasis on the possibilities for using Barth’s theology of religion as a 
resource for inter-religious dialogue, however, may have obscured this most direct 
implication of Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry for Christian interaction with 
persons of other world religions, and the one which he himself drew. Several scholars, 
in recent years, have sought to find in Barth’s theology of religion a resource for inter-
religious dialogue. Important works in this vein include Greggs’ article ‘Bringing 
Barth’s Critique of Religion to the Inter-Religious Table,’187 Chestnutt’s book 
Challenging the Stereotype: The Theology of Karl Barth as a Resource for Inter-
religious Encounter in a European Context,188 and Krötke’s article ‘A New Impetus to 
the Theology of Religions from Karl Barth’s Thought.’189 Barth’s theology of religion, 
as presented in §17 does indeed provide a resource for inter-religious conversation and 
dialogue. It reminds the Christian of his or her solidarity with persons of other religions 
(albeit solidarity in sin and idolatry), and ought, therefore, to engender attitudes of 
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humility and openness towards them. At the same time, it does not ask the Christian to 
compromise his or her convictions merely for the sake of conciliation. It is precisely 
humility which does not involve this kind of compromise of one’s convictions that is 
needed for genuine inter-religious dialogue and conversation.190 Chung, if he has 
something more than a merely historical or factual point in mind, is thus incorrect to 
state that Barth’s theology, ‘does not inspire inter-religious dialogue,’191 as is Kraemer 
when he states that Barth’s theology, ‘…keeps religion and religions in their place, but 
it establishes no contact and no real encounters.’192 
 Yet Barth’s theology of religion and, in particular, his idolatry-critique of 
religion, as he himself made clear, called, most directly and above all, for Christian 
missions and evangelism to persons of other world religions. It is remarkable that 
discussion of the implications of Barth’s theology for Christian engagement with other 
religions has almost completely neglected to mention this; Krötke’s recent article cited 
above, for example, though it contains a section entitled, ‘Christian Faith’s Encounter 
with Religions,’ makes no mention of the need for Christian missions or evangelism. 
Chung goes so far as to state that, ‘Barth is sceptical of any attempt of evangelising any 
ideologies, cultures and other religions…’193 Not only was Barth not sceptical of 
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missions and evangelism to persons of other religions, his theology of religion, and his 
idolatry-critique as levelled against religion, positively demanded them:  
And just as [Christianity] has not taken this light and glory [i.e., the fact that it is 
the true religion] for itself, so also no one can take it away, and it and only it has 
the task and authority for mission, that is, to confront the world of all religions as 
the one true religion, to invite and call upon them with complete self-confidence 
to turn back from their ways, to turn to the Christian way.194 
 
Other religions, for Barth, have been exposed by God’s revelation as idolatry. He was 
willing to say elsewhere that ‘If the ground of divine immanence is sought and 
supposedly found apart from Jesus Christ [and all non-Christian religions are in view 
here] it can signify only our enslavement to a false god.’195 The Christian religion is 
thus compelled to mission, in the hope that those who are adherents of other religions 
might ‘turn to the Christian way’ and overcome idolatry. Of course, by inviting the non-
Christian to ‘turn to the Christian way,’ the Christian is, for Barth, inviting him or her to 
leave behind one form of idolatry for another, for the Christian religion is also a 
religion, and therefore also has idolatry as its essence. The difference, for Barth, is that, 
within the Christian religion, one may expect to encounter God’s revelation, and 
therefore to really know and serve the true and living God.196 
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Responses to Other Faiths,’ in Modern Christian Thought: The Twentieth Century, 2nd Edition 
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 One who takes Barth’s theology of religion as a point of departure may infer a 
qualified affirmation of, and perhaps even summons to, inter-religious dialogue and 
conversation. But one must also say what Barth himself said explicitly in §17: and 
emphatic ‘yes’ to Christian mission and evangelism to other religions, in which human 
beings are held captive to idols.   
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toward universalism, i.e., the view that all are or will be saved. This has led D’Costa to claim, with 
justification, that, ‘Barth overturns these categories by being an exclusivist, inclusivist, and universalist 
all at once.’ (Gavin D’Costa, ‘Theology of Religions,’ in Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology since 1918, Third Edition, ed. David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2005), 630) Barth may be characterised not as a Christian exclusivist, but as a christological exclusivist, 
who holds that knowledge of Christ is to be expected in an ongoing way in the Christian religion, and not 
in other religions. See also on this question, Trevor Hart’s chapter ‘Truth, the Trinity, and Pluralism,’ in 
his Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of his Theology (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 1999), 117-
138. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of Idolatry-Critique, Idolatry, and the Idol in Barth’s Theology 
The theological critique of idolatry was an integral part of Karl Barth’s attempt to bear 
witness to the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as testified to by Holy Scripture. The only 
truly effective critique of idolatry was, for Barth, the critique of Jesus Christ himself 
who, in giving himself to human beings, displaces those aspects of created reality which 
human beings had previously held in roles which properly belong to him alone. Yet 
since Jesus Christ does, in giving himself to human beings, in this way reveal idols as 
such, Barth believed that theology, which must concern itself with testifying to and 
interpreting Jesus Christ’s self-giving, must also contain a critique of idolatry. Not only 
Barth’s idolatry-critique, but also his definition of idolatry (as the human act of 
substituting that which is created for God in God’s revelation) and his understanding of 
the idol (as the created reality so substituted) were, he believed, derived from revelation 
and its authoritative witness, Holy Scripture. 
 It has been seen, furthermore, that Barth’s understanding of the nature of the idol 
and (formally speaking) of the human act of idolatry underwent clarification and 
expansion, but little to no discernible, essential change, throughout his career. The 
unpublished §42, for example, was not excluded from the CD because Barth came to no 
longer understand the nature of the idol in the way in which he had described it there, as 
suggested, for example, by Wüthrich1 and van Wyk.2 The description of the nature of 
the idol offered in in the unpublished §42 is, rather, perfectly reconcilable with Barth’s 
description of the nature of the idol elsewhere, and the real reason why the unpublished 
                                                          
1 Wüthrich, Das Nichtige, 224. 
 
2 Van Wyk, ‘Gatg,’ 1595. 
 
208 
 
 
 
§42 was ultimately excluded from the CD remains an open question.3 And it was 
because Barth’s underlying, formal definition of idolatry remained constant that 
changes in his understanding of the material content of revelation elicited changes in his 
idolatry-critique. This has been demonstrated, for example, in the discussion in 2.2.3 of 
the way in which changes in Barth’s material understanding of revelation elicited 
changes in his idolatry-critique as it related to natural theology. 
 Barth’s critique of and aversion to idolatry played important roles in his 
discussion of a variety of topics, including his discussion of the knowledge of God, the 
doctrine of God, and religion. Within his discussion of the knowledge of God, for 
example, he rejected all natural theology on the grounds that it was idolatrous. Within 
the doctrine of God, it was a desire to correspond to revelation, and thereby avoid 
idolatry, which drove some of Barth’s most innovative decisions vis-à-vis the 
theological tradition, and it was often through a critique of idolatry in traditional 
approaches to the doctrine of God that Barth argued negatively for the necessity of those 
decisions. When it came to Barth’s discussion of religion, two of his major goals were 
to expose as idolatrous both the essence of religion and certain forms of its theological 
usage. Since ‘religion’ was, in his thinking, the generative principle and essential core 
of particular religions, Barth’s critique of religion as idolatry was also meant to apply to 
particular religions, and to be understood as having implications for the interaction of 
the Christian with the adherents of non-Christian religions, the most direct of which was 
                                                          
3 The still unresolved discussion of and debate on the question of why Barth ultimately chose to 
exclude the unpublished §42 from the CD, which cannot be entered into here, has been carried out in the 
German secondary literature, and in particular in the following works: Stoevesandt, ‘GG,’; Hailer, Gott 
und die Götzen; Plonz, Die herrenlosen Gewalten, 317-318; Wüthrich, ‘Das fremde Geheimnis’; 
Wüthrich, Das Nichtige; Krötke, ‘A New Impetus.’  
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the urgency of Christian missions and of enjoining the adherents of non-Christian 
religions to ‘turn to the Christian way.’4 
 
5.2 The Relevance of Barth’s Idolatry-Critique for Contemporary Theology 
At a number of points throughout the present work it has become evident that Barth’s 
idolatry-critique raises, and suggests certain ways of answering, questions of great 
relevance to contemporary theology. Three of these questions will be raised once again 
here for further consideration. 
 
5.2.1 The question of the propriety of natural theology  
Barth’s critique of idolatry calls into question whether, and to what extent, 
contemporary Christian theology ought to offer its endorsement to natural theology. 
Barth’s idolatry-critique as levelled against natural theology suggests that Christian 
theology ought to deny the propriety of natural theology, and insist that the ‘god’ with 
which natural theology is concerned is not God. Many attempts to overcome the 
obstacle that Barth’s critique of natural theology as idolatry presents for the theological 
endorsement of natural theology have been based upon the idea that Barth’s critique 
was the product of extra-theological considerations – the socio-historical circumstances 
of 1930s and 1940s Germany5 or unacknowledged (and now unacceptable) 
philosophical presuppositions,6 for example. The true, theological foundations of 
Barth’s critique of natural theology as idolatry have not been sufficiently reckoned with, 
                                                          
4 Barth, On Religion, 120. 
 
5 E.g., Marquardt, TuS, 263; Webb, RFT, 168; Grant, ‘Unnatural,’ 99; Barr, BFNT, 116. 
 
6 E.g., Grant, ‘Unnatural,’ 96-98; Matthew Rose, ‘Karl Barth’s Failure,’ First Things (June 
2014), http://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/06/karl-barths-failure. 
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and, in part for this reason, it continues to offer a formidable challenge to theological 
proponents of natural theology. 
 As has been seen in chapter 2, Barth’s judgment that natural theology is 
necessarily idolatry emerged from deeply-rooted theological convictions – and 
especially from within his doctrines of sin and salvation. If Barth’s doctrines of sin and 
salvation are accepted, natural theology is, in fact, necessarily idolatry. Barth’s rejection 
of natural theology as idolatry will continue to stand as a significant obstacle to the 
Christian endorsement of natural theology until it is successfully challenged at its 
foundations within these doctrines. The present work has sought to demonstrate one 
problem among them, the correction of which makes allowance for a specific form of 
non-idolatrous natural theology, namely, that which is undertaken by the Christian who 
has been a recipient of special revelation.7 If Christian theology is to give an even 
broader endorsement to natural theology, it will be necessary to go further in critiquing 
and correcting the foundations of Barth’s critique of natural theology as idolatry in his 
doctrines of sin and salvation. 
 
5.2.2 The question of the doctrine of divine incorporeality 
Barth’s critique of idolatry, further, should cause contemporary theology to question the 
traditional doctrine of divine incorporeality and the associated systematic 
spiritualisation of biblical anthropomorphisms. It has been recounted that, according to 
Barth, avoiding idolatry within the doctrine of God requires serious and sustained 
consideration of the anthropomorphisms and anthropoieticisms which are found within 
the biblical description of God and the rejection of that principle of spiritualisation. If it 
                                                          
7 See 2.3 of the present work. 
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is accepted that the avoidance of idolatry requires this, this would mean that the task for 
theologians working within the doctrine of God when it comes to the matter of biblical 
anthropomorphisms would not be to seek to understand and articulate their supposedly 
more real, spiritual significance, such that they themselves might then be discarded. It 
would be, rather, (1) to uphold and interpret them as genuine objects of inquiry and 
reflection in their own right, and, (2) to articulate in what sense God is corporeal, 
possessing an arm, a face, etc., on the one hand, and in what sense God is ‘Spirit’ (John 
4.24), on the other, such that ‘corporeal’ and ‘spiritual,’ predicates of God, are not 
understood to be mutually exclusive. The idea that they need not be is not unknown to 
the theological tradition. Tertullian, for one, took it for granted that they were not: ‘For 
who will deny that God is body, even though ‘God is spirit’? For spirit is a particular 
kind of body in its own image.’8 Articles by Paulsen9 and Stroumsa10 have further 
documented the presence of a strand of early Christian theology which affirmed the 
corporeality of God.  
Departure from the traditional doctrine of divine incorporeality need not be 
understood to entail the acceptance of the kind of corporeal understanding of God which 
                                                          
8 Tertullian, Against Praxeas, trans. Alexander Souter (London: SPCK, 1920), 42. Undoubtedly, 
it was a conception of ‘spirit’ influenced by Stoicism which Tertullian held, and which allowed him to 
understand ‘spirit’ as not being exclusive of corporeality. 
 
9 David L. Paulsen, ‘Early Christian Belief in a Corporeal Deity: Origen and Augustine as 
Reluctant Witnesses,’ Harvard Theological Review 83, 2 (1990): 105-116. Paulsen’s thesis runs as 
follows: ‘The view that God is incorporeal, without body or parts, has been the hallmark of Christian 
orthodoxy, but in the beginning it was not so...I show that ordinary Christians for at least the first three 
centuries of the current era commonly (and perhaps generally) believed God to be corporeal. The belief 
was abandoned (and then only gradually) as Neoplatonism became more and more entrenched as the 
dominant world view of Christian thinkers.’ (105) He further argues for an understanding of God as 
corporeal in the thought of the 2nd century Melito of Sardis. (111-113) 
 
10 Guy G. Stroumsa, ‘Form(s) of God: Some Notes on Metatron and Christ,’ Harvard 
Theological Review 76, 3 (1983): 269-288. Stroumsa focusses upon rabbinic thought concerning 
corporeal anthropomorphisms, but also discusses the segment of the early Christian tradition which 
accepted corporeal anthropomorphisms within the doctrine of God without the principled attempt to 
spiritualise them.   
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applies the predicates of body, finger, hand, etc., to God univocally, such that it is 
thought that one, by the mere examination of, e.g., a human hand, can understand what 
it means that God has a hand. This is the type of affirmation of divine corporeality 
which existed in the popular religion of antiquity (and, indeed, in a widespread manner 
in early Christianity, if Paulsen is to be believed11), and which was rightly made the 
target of the early philosophical critique of religion and of the critique of early 
spiritualising Christian theologians.12 On the contrary, the kind of affirmation of divine 
corporeality Barth’s idolatry-critique calls theologians to consider has as a basic 
underlying assumption the idea that no concept derived from the created world can be 
univocally applied to God; nor, indeed, can any concept be applied to God even 
analogically apart from the instruction of revelation. Instead, the human being must be 
taught by revelation and Holy Scripture both which concepts to predicate of God, and 
how those predicates must be understood when applied to God. What it means that God 
has a hand can by no means be grasped by mere observation of a human hand. This 
point may be clarified by the assertion that the fact, according to Scripture, God has a 
hand, a face, a finger, etc., does not mean that God has ‘flesh and bones,’ just as (to 
answer a question of Wittgenstein’s) the fact that God has an eye (2 Chron. 16.9; 1 
                                                          
11 Paulsen, ‘Early Christian Belief in a Corporeal Deity.’ 
 
12 See, e.g., Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata or Miscellanies, trans. William Wilson 
(Savage, MN: Lighthouse, 2015). Clement, himself an incorporealist, wrote: ‘Now, as the Greeks 
represent the gods as possessing human forms, so also do they as possessing human passions. And as 
each of them depict their forms similar to themselves…’ and goes on to cite the critique of Xenophanes to 
the same effect. (517) Elsewhere, he gives an appreciative overview of the philosophical critique of 
ancient popular religion on the ground that it understood God to exist in the same form as human beings. 
(369ff) The kind of corporeal understanding of God that Xenophanes and Clement were concerned to 
contest should not be accepted. In the present day, this seems to be the understanding of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the tradition from out of which Paulsen writes), whose Doctrine and 
Covenants (130.22) states that: ‘The Father has a body of flesh and bones as tangible as man’s; the Son 
also...’ 
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Peter 3.12) does not mean that one ought to speak of God’s eyebrows.13 In both cases, 
Scripture asserts the former, but not the latter. To assert the latter on the basis of the 
former is to assume that God has a hand, a face, a finger, an eye, etc., in the same way 
in which human beings have them, and this is not warranted. If the traditional doctrine 
of incorporeality is left behind, the proper distance between Creator and creature should 
be maintained by the affirmation that the way in which a predicate applies to God – 
whether that predicate be spiritual or corporeal – is analogous to the way in which it 
applies to created being. 
Further, if it is accepted that the avoidance of idolatry requires that the 
traditional doctrine of divine incorporeality and the systematic spiritualisation of 
corporeal images of God be left behind, this also would not necessarily imply that 
corporeal images should have a role within the doctrine of God which is equal to that of 
the non-corporeal, spiritual divine attributes – though it is also not clear a priori that 
they should not, or, indeed, that they should not have an even greater role than them. To 
settle the question of whether corporeal or spiritual predicates should predominate in the 
description of God, or whether they ought to be equally balanced, a priori, is to allow a 
non-revealed principle to usurp the proper place of revelation, and, therefore, to commit 
idolatry. If idolatry is to be avoided, Barth would urge, revelation and Holy Scripture 
must settle this question. 
 
5.2.3 The question of metaphysics in theology 
Barth’s critique of idolatry, further, raises, and suggests a way of answering, the 
question of metaphysics within theology. In recent years there has emerged, from within 
                                                          
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious 
Belief (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1966), 71: ‘Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in connection with the 
Eye of God?’ 
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certain quarters, a call to rid theology in general, and the doctrine of God in particular, 
of metaphysics, at least partially on the grounds that metaphysical images of God are 
idols. Exemplary of this call is Kevin Hector’s 2011 book Theology without 
Metaphysics,14 throughout the course of which Hector links metaphysical doctrines of 
God with idolatry. Barth’s evaluation of metaphysics and their relationship to idolatry 
gives contemporary theologians reason to be circumspect regarding such calls. 
 While Barth believed that the use of metaphysics in theology and the doctrine of 
God in particular was, strictly speaking, always idolatrous, he also believed that the 
same was inevitable. The most important question, for Barth, was whether a particular 
doctrine of God was metaphysical in the right way – i.e., was a venture in metaphysics 
which corresponded to revelation – and it might, therefore, be hoped that God would 
give Godself to be the object of its description and its victory over idolatry. Barth’s 
theology raises the question of whether calls to dispense with metaphysics are not 
misleading in suggesting that metaphysics can be avoided, and whether such calls are 
not always, necessarily, ultimately calls only for the leaving behind of a specific form of 
metaphysics, and (even if only implicitly) for the acceptance of another. 
 In the case of Hector, early on in his book he admits that he is not really 
attempting to argue for a theology free from metaphysics in the broadest sense of that 
term (the sense which Barth usually assumed), but rather only a certain type of 
metaphysics,15 namely, what he calls ‘essentialist-correspondentist metaphysics.’16 
While Hector affirms that his proposals may be understood as a revised form of 
                                                          
14 Kevin Hector, Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language and the Spirit of Recognition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
 
15 Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 3. 
 
16 Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 9. 
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metaphysics,17 he clearly believes that they lead to the avoidance of idolatry,18 and he 
critiques as idolatrous, throughout his book, only the specific type of metaphysics that 
he has in mind in using that term. If it be granted, as in the case of Hector, that the call 
to dispense with metaphysics within theology can ultimately only be a call to dispense 
with a certain kind or certain kinds of metaphysics (namely, those which are idolatrous), 
Barth’s critique of idolatry poses the further question of whether the problem of idolatry 
might be a problem not with a certain kind of metaphysics, but, rather, with metaphysics 
themselves, such that the a priori dispensing with a certain form of metaphysics cannot 
aid in the task of overcoming idolatry.19 A serious reckoning with Barth’s idolatry-
critique in relation to metaphysics causes one to ask seriously whether it might be 
salutary for theology to give up on the attempt to overcome metaphysical idolatry by 
seeking to jettison either metaphysics in general or particular forms of it which are 
purportedly (particularly) idolatrous, and to, rather, embrace the fact that theology is 
unavoidably an exercise in metaphysics, dependent upon divine grace for the 
overcoming of the idolatry typically resident therein. 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 3. 
 
18 Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 211. 
 
19 Barth would claim that all metaphysics are, as such, intrinsically idolatrous, but that 
metaphysics can be undertaken in correspondence to revelation and thereby have hope that God will give 
Godself to be their object and their victory over idolatry, and thus that the question of which forms 
metaphysics are to be used in theology cannot be determined a priori. The present work, though it 
suggests something slightly stronger, namely, that metaphysical efforts, when they are undertaken in 
service of revelation, can be intrinsically non-idolatrous, nevertheless ultimately suggests the same thing: 
that which forms of metaphysics should and should not be used in theology and the doctrine of God 
should not be based on an a priori determination that a certain form of metaphysics is idolatrous (since a 
priori, not taken up and transformed as part of the attempt to testify to revelation, all metaphysics are 
idolatrous), but, rather, that the use or non-use of a certain form of metaphysics can only be determined 
by whether or not the ongoing attempt to bear obedient witness to revelation requires one to take it up. 
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5.3 The Example of Barth’s Idolatry-Critique 
Barth’s idolatry-critique should be considered not only with an eye to the questions its 
raises and helps answer, but also with an eye to the example that it offers, for 
contemporary theology. Barth’s understanding of idolatry and his idolatry-critique are 
marked, above all, by the fact that they are derived from concrete, historical, special 
revelation – Jesus Christ as testified to by Holy Scripture – and that his idolatry-critique 
has as its goal bearing witness to the uniqueness of that same revelation. Idolatry, for 
him, must be defined and critiqued as the replacement of God’s self-giving in Jesus 
Christ. 
In this, Barth’s idolatry-critique and his understanding of idolatry differ rather 
widely from those of thinkers like Paul Tillich, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, and, more 
recently, Mark Johnston. Idolatry, in these thinkers is, de-particularised (from the 
perspective of Barth), and understood not as the replacement of Jesus Christ with a 
substitute, but rather as the replacement of, or, more generally, as a sin against, a more 
abstract conception of deity or true religion. Thus Tillich’s criticism of idolatry, which 
is born of an attempt to bear witness not to the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, but, rather, to 
the transcendence  of ‘the Holy’: ‘All idolatry is nothing else than the absolutizing of 
symbols of the Holy, and making them identical with the Holy itself.’20 For Tillich, the 
Holy is not Jesus Christ; instead, Jesus Christ is one such symbol of the Holy, the 
identification of which with the Holy is idolatry.21 Thus also Cantwell Smith’s 1987 
argument that idolatry in the sense of false worship does not exist, since all human 
worship is worship of ‘the Transcendent,’ the only true idolatry being the absolutisation 
                                                          
20 Paul Tillich, ‘Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God,’ The Christian Scholar 38, 3 
(1955): 193. 
 
21 Paul Tillich, The New Being (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 133. 
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of one religion or theology over and against the others.22 And thus, more recently Mark 
Johnston’s claim in his 2009 book Saving God: Religion after Idolatry, that idolatry is, 
among other things, ‘the attempt to evade or ignore the demanding core of true religion: 
radical self-abandonment to the Divine as manifested in the turn toward others and 
toward objective reality.’23 
Less particular definitions of idolatry like these (and their corresponding forms 
of the critique of idolatry) undoubtedly carry certain advantages with them. Most 
notably they seem, at least on the surface, to not only not detract from, but in fact to 
help promote, inter-religious and inter-disciplinary dialogue and cooperation. The 
theological critique of idolatry thus understood, far from necessarily implicating the 
forms of worship and conceptions of deity of other world religions and therefore being a 
potential impediment to inter-religious dialogue can, in fact, become a grounds of inter-
religious agreement, as long as one’s definition of ‘the Holy,’ ‘the Transcendent,’ or 
true religion, is broad enough to include the deity and the religion of persons of other 
religions – as is indeed the case in Tillich, Cantwell Smith, and Johnston. And 
according to such a conception of idolatry, far from, for example, philosophical 
conceptions of deity having to be judged as idolatrous from the perspective of theology, 
philosophical and theological forms of idolatry-critique can be allies. 
While it is not difficult to understand why this state of affairs might be desirable, 
Barth’s particularistic definition and critique of idolatry calls on theologians to consider 
whether fidelity to Jesus Christ as testified to by Holy Scripture as the source and object 
                                                          
22 See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, ‘Idolatry: In Comparative Perspective,’ in The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Religions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005), 53-68. 
 
23 Mark Johnston, Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 24. A particularly notable recent analysis of idolatry which does not de-particularise the 
critique of idolatry is Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit’s book Idolatry, trans. Naomi Goldblum 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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of theology might call for defining idolatry in a manner more akin to his own definition. 
Not only does Barth exemplify a particularistic understanding and critique of idolatry 
which contrasts with these de-particularised versions, his version of the critique of 
idolatry would also implicate these de-particularised ones in itself. Since Jesus Christ is 
the proper source and object of all theology according to Barth, he would have 
understood theological idolatry-critiques which are driven by reflection upon and the 
desire to bear witness to more abstract conceptions of deity or true religion to have an 
idolatrous substitution already undergirding them. It was, for Barth, only through 
idolatry-critique derived more strictly from Jesus Christ and Scripture that one could 
hope for the true overcoming of idolatry.  
Adopting a particularistic theological critique of idolatry à la Barth could 
complicate (though it would not eliminate) the prospects for inter-disciplinary and inter-
religious dialogue. It would likely mean, as it did in Barth’s own thinking, that the 
critique of idolatry would have to be levelled against the world of non-Christian 
religions, and against conceptions of deity derived otherwise than from Jesus Christ and 
Holy Scripture (as, for example, philosophical conceptions of God, by definition, are).24 
It would likely mean, further, that missions to persons of other religions would come to 
take priority over inter-religious dialogue. Yet, in the question of how the theological 
critique of idolatry should be understood, the desire to not problematise the prospects 
for extra-theological conversation should surely not be more pressing than the desire to 
remain faithful to theology’s object. The important question implicitly raised by Barth, 
                                                          
24 Barth himself clearly understood this. It has been seen particularly in chapter 3 that Barth 
evaluated philosophical conceptions of deity as idolatrous, and, further, it has been seen in chapter 4 that 
Barth believed that his critique of idolatry had to be levelled not just against ‘religion’ but also against 
particular world religions (contra Loy, ‘Relation of Christianity,’ 269; Lai, ‘Theology of Religion,’ 250; 
Harrison, ‘Non-Christian Religions,’ 215; and Aagaard, ‘Revelation and Religion,’ 158). 
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once more, is whether or not such faithfulness might require adopting a particularistic 
critique of idolatry like his own. 
 
5.4 A Problem with Barth’s Idolatry-Critique 
Even if Barth’s particularistic understanding and critique of idolatry is accepted in 
general, it need not necessarily be accepted in all its details. A problematic aspect of his 
understanding of idolatry is that it seems that, according to it, all human activity is, 
intrinsically, wholly idolatrous. In chapter 2 it was argued that Barth was mistaken in 
believing that the critique of idolatry had to be levelled against all natural theology – 
including natural theology undertaken by the person who has been a recipient of special 
revelation. In chapter 3 it was argued that Barth was mistaken in holding that all human 
doctrines of God are, without exception, wholly idolatrous intrinsically. And in chapter 
4 it was argued that Barth was mistaken in claiming that no religion – including the 
‘true religion’ – could ever be intrinsically true, but that all religions are, rather, always 
wholly idolatrous intrinsically. For the same reason that Barth held natural theology, 
human doctrines of God, and all religion to be intrinsically idolatrous, he also held all 
human activity in general to be intrinsically idolatrous: namely because, due to effects 
of the fall, God cannot be the intrinsic object of any human worship (and all human 
activity is worship) and, therefore, some substitute must be. 
Idolatry, for Barth, could be overcome in the event of the divine act, but it was 
not abrogated or destroyed (either in whole or in part) within actual human life, i.e., 
within the realm of concrete human action. That idolatry is never abrogated or 
destroyed within actual human life, or, phrased positively, that all human action is 
intrinsically idolatrous, means that human thought, speech, and action, always, 
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considered according to their intrinsic nature, afford to that which is not God in God’s 
revelation roles which belong only to God in God’s revelation. That idolatry can 
nevertheless be overcome means that God, in the event of revelation, comes to possess 
those roles in spite of this fact. In other words, revelation causes human worship to have 
God in God’s revelation as its object not by intrinsically altering it, at least not in a way 
that perdures outwith the event of revelation, such that God becomes its intrinsic object 
and the ability to truly worship God becomes a human possession (destroying or 
eliminating idolatry). Rather, in the event of revelation it is granted to human worship to 
have God as its object, in spite of the fact that its intrinsic object is not God 
(overcoming idolatry).  
The fact that, on Barth’s account, all human activity is, intrinsically, wholly 
idolatrous is the product of a deficiency in his hamartiology and soteriology: namely, 
his unwillingness to understand sanctification as involving infused or imparted grace or 
righteousness, the human reception of which affects not just the momentary overcoming 
of idolatry, but also its elimination by way of the perduring alteration it makes to the 
intrinsic features of human life and worship. To be sure, Barth could speak of 
sanctification, and even of a resultant human righteousness.25 Grace did, for him, bring 
about a perduring alteration in the intrinsic character of human action, speech and 
thought, causing them to ‘correspond’ to itself.26 This human correspondence, or human 
righteousness brought about by sanctification, is, however, held by Barth to exist in 
‘unconquerable distinction’ from divine righteousness.27 In fact, in light of the 
                                                          
25 See especially Barth, TCL, §78, which is entitled, ‘The Struggle for Human Righteousness.’ 
 
26 Once more see Barth, TCL, §78 for an example of Barth’s use of the language of human 
‘correspondence’ to revelation or grace to describe the reality created in the human moral life by grace. 
 
27 Barth, TCL, 264-265. See also pp. 244-245. 
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foregoing argument of the present work, the human righteousness or correspondence to 
grace which is the result of sanctification should be understood to be, in Barth, 
ultimately a particular form of unrighteousness, sin and idolatry – unrighteousness, sin 
and idolatry ‘placed under the order of revelation’28 – and not, to any degree, their 
elimination. 
This denial of the impartation of righteousness on Barth’s part has wide-ranging 
implications for his theology as a whole, since his soteriology provides the basic pattern 
for much of what he says concerning the encounter of God in God’s revelation and the 
world – and, therefore, what he believes the theologian must say about the world.  Much 
of Barth’s discussion of the encounter between God in God’s revelation and the created 
world (whether in the realm of theology, the realm of religion, or some other) may be 
understood as the strict application of the reformed doctrine of justification without 
(and, at times, even with an explicit repudiation of the propriety of) a corresponding 
application of the doctrine of sanctification as infused or imparted righteousness. Thus 
Barth’s misstep in denying sanctification as infused righteousness very likely had 
consequences not only for his idolatry-critique as deployed within the realms of the 
doctrine of the knowledge of God, the doctrine of God, and the discussion of religion, 
but also for what he said on a number of other topics (e.g., ecclesiology). Barth’s 
soteriology, and his doctrine of sanctification in particular, have been the subject of a 
good deal of secondary literature,29 but the apparent absence of a conception of 
                                                          
28 Barth, On Religion, 125. Even in TCL, §78, where Barth appears at his most positive 
concerning the possibility of human righteousness, he makes sure to clarify that, ‘The only point is that in 
spite of their situation [that of those who practise human righteousness] of shared guilt and oppression 
they have been required and empowered to pray for the coming of the kingdom.  This is what 
differentiates them from all other people.’ (267) 
 
29 Works of secondary literature which address the topic of Barth’s soteriology, and specifically 
his doctrine of sanctification, include, among others, Fred H. Klooster, ‘Aspects of the Soteriology of 
Karl Barth,’ Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society 2 (1959): 6-14; John Webster, Barth’s Ethics 
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sanctification as infused righteousness in Barth is still in need of critique and correction: 
not only because of its implications for what would traditionally be discussed under the 
heading of soteriology, but also because of its implications for Barth’s theology more 
broadly.30 
For the present, it must suffice to say that Barth’s problematic doctrine of 
sanctification caused him to arrive at problematic conclusions within his discussion of 
idolatry: especially his assertion of its utter inescapability. Whether or not one accepts 
Barth’s particularistic understanding and critique of idolatry, Barth’s doctrine of 
sanctification, which denies imparted righteousness should not be accepted, nor should 
his associated claim that idolatry can never be abrogated or eliminated in the actual life 
of the human being, to any degree. Rather, even if one accepts Barth’s very strong 
doctrine of the depravity of humanity post-lapsum,31  one should also affirm that 
sanctification reverses the effects of the fall, and that, as a result of encountering grace 
and revelation, human beings may become no longer depraved, sinful or idolatrous, or 
at least no longer so to the same degree or with the same level of consistency. By the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; John Webster, Barth’s Moral 
Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Nigel Biggar, The 
Hastening that Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Adam Neder, Participation 
in Christ: An Entry into Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2009); Sonderegger, ‘Sanctification as Impartation in the Doctrine of Karl Barth’; Daniel L. Migliore, 
‘Participatio Christi: The Central Theme of Barth’s Doctrine of Sanctification,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische 
Theologie 18,3 (2002): 286-307; George Hunsinger, ‘A Tale of Two Simultaneities: Justification and 
Sanctification in Calvin and Barth,’ Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 18, 3 (2002): 316-338; Clifford 
Blake Anderson, ‘The Problem of Psychologism in Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Sanctification,’ Zeitschrift 
für dialektische Theologie 18, 3 (2002): 339-352; Nimmo, Being in Action; Ethan A. Worthington, The 
Claim of God: Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Sanctification in His Earlier Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 
2015). 
 
30 Perhaps, too, some might want to take issue with Barth’s even more fundamental decision to 
make soteriology (narrowly defined as the doctrines of justification and sanctification) the pattern for 
what theology must say about the encounter of God in God’s revelation with the world in general. 
 
31 This, of course, is not beyond questioning, and some may find it necessary to follow in the 
steps of Alan M. Fairweather (The Word as Truth: A Critical Examination of the Christian Doctrine of 
Revelation in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth (London: Lutterworth, 1944), 54ff) by also 
critiquing it. 
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impartation or infusion of grace and revelation, human knowledge of God can truly and 
intrinsically be knowledge of God, and not knowledge of an idol; human doctrines of 
God, truly and intrinsically doctrines of God, and not of an idol; human religious 
attempts to conceptualise God truly conceptualisations of God; and human religious-
moral strivings truly and intrinsically acts of worship of and bearing witness to God. 
And Christian theology, since revelation is truly imparted to it, can displace idols, not 
with another idol, but with revelation. 
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